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MEMOIRS

OF THE

HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF

NAPOLEON,

36397 ac

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY;

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

VOL. I.

DICTATED TO GENERAL GOURGAUD,

HIS AIDE-DE-CAMP.

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OF THE EDITORS.

DURING the last seven years much has been written respecting Napoleon; all have wished to say what they knew of him; many have said what they did not know.

Statesmen, soldiers, and authors of all nations have been desirous of passing judgment upon him; every body has spoken, except himself. At length he also breaks silence, and in the most solemn manner.

At the time of his abdication at Fontainebleau, he said to the remains of his old legions, "*I will record the deeds we have performed* "*together;*" but the rapid succession of events which led to the revolution of the 20th of March, did not permit him to write his memoirs at the Isle of Elba; nor was he able to fulfil the promise given at Fontainebleau, until he arrived at Saint-Helena.

Too active to delay for an instant the execution of a project on which he had determined, he did not even wait till he arrived at the rock

of exile; on board the vessel which carried him thither he commenced his memoirs.

He employed the six years of his captivity in writing the account of the twenty years of his political life. So constantly was he occupied in this undertaking, that to describe the labour he bestowed upon it, would almost be to write the history of his life at Saint-Helena.

He seldom wrote himself; impatient at the pen which refused to follow the rapidity of his thoughts.

When he wished to write an account of any event, he caused the generals who surrounded him to investigate the subject; and when all the materials were collected, he dictated to them extempore.

Napoleon revised the manuscript, correcting it with his own hand: he often dictated it anew; and still more frequently recommenced a whole page in the margin. These manuscripts, entirely covered with his writing, have been carefully preserved, because nothing which comes from so celebrated a man will be indifferent in the eyes of posterity; and they constitute an unquestionable proof of authenticity.

Napoleon had requested that all new works

should be sent to him from France; some of them reached him. He read them with eagerness, particularly those which were published against him. Lampoons and libels only excited in him a smile of contempt; but when he met with passages in important works, in which his policy had been mistaken or misinterpreted, he defended himself with his usual vivacity. He would read the passage several times over: then, folding his arms, and walking up and down with more or less rapidity according to the degree in which he felt excited, he would dictate a reply; but in the course of a few sentences, hurried away by the force of his imagination, he almost always forgot both the author and his book, and was entirely absorbed by the fact itself to which the work related.

Napoleon considered these notes as constituting materials for his memoirs; they are the more interesting, because, being the fruits of an unpremeditated dictation, the author's ideas lie on the surface; and because they throw a light on events the particulars of which have hitherto remained unknown. We have therefore made a separate collection of them.

Like Cæsar and Frederic, Napoleon writes in the third person; he was not very solicitous about his style: the truth of facts, and the de-

sire to make known to his contemporaries and to posterity, the motives which governed his actions,—such were the objects to which he seems to have directed his attention.

In publishing these memoirs, we are under no apprehension of being confounded with the editors of works intended to awaken hostile feelings and to irritate party spirit. Here, every thing bears the grave character of History; and of all possible publications on our memorable times, the Memoirs of Napoleon will be the most important and remarkable; an honourable monument to the glory of France, and calculated rather to calm than to excite the passions.

This work is written with the impartiality which history requires; but as it may be possible that in the absence of materials the illustrious historian may have sometimes fallen into error, we shall conceive we are fulfilling his intentions, by opening the door to explanation. We shall consider it our duty to collect such elucidations as we may receive; and shall publish them whenever they are of historical importance, and supported by unquestionable documents.

EXPLANATION OF THE FRONTISPIECE.

1. Fac-Simile of the Rough Draft of Napoleon's Letter to the Prince Regent.
2. General Gourgaud's Attestation of its Authenticity.
3. Fair Copy of Napoleon's Rough Draft.

Translation of Napoleon's Letter.

Royal Highness,

Exposed to the factions which divide my country, and to the enmity of the great powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career: and I come, like Themistocles, to seek the hospitality of the British nation. I place myself under the protection of its laws, which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.

(Signed,) Napoleon.

Translation of General Gourgaud's Attestation.

Rough Draft, entirely in the hand-writing of the Emperor Napoleon, of the letter addressed to the Prince Regent of England, with which he despatched me from the Isle of Aix, the 14th of July in the year 1815.

Island of St. Helena.

(Signed,) The General of Artillery and Aide de Camp to the Emperor,

Baron Gourgaud.

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FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY CALENDAR.

(ADOPTED IN 1793.)

	French Months.	*Signification.*	*English months.*
Autumn	1 Vendemiaire	Vintage	Sept. 22
	2 Brumaire	Foggy	Oct. 22
	3 Frimaire	Frosty or Sleety	Nov. 21
Winter	4 Nivose	Snowy	Dec. 21
	5 Pluviose	Rainy	Jan. 20
	6 Ventose	Windy	Feb. 19
Spring	7 Germinal	Springing or Budding	Mar. 21
	8 Floreal	Flowery	Apr. 20
	9 Prairial	Hay Harvest	May 20
Summer	10 Messidor	Corn Harvest	June 19
	11 Thermidor	Hot	July 19
	12 Fructidor	Fruit	Aug. 18

ERRATA.

PAGE 2, LINE 24, *for* bridge, *read* point.
9, —— 19, *for* which covers, *read* the rideau of.
16, —— 3, *for* headlands, *read* hillocks.
19, —— 10, *for* mountains, *read Montagne.**
19, —— 20, *for* was entirely governed by interested motives, *read* understood nothing but denunciations.
20, —— 28, *for* . . . . . *read* painters.
35, —— 3, 4, *for* reported, *read* denounced.
39, —— 1, *for* has been, *read* should be.
45, —— 24, *for* 20th, *read* 29th.
108, —— 8, *for* military chest, *read* public treasury.
118, —— 7, *for* at the head, &c. *read* in the treasury, at the head of the department of Exterior Relations.
171, —— 28, *for* promontory, *read* hill.
181, —— 13, *after* 20th of June, *read* forty days.
194, —— 18, 19, 20, *for* passed the Lech, &c. at Augsburg, *read* and arrived, &c. at Augsburg to pass the Lech there.
Ib. —— 28, *for* wait for, *read* come up with.

* A name given to the faction of Robespierre, &c.

MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON.

SIEGE OF TOULON.

First operations of the Army of Italy in 1792—Expedition against Sardinia—Toulon delivered up to the English—Plan of attack adopted against Toulon—Siege and taking of the place—Hints on the fortification of coasts—Fortifying of the shores of the Mediterranean—Taking of Saorgio—Positions of the French Army—Napoleon accused—Action of Cairo—Montenotte—Napoleon goes to Paris—Kellerman commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy—Schérer—Loano.

On the 28th of September, 1792, General Anselme, at the head of an army of between 12 and 15,000 men, passed the Var; took possession of Nice and of the fort of Montalbano, called the Castle of Villa Franca,

almost without resistance. The attack on Chamberry by General Montesquiou, appearing more pressing, had drawn the attention of the Court of Sardinia, which had given up defending the line of the Var, and had placed its line of defence in the county of Nice, occupying the camp of Utelle on the right, of Lentosca in the centre, and of Raus, and Fourches, at Saorgio, on the left.

The French army found the forts of Montalbano and Villa Franca completely lined with artillery, either from the abandonment of these places not having been resolved on by the enemy until the very last moment, or from their unwillingness to alarm the surrounding country by the removal of the cannon.

At the latter end of the year Sospello was taken: it was afterwards retaken by the enemy, but in November it fell again into the hands of the French; in whose possession it finally remained.

The head-quarters of the van-guard were advanced to Scarena; possession was obtained of Breglio, and thus a bridge was secured on the Roya.

The line of the Sardinian camps, or the position of Saorgio, was in itself impregnable. The enemy fortified themselves there, and

availed themselves of the road of the Col di Tende to carry with them a great quantity of cannon. Discouraged by the ill success of their attacks on our positions at Sospello, they now left us there unmolested.

The two armies remained a considerable time in sight of each other, each maintaining its position. The engineers constructed a bridge on piles across the Var, the boundary of ancient France. The source, the centre, and the mouth of this river are defended by the fortresses of Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes—all constructed by Vauban. The river is fordable; but when it is swollen by rains, or melted snow, it becomes broad, deep, and rapid. The force of the waters occasions at such times considerable stoppages at the piers of the bridges; the piles require frequent repairs.

The defence of the heights of Nice was intrusted to the artillery: thirty pieces of cannon were planted upon them, forming batteries supported on the Paglione, a small stream which takes its rise among the lesser mountains of the third range, and washes the walls of the city. These arrangements would enable Nice to be maintained for some time.

Our military attached but little importance

to these works, for they thought that if we should be menaced in Nice, the enemy would advance on the Var, and the instant that they should turn us, we should be forced to evacuate the city and recross the Var.

General Biron succeeded General Anselme in the command of the Army of Italy: he remained only a short time, and was succeeded by General Brunet, a man of an active and enterprising spirit. This General, proud of having from 20 to 25,000 picked men under his command, and burning with impatience and zeal, resolved on the 8th of June 1793, to attack the enemy. His aim was to force them into the plain, to possess himself of the county of Nice, and to take up a position in the great chain of mountains that compose the Alps. With this design he made divers attacks on the enemy's camps, in which the French troops did every thing that could be done. The enemy were driven from all their insulated positions, but took refuge in those of the centre, which were impregnable. The general, with foolish obstinacy, persisted in fresh attacks on this point, the result of which was the destruction of all the flower of our own troops, without any proportionate loss on the side of the enemy:—we were every where repulsed, nor could it have been otherwise.

At the commencement of the winter of 1793, the Army of Italy had experienced another check: the first maritime expedition that the republic attempted, the expedition against Sardinia, covered us with shame. Never, indeed, was an expedition planned with such want of forethought and so little talent.

Admiral Truguet, who commanded the squadron, was master of the sea. He had attacked and burnt the little town of Oneglia, which belonged to the King of Sardinia, and the outrages committed on that occasion by his men had filled all Italy with horror.

Some thought that the expedition against Sardinia was proposed by this Admiral; others that it was by the Executive Council; but in either case he was charged with its management and direction.

The General of the Army of Italy was to furnish him with troops: he did not choose to give him those that had passed the Var; he therefore placed at his disposal 4 or 5000 men from the Marseillese phalanx, who were still at Marseilles. General Paoli, who commanded in Corsica, furnished also three battalions of troops of the line, which were in that island. The Marseillese phalanx was as undisciplined as it was cowardly; the officers were no bet-

ter than the men; and they carried along with them all sorts of revolutionary disorder and excess. Nothing could be expected from such rabble; but the three battalions drawn out of the twenty-third division were chosen troops.

In the course of December, the Admiral sailed to Corsica; he manœuvred so unsuccessfully that he lost many of his frigates and first-rates, and among others the *Vengeur*, an entirely new vessel of 80 guns, which grounded in entering Ajaccio. The Admiral, however, imagining himself all-sufficient, took very little trouble about appointing a general to command the troops by land, though that was in fact the most important and decisive operation for the expedition. He found in Corsica Brigadier-general Casa Bianca, afterwards one of the Senate; a brave man but without experience, and who had never served in the line. The Admiral, without knowing any thing of this man, took him along with him, and gave him the command of the troops. With such generals and such troops the expedition proceeded to Cagliari.

Nevertheless as the squadron had staid more than two months in Corsica, and as the nature of the expedition was moreover publicly known in the port of Marseilles, all Sardinia was in

alarm, all its troops were mustered, and every measure taken to repel the attack.

In the course of February 1793, the French troops landed, in spite of the fire of the batteries which defended the shores of Cagliari. The next morning, by break of day, a regiment of Sardinian dragoons charged the Marseillese advanced posts, who, instead of meeting them, took to flight, crying "Treason:" they massacred an excellent officer of the line, who had been chosen to conduct them. This dragoon regiment would have cut off all the Marseillese phalanx, had not the three battalions of the line from Corsica stopped the charge, and given the Admiral time to re-embark his troops without farther loss. He then returned to Toulon, after having lost many other vessels, which were burnt by his own orders, on the shores of Cagliari.

There was, in reality, no object whatsoever in this expedition: its pretended aim was to facilitate the arrival of corn from Africa into Provence, where it was much wanted; and even to procure it in the island of Corsica, so fertile in grain. But in that case the Executive Council ought to have made choice of a general officer fitted for the command, and have given him artillery-officers and engineers

of sufficient ability, with several troops of cavalry and horse-artillery. Instead of mere revolutionary levies, the troops ought to have consisted of 15,000 effective men. The blame was afterwards laid upon the general who commanded the Army of Italy, but that was unjust; this general disapproved the expedition, and studied the interest of the Republic in reserving the troops of the line to defend the frontier and the county of Nice. He was tried, and perished on the scaffold, under the pretext of his having been guilty of treason, both in Sardinia and Toulon; he was, however, innocent of it in either place.

The squadron was composed of good vessels, completely manned with able seamen; but they were undisciplined and riotous like the Marseillese troops; forming themselves into clubs and popular assemblies, and deliberating on the affairs of the nation. Whenever they arrived in port they endeavoured to hang some of the citizens, under pretence of their being nobles or priests, and diffused terror wherever they went.

In consequence of the events which took place in Paris on the 31st of May, Marseilles revolted, raised several battalions, and sent them to the assistance of Lyons. General Car-

taux, who was detached from the Army of the Alps with 2000 men, beat the Marseillese at Orange, drove them out of Avignon, and entered Marseilles on the 24th of August 1793. Toulon had shared in the insurrection of Marseilles, she received the principal Marseillese sectionaries within her walls, and in concert with them the inhabitants summoned the English, and gave up the place to them—a place of the utmost importance to us. We had there from twenty to twenty-five ships of the line, besides noble establishments and immense stores. On hearing of it, General Lapoype set out from Nice with 4000 men, accompanied by the Representatives of the People, Freron and Barras: he advanced on Saulnier, observing the redoubts of Cape Brun, which the enemy occupied with a part of the garrison of Fort la Malgue; which covers the forts of Pharaon, and the line comprised between Cape Brun and Fort Pharaon.

On the other side General Cartaux, with the Representatives of the People, Albitte, Gasparin, and Salicetti, advanced on Beausset, and observed the passes of Ollioules, which were in possession of the enemy. The combined troops, English, Spanish, Neapolitans, Sardinians, &c. collected from all quarters, were

not only in possession of the place itself, but also of all the defiles and avenues for six miles round the town.

On the 10th of September, General Cartaux made an attack upon the passes of Ollioules, and gained possession of them. His advanced posts arrived within sight of Toulon, and of the sea. He made himself master of Sixfours, and restored the fortifications of the little port of Nazer. The division of General Cartaux consisted only of between 7 and 8000 men, and it could have no direct communication with that part of the Army of Italy commanded by General Lapoype, being separated from it by the mountains of Pharaon, which caused a great delay in the communications between them. The army of Cartaux on the right, and that of Lapoype on the left, had thus nothing in common: their posts were not even in sight of each other.

The manner of conducting the siege was a matter of much discussion:—whether the principal attack should be made on the left, or on the right. The left was opposed to the forts of Pharaon and la Malgue, which last is one of the most carefully constructed forts that we have in any of our fortified places. The right had only to take the fort of Malbosquet, which

is rather a field-fort than a permanent work, but which derives a certain degree of strength from its situation. This fort once taken, the troops would be close on the ramparts of the town; hence there could be no doubt that the true attack ought to be made on the right: towards that point, therefore, all the reinforcements sent from the interior were directed. Twelve or fifteen days after the taking of the passes of Ollioules, Napoleon, at that time chief of a battalion of artillery, arrived from Paris, being sent by the Committee of Public Safety to command the besieging artillery. The non-commissioned officers and ensigns had been promoted, through the Revolution, to the superior ranks of the artillery. A great number of them were capable of making good generals in that department of the army; but many had neither the capacity nor the information necessary for the elevated rank, to which their seniority and the spirit of the times had promoted them.

Napoleon, on his arrival, found the headquarters at Beausset. They were busy making preparations to burn the Allied squadrons in the road of Toulon; and the next day the Commandant of the artillery went with the

General-in-chief to visit the batteries. What was his surprize to find a battery of six twenty-four pounders planted a quarter of a league from the passes of Ollioules, at three gun shots from the English vessels, and two from the shore; and all the volunteers of the Côte d'Or and the soldiers of the regiment of Burgundy occupied with heating the balls at all the *bastides!** He did not conceal his astonishment.

The first care of the Commandant of the artillery was to get together a great number of officers in that department, whom the circumstances of the Revolution had removed. At the end of six weeks, he was enabled to assemble, organize, and supply a park of two hundred pieces of artillery. Colonel Gassendi was placed at the head of the arsenal of constructions at Marseilles. The batteries were advanced, and placed on the most advantageous points of the shore; and their effect was such, that some large vessels were dismasted, several smaller ones sunk, and the enemy were forced to abandon that part of the road.

During the time that the preparations for

* A name given in the South of France to a sort of country-houses.

the siege were completing, the army was considerably increased. The Committee of Public Safety sent plans and instructions relative to the conduct of the siege. They had been drawn up in the Committee of Fortifications by General D'Arçon of the engineers, an officer of great merit. The chief of battalion, Marescot, and many brigades of engineer officers arrived. All appeared to be in readiness to commence. A council was called, of which Gasparin, a representative, was president: he was a sensible and well-informed man, who had himself been in the service. The instructions from Paris were read: they detailed at great length the operations necessary to recover Toulon by a regular siege.

The Commandant of artillery, who for the space of a month had been carefully reconnoitring the ground, and had made himself perfectly acquainted with all its localities, proposed the plan of attack which occasioned the reduction of Toulon. He regarded all the propositions of the Committee of Fortifications as totally useless, under the circumstances of the case; and it was his opinion, that a regular siege was not at all necessary. In fact, supposing a position could be gained, which, with from fifteen to twenty mortars, thirty or forty

pieces of cannon, and furnaces for red-hot balls, would keep up a fire upon every point of the great and lesser roads, it was evident that the combined squadron would be obliged to abandon them; and the garrison would then be placed in a state of blockade, not being able to communicate with the squadron, which would be forced to stand out to sea. On this hypothesis the Commandant of artillery had laid it down as a principle, that the combined forces would prefer drawing off the garrison, and burning the French vessels and magazines, rather than leave 15 or 20,000 men in the fortress, who sooner or later would be obliged to surrender, without having any thing in their power to destroy, so as to ensure terms of capitulation for themselves.

In a word, he declared that it was not necessary to march against the place at all, but only to occupy the position proposed; and which was to be found at the extreme point of the promontory of Balagnier and l'Eguillette; that he had discovered this position a month before, and had pointed it out to the General-in-chief, assuring him that if he would occupy it with three battalions, he would take Toulon in four days; that the English had become, since he first observed it, so sensible of its

importance, that they had disembarked 4000 men there, had cut down all the wood that covered the promontory of Cair, which commanded the whole position, and had employed all the resources of Toulon, even the galley-slaves, in order to intrench themselves there; making of it, as they expressed themselves, "a little Gibraltar." But that the point, which a month ago might have been seized and occupied without opposition, now required a serious attack; that it would not be advisable to risk an assault, but to form batteries, mounted with twenty-four pounders and mortars, in order to destroy the epaulments, which were constructed of wood, to break down the palisades, and throw a shower of shells into the interior of the fort; and that then, after a vigorous fire for eight-and-forty hours, the work should be stormed by picked troops. Two days after this fort should be taken, he gave it as his opinion, that Toulon would belong to the Republic. This plan of attack was much discussed; and the engineer officers who were present at the council were of opinion, that the project of the Commandant of artillery was a necessary preliminary to regular sieges, the first principle of all sieges being the establishment of a strict blockade.

From this time there was unanimity of opinion: the enemy constructed two redoubts under the two headlands, one of which immediately commands l'Eguillette and the other Balagnier. These redoubts flanked Little Gibraltar, and played on the two sides of the promontory.

In conformity to the plan adopted, the French raised five or six batteries against Little Gibraltar, and constructed platforms for fifteen mortars. A battery had also been raised of eight twenty-four pounders and four mortars against Fort Malbosquet, the construction of which was a profound secret to the enemy, as the men who were employed on the work were entirely concealed from observation by a plantation of olives. It was intended that this battery should not be unmasked till the moment of marching against Little Gibraltar; but on the 20th of November the Representatives of the People went to inspect it, when they were informed by the cannoneers that it had been completed eight days, and that no use had yet been made of it, though it was supposed the effect produced by it would be very important. Without further explanation, the Representatives ordered them to open a fire, and accordingly the can-

noneers with great joy immediately opened an alternate fire from the battery.

General O'Hara, who commanded the Allied Army at Toulon, was greatly surprised at the erection of so considerable a battery close to a fort of such importance as Malbosquet, and gave orders that a sortie should be made at break of day. The battery was situated in the centre of the left of the army: the troops in that part consisted of about 6000 men; occupying the line from Fort Rouge to Malbosquet, and so disposed as to prevent all individual communication, though too much scattered to make an effectual resistance in any given point.

An hour before day, General O'Hara sallied out of the garrison with 6000 men; and, meeting with no obstacle, his skirmishers only being engaged, spiked the guns of the battery.

In the mean while, the drums beat the generale at head-quarters, and Dugommier with all haste rallied his troops: the Commandant of artillery posted himself on a little headland behind the battery, on which he had previously established a depôt of arms. A communication from this point to the battery had been effected, by means of a boyau which was substituted for the trench. Perceiving

from this point that the enemy had formed to the right and left of the battery, he conceived the idea of leading a battalion which was stationed near him through the boyau. By this plan he succeeded in coming out unperceived among the brambles close to the battery, and immediately commenced a brisk fire upon the English, whose surprise was such, that they imagined it was their own troops on the right, who through some mistake were firing on those on the left. General O'Hara hastened towards the French to rectify the supposed mistake, when he was wounded in the hand by a musket-ball, and a serjeant seized and dragged him prisoner into the boyau; the disappearance of the English General was so sudden, that his own troops did not know what had become of him.

In the mean time, Dugommier, with the troops he had rallied, placed himself between the town and the battery: this movement disconcerted the enemy, who forthwith commenced their retreat. They were hotly pursued as far as the gates of the fortress, which they entered in the greatest disorder and without being able to ascertain the fate of their General. Dugommier was slightly wounded

in this affair. A battalion of volunteers from the Isere distinguished itself during the day.

General Cartaux had conducted the siege at its commencement; but the Committee of Public Safety had found it necessary to deprive him of the command. This man, originally a painter, had become an adjutant in the Parisian corps; he was afterwards employed in the army; and, having been successful against the Marseillese, the deputies of the Mountains had in the same day obtained him the appointments of Brigadier-general and General of division. He was extremely ignorant, and had nothing military about him; otherwise he was not ill-disposed, and committed no excesses at Marseilles on the taking of that city.

General Doppet succeeded Cartaux: he was a Savoyard, a physician, and an unprincipled man: he was entirely governed by interested motives. He was a decided enemy to all who possessed talent. He had no idea of war, and was any thing but brave. This Doppet nevertheless, by a singular chance, in forty-eight hours after his arrival had very nearly taken Toulon. A battalion of the Côte d'Or and a battalion of the regiment of Burgundy, being on duty in the trenches before Little Gibraltar,

had one of their men taken by a Spanish company on guard at the redoubt: they saw their companion ill-treated and beaten, and at the same time the Spaniards offered them every insult by shouts and indecent gestures. The French, enraged, ran to their arms, commenced a brisk fire, and marched against the redoubt.

The Commandant of the artillery immediately hastened to the General-in-chief, who was ignorant of what was going on. They galloped to the scene of action, and there perceiving how the matter stood, Napoleon persuaded the General to support the attack, with the assurance that it would not be productive of greater loss to advance than to retire. The General, therefore, ordered the different corps of reserve to be put in motion: all were quickly on the alert, and Napoleon marched at their head. Unfortunately, an aide-de-camp was killed by the side of the General-in-chief. Doppet was panic-struck; and ordering the drums in all directions to beat a retreat, recalled his soldiers at the very moment when the grenadiers, having repulsed the skirmishers of the enemy, had reached the gorge of the redoubt, and were about to take it. The troops were highly indignant, and complained that * * * * * and physicians were

sent to command them. The Committee of Public Safety recalled Doppet, and at length perceived the necessity of employing a real military man: they accordingly sent Dugommier, an officer who had seen fifty years of service, who was covered with scars, and who was as dauntless as the weapon he wore.

The enemy were every day receiving reinforcements: the public watched with anxiety the direction of the operations of the siege. They could not conceive why every effort should be directed against Little Gibraltar, quite in an opposite direction to the town. "There has not been any thing done yet," it was said all over the country, "but laying siege to a fort which has nothing to do with the permanent fortifications of the place. They will afterwards have to take Malbosquet, and open trenches against the town." All the popular societies made denunciation after denunciation on this subject. Provence complained of the long duration of the siege. A scarcity began to prevail, and increased to such a degree that Freron and Barras, having lost all hopes of the prompt reduction of Toulon, wrote in great alarm from Marseilles to the Convention, to persuade them to take into consideration whether it would

not be better that the army should raise the siege and repass the Durance — a manœuvre which had been planned by Francis the First at the time of the invasion of Charles the Fifth. He retired behind the Durance, while the enemy laid Provence waste; and when famine compelled them to retreat, he then attacked them with fresh vigour. The Representatives urged, that, if our troops should evacuate Provence, the English would be obliged to find provisions for its support, and that after the harvest, offensive operations might be renewed with considerable advantage by an army complete in itself and invigorated by rest. This measure was, they said, absolutely necessary; for as yet, after four months' operations, Toulon had not even been attacked; and as the enemy were perpetually receiving reinforcements, it was to be apprehended that we should in the end be obliged to do precipitately and in confusion, what at the present moment might be effected with regularity and order. However, in a few days after the letter had been received by the Convention, Toulon was taken. The letter was now disowned by the Representatives as a forgery. This was ill-judged; for it was genuine, and gave a just idea of the

opinion that existed at the time of its being written, respecting the issue of the siege, and of the difficulties that prevailed in Provence.

Dugommier determined that a decisive attack should be made upon Little Gibraltar: the Commandant of the artillery accordingly threw 7 or 8000 shells into the fort, while 30 twenty-four pounders battered the works.

On the 18th of December, at four in the afternoon, the troops left their camps, and marched towards the village of Seine: the plan was to attack at midnight, in order to avoid the fire of the fort and the intermediate redoubts. At the instant when every thing was ready, the Representatives of the People held a council to deliberate whether the attack should be put in execution or not: it is probable they either feared the issue of it, and were desirous to throw all the responsibility of the affair upon General Dugommier, or they were influenced by the opinion entertained by many officers, who conceived success impossible, chiefly on account of the dreadful weather; the rain was falling in torrents.

Dugommier and the Commandant of artillery ridiculed these fears: two columns were formed, and marched against the enemy.

The Allied troops, to avoid the effect of the shells and balls, which showered upon the fort, were accustomed to occupy a station at a small distance in the rear of it. The French had great hopes of reaching the works before them; but the enemy had placed a line of skirmishers in front of the fort, and as the musquetry commenced firing at the very foot of the hill, the Allied troops hastened to the defence of the fort, whence a very brisk fire was immediately opened. Case-shot showered all around. At length, after a most furious attack, Dugommier, who according to his usual custom headed the leading column, was obliged to give way; and in the utmost despair he cried out "I am a lost man." Success was indeed every way important in those days, for the want of it usually conducted the unfortunate General to the scaffold.

The fire of the cannonading and musquetry continued. Captain Muiron of the artillery, a young man full of bravery and resources, and who was the adjoint of the Commandant of artillery, was detached with a battalion of light infantry, and supported by the second column, which followed them at the distance of a musquet-shot. He was perfectly acquainted with the position; and he availed himself so

well of the windings of the ascent, that he conducted his troops up the mountain without sustaining any loss. He debouched at the foot of the fort: he rushed through an embrasure: his soldiers followed him—and the fort was taken. The English and Spanish cannoneers were all killed at their guns, and Muiron himself was dangerously wounded by a thrust from the pike of an English soldier.

As soon as they were masters of the fort, the French immediately turned the cannon against the enemy.

By the time that Dugommier had been three hours in the redoubt, the Representatives of the People came with their drawn swords in their hands to load the troops which occupied it with eulogiums. [This positively contradicts the accounts of that time, which incorrectly state that the Representatives marched at the head of the columns.]

At break of day the French marched on Balagnier and l'Eguillette: the enemy had already evacuated those positions. The twenty-four pounders and the mortars were brought to mount these batteries, whence they hoped to cannonade the combined fleets before noon; but the Commandant of the artillery deemed it impossible to fix them there. They were

of stone, and the engineers who had constructed them had committed an error, in placing a large tower of masonry just at their entrance, so near the platforms that whatever balls might have struck them would have rebounded on the gunners, besides the splinters and rubbish. They therefore planted pieces of cannon on the heights behind the batteries. They could not open their fire until the next day; but no sooner did Lord Hood, the English Admiral, see that the French had possessed themselves of these positions, than he made signal to weigh anchor and get out of the roads.

He then went to Toulon to make it known that there was not a moment to be lost in getting out to sea directly. The weather was dark and cloudy, and every thing announced the approach of the Libeccio * wind, so terrible at this season. The council of the combined forces immediately met; and, after mature deliberation, they unanimously agreed that Toulon was no longer tenable. They accordingly proceeded to take measures as well for the embarkation of the troops, as for burning and sinking such French vessels as they could not

* Called also Lebeche; a south-west wind in the Mediterranean.

carry away with them, and setting fire to the marine establishments: they likewise gave notice to all the inhabitants, that those who wished to leave the place might embark on board the English and Spanish fleets.

When these disastrous tidings were spread abroad, a scene of confusion took place which it would be difficult to describe; any more than the disorder and astonishment of the garrison, and of the unfortunate inhabitants, who, only a few hours before, calculating on the great distance of the besiegers from the place, the slow progress of the siege during four months, and the expected arrival of reinforcements, not only hoped to effect the raising of the siege, but even to become masters of Provence.

In the night, Fort Poné was blown up by the English, and an hour afterwards, a part of the French squadron was set on fire. Nine seventy-four gun ships and four frigates or corvettes became a prey to the flames.

The fire and smoke from the Arsenal resembled the eruption of a volcano, and the thirteen vessels which were burning in the road were like so many magnificent displays of fireworks. The masts and forms of the vessels were distinctly marked by the blaze, which

lasted many hours, and formed an unparalleled spectacle. It was a heart-rending sight to the French to see such grand resources, and so much wealth consumed within so short a period. They feared, at first, that the English would blow up Fort La Malgue, but it appeared that they had not time to do so.

The Commandant of artillery then went to Malbosquet. The fort was already evacuated. He ordered the field-pieces to sweep the ramparts of the town, and heighten the confusion by throwing shells from the howitzers into the port, until the mortars, which were upon the road with their carriages, could be planted in the batteries, and shells thrown from them in the same direction.

General Lapoype took possession of Fort Pharaon, which was evacuated by the enemy. During all this time the batteries of l'Eguillette and Balagnier kept up an incessant fire on the vessels in the road. Many of the English ships were much damaged, and a great number of transports with troops on board were sunk. The batteries continued their fire all the night, and at the break of day the English fleet was seen out at sea. By nine o'clock in the morning a high Libeccio wind got up, and the English ships were forced to put into the Hyeres.

Many thousands of the families of Toulon had followed the English; so that the revolutionary tribunals found but few of the guilty in the place: all the parties most deeply implicated had left it. Nevertheless above a hundred unfortunate wretches were shot within the first fortnight.

Orders afterwards arrived from the Convention for demolishing the houses of Toulon: the absurdity of this measure did not impede the execution of it, and many houses were pulled down, which were obliged subsequently to be built up again.

During the siege of Toulon, the Army of Italy had been attacked on the Var. The Piedmontese had attempted to invade Provence, and got nearly as far as Entrevaux; but being defeated at Gillette, they retreated, and retired within their lines.

The news of the taking of Toulon caused a sensation in Provence and throughout France, the more lively as such success was unexpected and almost unhoped-for. From this event Napoleon's reputation commenced: he was made Brigadier-general of artillery in consequence, and appointed to the command of that department in the Army of Italy. General Dugommier was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees.

Before he joined the Army of Italy, Napoleon fortified the coasts of Provence, and the isle of Hyeres, immediately after they were evacuated by the English. There are no fixed rules in France with respect to the fortifying of coasts. This causes endless disputes between the artillery-officers and the local authorities; the latter always requiring too much, the former being perhaps contented with too little.

There are no certain rules for laying down the plans of coast-batteries. Powder-magazines and guard-houses are established on bad positions; they are often ill-constructed, though at a great expense; require frequent repairs; are useless with regard to defence, and only last two or three campaigns. Reverberatory furnaces are constructed, and grates set to heat the balls, without any judgment; and they are placed in positions where, during the fire, it is impossible for the cannoneers to approach them without danger, &c.

Coast-batteries ought to be divided into three classes, that is to say: 1st, those intended to guard the entrance of a great port, and to protect squadrons of men of war; 2dly, those intended to protect the entrance of a trading port, roads, anchorages, and the arrival

of convoys of merchantmen; 3dly, those erected on the brows of promontories, to defend the coasting-vessels, and prevent any landing on the shore.

The batteries of the first class should be provided with a great number of pieces of artillery, and their gorges should be covered by a tower (1st. model) capable of receiving on its platform four field-pieces or four-and-twenty pounder carronades; and of affording quarters to sixty men, with provisions for twelve or fifteen days, as well as the necessary stores of powder for the artillery. Similar erections have been completed for about 60,000 francs; and, as has been seen, they supply the place of the powder-magazine, the guard-house, and the magazine of provisions. A considerable saving is therefore effected. Batteries defended by these towers are not liable to be taken by a *coup de main*, and might be defended even if several thousand men had landed and turned them. These forts should have a furnace or a grate for heating balls, but this furnace or grate should not be constructed in the centre of the battery behind the platform; for it is there that the enemy's balls strike. The reverberatory furnaces or grates ought to be placed immediately against the epaulments, allowing

additional space for that purpose in the line of the battery: in this position the men are secure from the balls of the enemy, and the service can be performed with safety. The duty of firing with red-hot shot is in itself dangerous, laborious, and difficult: the artillerymen have such a dislike to it, that the moment any fresh difficulties arise, they give it up and fire with cold shot. The tower at the gorge of the battery ought to be from thirty to forty toises at least from the platform, in order that the balls which strike it and the splinters may not rebound upon the platform.

The batteries of the second description ought, as well as those of the first, to have at their gorge a tower of masonry (2d model), containing only two field-pieces, or eighteen pounder carronades on the platform, and capable of lodging twenty-five or thirty men with the necessary stores. They have been erected for 40,000 francs. The batteries of the second class have no occasion for many pieces of artillery. They are rarely liable to attack. Whatever interest the enemy may have in taking them, they will never employ so much time or trouble on the occasion as they will in taking ships of war.

Lastly, the batteries of the third class need

only be provided with few pieces. In these a grate or furnace is unnecessary, for no vessel will expose herself to its fire long enough to allow it to be made use of. A tower at the gorge is requisite as in the two first classes, but smaller, and made according to the 3d model, with only a single twelve-pounder gun or carronade on the platform.

Such a tower would resist any sudden assault. It can be constructed for 6000 francs, and serves like the others for powder-magazine and guard-house: these towers of the third kind have neither *contre-coupe* nor covered way.

When this system shall be once established on all the coasts throughout the state, there will be no more discussions at every breaking out of war respecting the nature of the fortifications.

In time of peace these batteries may be quickly dismantled by lodging the gun-carriages in the towers, which would spare a very considerable expense in removing them. At present these carriages are always laid up in the arsenals. According to the new method, they may be got ready again as quickly as occasion may require.

It is for want of classing these coast-batteries, according to their respective purposes, that

we see some of five or six pieces of cannon defending only coasting-vessels; and others, meant only to protect the accidental moorings of merchant-vessels, as fully armed as if the safety of a whole squadron of men-of-war depended on them.

The first expense of fortifying the coast on these principles would be amply compensated by the saving that would result from it in the end; as well by the additional length of time that the gun-carriages would last, as by their serving for powder magazines and guard-houses.

The gun-carriages for the coast have been so constructed by the ordnance department as to allow of firing only under the angle of 17°; and with good reason. It would have been wrong to empower the gunners to fire at too great a distance, which only destroys the carriages, without producing any important effect; and to this practice are owing the greater part of the complaints against the powder, the range of the guns, &c. The balls from the ships reached us, but our balls did not reach the ships. This is in consequence of the guns on board a vessel being able to fire on the ship-carriages at 25°; this angle is often increased, by the heeling of the vessel, to 30° or 40°.

The General of artillery ordered to fortify the coasts of the Mediterranean, finding that the artillery officers were every where reported, because the French cannon did not carry so far as the English, mounted some of the guns so as to fire at an angle of 43°; in order that, if the complaint came to be examined into, it might be immediately proved that the powder and the reach of the cannon were altogether equal to that of the English. But carriages constructed in this manner are much sooner unfit for service than those which are calculated to fire at 17°, and should only be employed in batteries defending anchorages at a distance of more than 1500 toises. A vessel never casts anchor where she is directly within cannon shot. The mortars cast by M. de Gribeauval will not carry to any great distance; but they are found quite sufficient to bombard a fort, and are more true than they would be with a longer reach. Circumstances, however, occur in which mortars that carry to a greater distance are useful; for example, in the road of Hyeres, the anchorage is 1800 toises distant from the coast, and is therefore out of the reach of cannon mounted in the ordinary manner for coast service, the mortars *à la Gomer*, and those of ten inches.

Consequently an enemy could anchor in these roads with impunity; but no sooner were the batteries mounted with twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, on carriages at 43°, and with mortars *à la Villantroys*, or like those of Seville, which throw shells 2500 and 3000 toises, than the enemy's vessels discontinued anchoring in these roads. The same is to be observed in the Gulf of Spezia; in which place an enemy might anchor without any danger in the very middle of the bay, if the coast-batteries had not been mounted in the manner here pointed out.

These principles have since been fully developed, and extensively applied, principally for the defence of great rivers, as the Scheldt, the Gironde, the open roads of Brest, of the Isle of Aix, &c. They are not in opposition to those concerning the artillery by M. de Gribeauval; for it must always be acknowledged that the artillery is but of little use when its range is too great; the effect of the discharge is very inconsiderable, and the carriages, platforms, and even the pieces themselves, are frequently broken. Our metal is not sufficiently tenacious to resist, for any length of time, an explosion of from twenty to thirty pounds of powder.

Napoleon repaired to the mouths of the Rhone, whence he commenced his survey for the fortification of the coasts of the Mediterranean. In every town he came to he had to encounter the arguments of the public authorities and the popular societies, who were desirous to have batteries erected at every little village or hamlet that might be situated near the sea-side.

The interior extremity of the Gulf of Lyons used to be considered by the seamen of the Mediterranean as an innavigable sea, but the English have proved the contrary. They have been seen to anchor at the mouth of the Rhone, and ride there in safety, in the worst weather. This anchorage likewise enabled them to profit by the river, for the purpose of taking in water. The anchorage of the Buc is good; it is defended by a small castle; the entrance to it is very narrow, but ships of war may get in.

When the canal of Arles shall be finished, Buc will be the port of the Rhone; by which means the bar, which is dangerous, having only seven feet water, will be avoided. It is owing to this bar that only small vessels, that sail ill and only before the wind, put in here.

The canal of Arles will establish a regular communication between Marseilles, Toulon,

and the Army of Italy, and Lyons, Paris, and Strasburg. Buc is destined to be the chief port in the Mediterranean for building men-of-war, as Toulon and Spezia are for fitting them out, and dismantling them. From Buc to Marseilles there are only small batteries to defend the coasting-vessels, and there are no moorings for any thing but sloops and little vessels.

At Marseilles, the best anchorage is at Istac. The General of artillery had two strong batteries constructed there, each mounted with eight pieces of cannon. They were placed in such a manner as to afford a strong support to the two wings of a naval line of defence: they have never been made use of; but, inferior as we are in naval force, it was prudent to secure the safety of these moorings. The port of Marseilles can only receive frigates, and it is sufficiently protected by the forts of St. Jean and St. Nicolas. From Marseilles to Toulon there are only batteries of the third class, excepting those for the protection of the little ports and the anchorages of Cain, Ciotat, and Bandolle; which are of the second. A tower is required on the little island opposite Ciotat.

The defence of Toulon is of the highest importance; and in providing for it, nothing

has been spared. The road is protected by the batteries of Cape Cepet and Cape Brun. Formerly there were several batteries on the peninsula of Cepet, but it was attended with this inconvenience, that in case of a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might, by obtaining possession of this peninsula, avail themselves of the batteries against our fleets that might be at anchor in the road. On this account it has been determined to have only a single battery on Cape Cepet, protected by a fort adjoining the signal station; so that the enemy, even should they obtain possession of the peninsula, would not obtain possession also of the battery which defends the entrance of the roads. This battery was fortified with thirty pieces of cannon. It has always been found necessary to have a camp in the peninsula, in order to protect the marine officers; but for the future, they will be secure from danger with only the garrison of the battery. The battery of Cape Brun is commanded by the heights, six hundred toises from Fort la Malgue. If therefore the enemy should land at Hyeres, they might obtain possession of the battery in spite of the fort, and thus block up the roads. Fort la Malgue ought to have been built upon these heights, which are called

the heights of Cape Brun. It would, it is true, be six hundred toises farther from the place, but it would protect the cape which covers the roads; besides, it would be of double strength, situated on this culminating point. A redoubt, that might be raised for 150,000 francs, would have been quite sufficient for the spot where Fort la Malgue now stands. The batteries of l'Eguillette and Balagnier defend the roadstead, and are themselves defended by the heights of Cair, where stood Little Gibraltar. In gaining these heights, the enemy would have been enabled to burn the French fleet as they lay in the road, even without the peninsula of Cepet, where it was also usual to have another camp. A redoubt (model No. 1) which cost a million livres is now raised on this promontory; which, with a garrison of two or three hundred men, secures the possession of it.

The batteries of the great tower, opposite to Balagnier and l'Eguillette, are commanded by Fort la Malgue.

To prevent the enemy from anchoring in the road of Hyeres it is necessary to have the mortars *à la Villantroys*, which carry their balls to a distance of at least two thousand five hundred toises, as well as guns mounted at an angle

of 43°. The anchorage is two thousand three hundred toises from any part of the shore, and before the batteries commanding these roads were fortified in this manner, the English were constantly anchoring there. From Hyeres to St. Tropez all the batteries are of the third class, and are only meant for the protection of coasting-vessels.

St. Tropez ought to be reckoned a battery of the second class; Frejus and Juan afford anchorage to ships of war; it was therefore necessary to give them batteries of the first class.

The Gulf of Juan, which is close upon Antibes, has the best roads of any on the coast of Provence, after Toulon. Squadrons of twelve ships have been seen there, blockaded by English fleets, far superior in number, yet perfectly safe under the protection of the batteries constructed by the General of artillery.

The anchorage of Antibes and Nice need only be defended by batteries of the second class. Villafranca has an excellent road, capable of admitting large squadrons. It was fortified with batteries of the first class. No squadron has ever been obliged to put in there; but every thing was so disposed as to secure protection to them if they should. From Nice to Vado, a distance of about thirty leagues, there

are only batteries of the third class. The roads of Vado, though not very superior, are regarded as the fourth best, in this part of the Mediterranean. Strong batteries were therefore constructed for their defence. From Vado to Genoa there are only batteries for the protection of the coasters. Genoa is only a middling port: nevertheless it occasionally affords shelter to vessels, and there was an intention of making new embankments, to render the anchorage more secure.

Napoleon joined the head-quarters of the Army of Italy at Nice, in March 1794. It was at that time commanded by General Dumerbion, an old and brave officer, who had been ten years a captain of grenadiers in the troops of the line. His military knowledge was considerable, but he was confined to his bed by the gout half his time; he had carried on war between the Var and the Roya, and knew perfectly the positions of all the mountains that cover Nice.

The new General of artillery visited all the advanced posts and reconnoitred the line occupied by the army. It is the duty of a General of artillery to make himself acquainted with the whole operations of an army, as he is required to furnish the different divisions with arms

and ammunition. His connection with the commandants of artillery in each division procures him information of every thing that takes place, and the arrangement of his grand park is regulated by the communications he receives.

On returning from this inspection he laid a memorial before General Dumerbion, relating to the unfortunate attack of General Brunet, and to the method of driving the enemy beyond the high Alps, by taking possession of the Col di Tende. If the French could thus fix themselves in the upper chain of the Alps, they would obtain impregnable positions, which, requiring but few men to maintain them, would leave a great number of troops disposable for other service.

These suggestions were laid before a council at which the representatives Ricors and young Robespierre were sitting: they were agreed to unanimously. Since the taking of Toulon the reputation of the General of artillery was quite enough of itself to inspire confidence in his designs.

The territory of Nice is comprised between the Var and the Roya; and the road from Nice to Turin, which passes by Saorgio, does not follow the course of any valley, but crosses

hills and mountains, the valley of the Col di Tende and the Roya. This river rises, indeed, in the Col di Tende and goes down to the sea, near Vintimiglia. It affords some debouches. The Nervia, taking its rise near Menton, below Saorgio and the Col Ardente, does not come from the chain of the high Alps, any more than the Taggio, the source of which is between Triola and the Col Ardente.

On the 8th of April, in consequence of the plans of the General of artillery, a part of the army, under the command of General Massena (General Dumerbion being confined to his bed by a fit of the gout), filing along the edge of the Roya by Menton, crossed the river. It then divided into four columns: the first marched up the bank of the Roya, the second up that of the Nervia, the third up that of the Taggio, and the fourth moved upon Oneglia.

The column of Oneglia fell in with a corps of Austrians and Piedmontese upon the heights of Saint Agatha, repulsed and defeated them. The General of brigade, Brulé, was killed in the action. The head-quarters were removed to Oneglia, and troops were immediately marched to occupy Loano. From Oneglia the French troops marched to the sources of the Tanaro, beat the enemy on the heights of

Ponte-Dinairo, possessed themselves of the fortress of Ormea, where they took four hundred prisoners, entered Garessio, and made themselves masters of the road from that place to Turin. The communication with Loano was kept up by way of Bardinetto and little St. Bernard.

The movements of the three columns along the vallies of the Roya, the Taggio, and the Nervia, and those of the troops which had debouched in Piedmont by the sources of the Tanaro, very naturally alarmed the Court of Sardinia. The Piedmontese army occupying the camps supported on Saorgio might be cut off, or taken prisoners; and the loss of an army of that kind, of twenty thousand men, would involve the ruin of the monarchy itself. The Piedmontese army therefore hastily abandoned those famous positions which had been washed with so much blood, and in which the Piedmontese troops had acquired considerable renown. Saorgio was immediately invested, and capitulated. The Piedmontese troops occupied the Col di Tende on the 20th of April, but they did not long remain there. On the 7th of May, after a brisk attack, they were driven from it; and thus all the upper regions of the Alps fell into the hands of the French.

The line of the French army was formed in the following manner. The right was supported on Loano; the line afterwards passed to St. Bardinetto and the little St. Bernard, commanded the Tanaro, traversed the valley, and reached the Col di Terme, which commands the sources of the Tanaro, on the left, beyond Ormea. Thence it passed over the higher range of the Alps to the Col di Tende. The line continued over the upper straits, which commanded the valley of Lastrera, and its left was supported by the right of the army of the Alps, at the camp of Tormes.

By these manœuvres the Army of Italy had gained more than sixty pieces of cannon. Saorgio was well provided with provisions and ammunition of every kind: it was the principal depôt of all the Piedmontese army.

The commandant of Saorgio was tried and shot by order of the King of Sardinia; and justly; for he might have held out twelve days or a fortnight longer. It is true the event would have been the same, as the Piedmontese could not have come to his assistance; but in war the commandant of a place is not to judge of events: he ought to defend it until the very last hour, and he deserves death if he gives it up a single instant sooner than he is com-

pelled to do so. The French army remained in these positions until September; when they learned from Nice, that a considerable Austrian force was advancing on the Bormida. General Dumerbion, in consequence, marched the army to reconnoitre the Austrian force, and to seize its stores which he was informed had been advanced as far as Cairo. The representatives Albitte and Salicetty accompanied the French army: the General Commandant of the artillery directed the operations, which saved him from being summoned to the bar of the Convention.

Napoleon, whilst making his inspections at Marseilles, was summoned by the representative . . . . . , who informed him that certain popular societies intended to plunder the powder-magazines. The General of artillery, therefore, gave him a plan for constructing a little wall, with battlements, upon the ruins of fort St. James, and fort St. Nicolas, which had been destroyed by the Marseillese at the beginning of the Revolution. The expense was trifling; but some months after, there was a decree for summoning the Commandant of artillery at Marseilles to the bar of the Convention, as having projected a plan for restoring the forts of St. James and St. Nicolas, in order to oppose the patriots.

The decree mentioned the Commandant of artillery at Marseilles; but Napoleon was at this time General of artillery in the Army of Italy. Colonel Seigny, who was the person specified by the text of the decree, went to Paris according to its literal tenor.

When he presented himself at the bar, he proved that the plan was not in his handwriting, and that he knew nothing about the matter. All was explained, and Napoleon was found to be the person in question; but the representatives of the Army of Italy, who wanted him to direct the affairs of the army, wrote to Paris, and gave such explanations to the Convention as it was satisfied with.

The French proceeded from Loano to Bardinetto, where they passed the straits of the Bormida, and on the 26th of September came to Balastreno, whence they proceeded to Cairo or Cair; where they fell in with from 12 to 13,000 Austrians, manœuvring in the plain, who no sooner saw the French army, than they retreated upon Dego. The French quickly attacked them there; and after an action with the rear-guard, in which the Austrians lost some prisoners, the latter retired upon Acqui. Having taken Dego, the French halted: their end was attained. They

had now several magazines, and had ascertained that there was nothing to fear from the expedition of the Austrians. The march of the French spread consternation through all Italy; the army returned upon Savona, traversing upper and lower Montenotte.

The right of the army moved from Loano to the heights of Vado, in order to command the roads of that port, which are the best and most important of any in these seas; and to prevent the English privateers from anchoring there. The line of the French army then passed by Septipani, Melagno, and Saint James, and extended to Bardinetto and the Col di Tende.

The remainder of the year 1794, was spent in putting the positions occupied by the army into a state of defence, particularly Vado. The knowledge that Napoleon acquired, under these circumstances, of all the positions of Montenotte, was very useful to him when he became commander-in-chief of the same army, and enabled him to make the bold manœuvre to which he owed the victory of Montenotte, at the opening of the campaign of Italy, in 1796. In the month of May 1795, Napoleon quitted the command of the army of Italy, and went to Paris; he had been put on the

list of generals who were intended to serve in the army of La Vendée. The command of a brigade of infantry had been assigned to him, but he refused this distinction, and protested against it.

The command of the army of Italy had meanwhile been confided to Kellerman; a man of much personal bravery, but who, having none of the talents necessary for a General in Chief, made only unskilful dispositions; and by the end of June, the army had lost the positions of Vado, Saint James, and Bardinetto. General Kellerman even talked of evacuating the Genoese coast, and alarmed the Committee of Public Safety, which called together all the representatives who had been with the army of Italy, in order to consult them. They described Napoleon as perfectly acquainted with the localities of the country. He was summoned by the committee, and put in requisition. He was attached to the topographical committee. He laid down the line of Borguetto for the Italian army—a line so strong that it only required an army of half the strength of ours to maintain it. It saved the French army, and preserved the coast of Genoa. The enemy attacked it several times in great force, but

they were always repulsed with considerable loss.

At the end of the year, the government, convinced of the incapacity of General Kellerman, superseded him in his command, and appointed General Scherer. On the 22d of November, this general, having received reinforcements from the army of the Pyrenees, attacked Devins, the enemy's general, at Loano, took his lines, made many prisoners, and took a considerable number of cannon: had he been sufficiently enterprising, he might at the time have made the conquest of Italy —he could not have had a more favourable opportunity; but Scherer was incapable of so important an operation; and, far from endeavouring to profit by his advantages, he returned to Nice, and went into winter quarters.

The generals of the enemy, after having rallied their troops, also went into winter quarters.

THE EIGHTEENTH OF BRUMAIRE.*

Arrival of Napoleon in France—Sensation produced by that event—Napoleon at Paris—The directors, Roger Ducos, Moulins, Gohier Sieyes—Conduct of Napoleon—Rœderer, Lucien and Joseph, Talleyrand, Fouche, Real—State of the different parties—They all make proposals to Napoleon — Barras — Napoleon coalesces with Sieyes—State of feeling among the troops in the capital—Measures arranged for the eighteenth Brumaire—Proceedings of that day—Decree of the Council of the Ancients, which transfers the seat of the Legislative Body to Saint Cloud—Speech of Napoleon to the Council of the Ancients—Tumultuous sitting at Saint Cloud—Adjournment of the Councils for three months.

When lamentable weakness and endless versatility are manifested in the councils of a government; when an administration, yielding by turns to the influence of every opposing party, and going on from day to day without any fixed plan or determined system, has shewn its utter insufficiency; and when the most moderate citizens in the state are

* November 9, 1799.

obliged to confess that it is without a government; when rulers, insignificant at home, have shamefully brought on their country the contempt of foreigners—the greatest of injuries in the eyes of a proud people; a vague uneasiness spreads throughout society: agitated by the instinct of self-preservation, it looks into its own resources, and seeks for some one able to save it from destruction.

A populous nation always possesses this tutelary genius in its own bosom, though he may sometimes be tardy in appearing. It is not indeed sufficient for him to exist, he must be known to others, and he must know himself. Until then all endeavours are vain, all schemes ineffectual. The inertness of the multitude is the protection of the nominal government, and in spite of its inexperience and weakness, the efforts of its enemies cannot prevail against it. But let this deliverer, so impatiently expected, suddenly give a proof of his existence, and the nation instinctively acknowledges and calls on him; all obstacles vanish at his approach, and a great people thronging round his steps, seems exultingly to proclaim "This is the man."

Such was the state of the public mind in France in the year 1799, when, on the 9th of

October, (16th of Vindemiaire, year VIII.), the frigates La Muiron and La Carrére, and the zebecks La Revanche and La Fortune, cast anchor, at the break of day, in the gulf of Frejus.

No sooner were the French frigates recognised, than it was conjectured they came from Egypt. The people ran in crowds to the shore, eager for news from the army. It was soon understood that Napoleon was on board; and such was the enthusiasm among the people, that even the wounded soldiers got out of the hospitals, in spite of the guards, and went to the shore. The spectators wept with joy. In a moment the sea was covered with boats. The officers belonging to the fortifications and the customs, the crews of the ships that were anchored in the road, in short, every body thronged about the frigates. General Pereymont, who commanded on the coast, was the first to go on board. Thus they were enabled to enter, without waiting for the officers of quarantine; for the communication with the shore had been general.

Italy had just been lost; war was about to be recommenced on the Var, and Frejus dreaded an invasion as soon as hostilities should begin. The necessity of having a leader at the head of

affairs was too imperious; every one was too much agitated by the sudden appearance of Napoleon at this juncture, for ordinary considerations to have any weight. The officers of quarantine declared that there was no occasion for subjecting these vessels to it, and grounded their report on the circumstance that communication had taken place at Ajaccio. This argument, however, far from being tenable, only went to prove that Corsica itself ought to have been put under quarantine. The administration at Marseilles made this observation a fortnight afterwards, and with reason. It is true, that during the fifty days which had elapsed from the vessels leaving Egypt, there had been no sickness on board any of them, and indeed the plague had ceased three months before their departure. At six o'clock that evening, Napoleon, accompanied by Berthier, set off in a coach for Paris.

The fatigue of his passage, and the effect of the transition from a dry climate to a moist one, determined Napoleon to stop six hours at Aix. The inhabitants of the city, and of the neighbouring villages, came in crowds to testify their happiness at seeing him again. The joy was universal. Those who lived too far in the country to present themselves on the

road in time, rang the bells, and hoisted flags upon the steeples, which at night blazed with illuminations.

It was not like the return of a citizen to his country, or a general at the head of a victorious army, but like the triumph of a sovereign restored to his people. The enthusiasm of Avignon, Montelimart, Valence, and Vienne, was only surpassed by the rapture of Lyons. That city, in which Napoleon rested for twelve hours, was in an universal delirium. The Lyonnese had at all times shewn great attachment to Napoleon, either from the natural generosity of character by which they are distinguished—or that, considering their city as the capital of the south, they felt peculiarly interested in all that concerned the security of the frontiers on the Italian side—or that the population of Lyons being composed chiefly of natives of Burgundy and Dauphiny, shared the sentiments most prevalent in these provinces. Their imaginations were, moreover, still in a state of exultation at that time, from the accounts which had been spread eight days before of the battle of Aboukir, and of the brilliant success of the French arms in Egypt, which formed such a striking contrast to the defeat of their armies in Germany and Italy. "We are numerous, we

are brave," the people seemed every where to say, "and yet we are conquered. We want a leader to direct us:—we now behold him, and our glory will once more shine forth." In the mean time the news of Napoleon's return had reached Paris. It was announced at the theatres, and caused an universal sensation—a general delirium, of which the members of the Directory partook. Some of the *Société du Manège** trembled on the occasion; but they

* The *Société du Manège* was the remnant of that most celebrated and powerful of all political sects, known throughout Europe, at the beginning of the French Revolution, by the name of the "Jacobins." It originated in 1789, under the denomination of the "Breton Club," in consequence of having been first established by the representatives of Britany. Its numbers were rapidly increased by deputies from the other provinces, and the members then termed themselves more comprehensively "the friends of the people;" but they soon became universally known by the name of the place where they assembled, in the Rue St. Honoré, which was called the "Hall of the Jacobins," from having formerly belonged to a fraternity of Dominican Friars, who were denominated after their patron saint. In the zenith of its renown, this central meeting in the capital kept up a constant intercourse with every part of France, by means of 20,000 affiliated clubs. It was only when they had fallen from their pitch of power, by their despotism and thirst of blood—aptly expressed in their own favourite phrase, "the system of terror," that the Jacobins took upon themselves the compa-

dissembled their real feelings so well as to seem to share the general rejoicing. Baudin, the deputy from Ardennes, who was really a worthy man, and sincerely grieved at the unfortunate turn that the affairs of the Republic had taken, died of joy when he heard of Napoleon's return.

Napoleon had already quitted Lyons, when his landing was announced in Paris. With a precaution which was very advisable in his situation, he expressed to his couriers an intention of taking a different road from that which he actually took; so that his wife, his family, and particular friends, went in a wrong direction to meet him, and by that means some days passed before he was able to see them. Having thus arrived in Paris quite unexpectedly, he was in his own house, in the *rue Chantereine*, before any one knew of his being in the capital. Two hours afterwards, he presented himself to the Directory, and, being recognised by the soldiers on guard, was announced by shouts of gladness. All the members of the Directory appeared to

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ratively obscure appellation of the *Société du Manège*, from holding their meetings in the *Manège*, or Riding House, where the National Convention had before held its sittings.—*Note of the Editor.*

share in the public joy; he had every reason to congratulate himself on the reception he experienced on all sides. The nature of past events sufficiently instructed him as to the situation of France; and the information he had procured on his journey, had made him acquainted with all that was going on. His resolution was taken. What he had been unwilling to attempt on his return from Italy, he was now determined to do immediately. He held the government of the Directory and the leaders of the councils in supreme contempt. Resolved to possess himself of authority, and to restore France to her former glory, by giving a powerful impulse to public affairs, he had left Egypt to execute this project; and all that he had just seen in the interior of France, had confirmed his sentiments and strengthened his resolution.

Of the old Directory only Barras remained. The other members were Roger Ducos, Moulins, Gohier, and Sieyes.

Ducos was a man of narrow mind and easy disposition.

Moulins, a general of division, had never served in war; he was originally in the French guards, and had been advanced in the army of the Interior. He was a worthy man, and a warm and upright patriot.

Gohier was an advocate of considerable reputation, and exalted patriotism; an eminent lawyer, and a man of great integrity and candour.

Sieyes had long been known to Napoleon. He was born at Frejus, in Provence. His reputation commenced with the Revolution. He had been called to the constituent assembly by the electors of the third-estate, at Paris, after having been repulsed by the assembly of the clergy at Chartres. He was the author of the pamphlet intituled "What is the Third Estate?"* which made so much noise. He was not a man of business: knowing but little of men, he knew not how they might be made to act. All his studies having been directed to metaphysics, he had the fault of metaphysicians, of too often despising positive notions; but he was capable of giving useful and luminous advice on matters of importance, or at any momentous crisis. To him France is indebted for the division into departments, which destroyed all provincial prejudices: and though he was never distinguished as an orator, he greatly contributed to the success of the revolution by his advice in the committees. He was nomi-

* "*Qu'est ce que le Tiers Etat?*"

nated as director, when the Directory was first established; but he refused the distinction at that time, and Lareveillere was appointed instead of him. He was afterwards sent ambassador to Berlin, and imbibed a great mistrust of the politics of Prussia in the course of his mission. He had taken a seat in the Directory not long before this time; but he had already been of great service in checking the progress of the *Société du Manège*, which he saw was ready to seize the helm of the state. He was abhorred by that faction; and, fearless of bringing upon himself the enmity of so powerful a party, he courageously resisted the machinations of these men of blood, in order to avert from the Republic the evil with which it was threatened.

At the period of the 13th of Vindemiaire, the following occurrence had enabled Napoleon to form a correct judgment of him. At the most critical moment of that day, when the committee of the Forty seemed quite distracted, Sieyes came to Napoleon, and took him into the recess of a window, while the committee was deliberating upon the answer to be given to the summons of the sections. "You hear them, General," said he; "they talk while they should be acting. Bodies of men are

wholly unfit to direct armies, for they know not the value of time or opportunity. You have nothing to do here: go, General, consult your genius and the situation of the country: the hope of the Republic rests on you alone."

Napoleon accepted an invitation to dine with each of the directors, on condition that it should be merely a family dinner, and that no stranger should be present. A grand entertainment was given to him by the Directory. The Legislative Body wished to follow the example; but when it was proposed to the general committee, a strong opposition arose: the minority refusing to pay any homage to General Moreau, whom it was proposed to include in the entertainment; he was accused of having misconducted himself on the 18th of Fructidor. The majority, in order to remove every difficulty, had recourse to the expedient of opening a subscription. The festival took place in the church of Saint Sulpice; covers were laid for seven hundred. Napoleon remained at table but a short time,—he appeared to be uneasy, and much preoccupied. Every one of the ministers wished to give him an entertainment; but he only accepted a dinner with the Minister of Justice, for whom he had a great esteem: he requested that the principal lawyers of the Republic might be

there; he was very cheerful at this dinner, conversed at large on the civil and criminal codes, to the great astonishment of Tronchet, Treilhard, Merlin, and Target, and expressed a desire that the persons and the property of the Republic should be governed by a simple code, adapted to the enlightened state of the age.

Constant to his system, he entered but little into these public entertainments, and pursued the same line of conduct that he had followed on his first return from Italy. Always dressed as a member of the Institute, he shewed himself in public only with that society: he received at his house none but men of science, the generals of his suite, and a few friends; —such as Regnault-de-Saint-Jean-d'Angely, whom he had employed in Italy in 1797, and subsequently placed at Malta; Volney, the author of excellent Travels in Egypt; Rœderer, whom he respected for his probity and noble sentiments; Lucien Bonaparte, one of the most powerful orators of the Council of Five Hundred, who had protected the Republic from the revolutionary *regime*, by opposing the declaration that the country was in danger; and Joseph Bonaparte, who lived in splendour and was highly respected.

He went frequently to the Institute; but never to the theatres, except at times when he was not expected, and then always into the private boxes.

Meanwhile all Europe rang with the arrival of Napoleon; all the troops and friends of the Republic, even the Italians, indulged in the most sanguine hopes: England and Austria were alarmed. The fury of the English was turned against Sir Sidney Smith, and Nelson, who commanded the British naval force in the Mediterranean. A variety of caricatures on this subject were seen in the streets of London.*

Talleyrand was fearful of being ill-received by Napoleon. It had been agreed both by the Directory and Talleyrand, that immediately after the departure of the expedition for Egypt, negotiations respecting its object should be opened with the Porte. Talleyrand was even to have been the negotiator, and to have set out for Constantinople twenty-four hours after the sailing of the expedition for Egypt from Toulon. This engagement, which had been formally insisted on and positively consented

* In one of these, Nelson was represented amusing himself with dressing Lady Hamilton, while the frigate La Muiron was passing between his legs.

to, had been immediately consigned to oblivion; not only had Talleyrand remained at Paris, but no sort of negotiation had taken place. Talleyrand did not suppose that Napoleon had forgotten this; but the influence of the *Société du Manège* had procured the dismission of this minister: his situation was itself a guarantee. Napoleon did not repulse him: Talleyrand, moreover, availed himself of all the resources of a supple and insinuating address, in order to conciliate a person whose suffrage it was important to him to secure.

Fouché had been for several months minister of police; he had, after the 13th of Vindemiaire, some transactions with Napoleon, who was aware of his immoral and versatile disposition. Sieyes had closed the *Manège* without his participation. Napoleon effected the 18th of Brumaire without admitting Fouché into the secret.

Réal, commissioner of the Directory in the department of Paris, gained more of Napoleon's confidence. Zealous for the revolution, he had been substitute for the attorney of the commune of Paris, at a time of storms and troubles. His disposition was ardent, but he was full of noble and generous sentiments.

All classes of citizens, all the provinces of

France, were impatient to see what Napoleon would do. From all sides came offers of support, and of entire submission to his will.

Napoleon employed himself in listening to the proposals which were submitted to him; in observing all parties; and, in short, in making himself thoroughly master of the true state of affairs. All parties desired a change, and all desired to effect it in concert with him, even the leaders of the *Manège*.

Bernadotte, Augereau, Jourdan, Marbot, &c. who were at the head of the plotters of this society, offered a military dictatorship to Napoleon, and proposed to acknowledge him as chief, and to confide the fortunes of the Republic to him, if he would but second the principles of the *Société du Manège*.

Sieyes, who commanded the vote of Roger-Ducos in the Directory, swayed the majority of the Council of Ancients, and influenced only a small minority in the Council of Five Hundred, proposed to place Napoleon at the head of the government, changing the constitution of the year III. which he deemed defective, and that Napoleon should adopt the institutions and the constitution which he had projected, and which he had by him in manuscript.

Regnier, Boulay, a numerous party of the

Council of Ancients, and many of the members of that of Five Hundred, were also desirous to place the fate of the Republic in Napoleon's hands.

This party was composed of the most moderate and wisest men of the legislature: it was the same that joined Lucien Bonaparte in opposing the declaration that the country was in danger.

The directors Barras, Moulins, and Gohier, hinted to Napoleon his resuming the command of the army of Italy, his re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic and the glory of the French arms. Moulins and Gohier had no secret plan in reserve: they were sincere in the scheme they proposed; they trusted that all would go well from the moment that Napoleon should lead our armies to new successes. Barras was far from partaking of this security: he knew that every thing went wrong, that the Republic was sinking; but whether he had made engagements with the Pretender to the throne, as was asserted at the time,* or whether he

* "It is known at the present day that Barras had interviews at that period with agents of the house of Bourbon. It was David Monnier who served Barras as emissary in the negotiation which was then entered upon. Barras had sent him into Germany; but, as he durst not hope that the King

deceived himself as to his personal situation—for what errors may not spring from the va-

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would forgive his revolutionary conduct, he had not been able to give his messenger any kind of positive instruction. Monnier then negotiated on behalf of Barras, without the latter having knowledge of any one clause of the negotiation; and it was thus that Monnier stipulated that Barras should consent to the re-establishment of monarchy in France, on condition that the king, Louis XVIII., would grant him safety and indemnity:—'safety, that is to say, complete oblivion with respect to revolutionary conduct—the King's sacred pledge to annul, by his sovereign power, all inquisitions on that head; indemnity, that is to say, a sum at least equal to that which the two years that he was to pass in the Directory would produce to him—a sum that he calculated at twelve millions of *livres tournois*, including the two millions that he was to distribute among his coadjutors.' His Majesty, on this occasion, granted letters patent, which were transmitted to Barras by the chevalier Tropès-de-Guerin, and exchanged for the engagement subscribed by the director, for the restoration of monarchy. Barras then took measures for recalling the Bourbons. On the 29th of Vindemiaire, nineteen days before the 18th of Brumaire, he believed himself to be certain of success; but this great design miscarried, partly through the excessive confidence of Barras, and partly by the delays occasioned in the execution by one of the King's agents, who, in order to make himself necessary, raised disputes respecting the powers that the King had given to the Duke de Fleury for the negotiation of this affair, &c."—*Biographie des Hommes vivants, Michaud*, 1816, tom. 1, page 214.

nity and self-love of an ignorant man?—he imagined he could keep himself at the head of affairs. Barras made the same proposals as were made by Moulins and Gohier.

However, all the factions were in motion. That of the *Fructidorisés** seemed persuaded of its own influence; but it had no partisans among the existing authorities. Napoleon had the choice of several measures, viz.

To consolidate the existing constitution, and to support the Directory by becoming himself a director. But the constitution was fallen into contempt, and a magistracy in several hands could not lead to any satisfactory result; it would, in fact, have been associating himself with revolutionary prejudices, with the passions of Barras and of Sieyes, and by the consequent re-action rendering himself obnoxious to the hatred of their enemies.

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* The *Fructidorisés* were those who supported the decrees of the 5th of Fructidor (August 23), and the 13th of Fructidor (August 31, 1795): the first of these decrees, was to compel the re-election of two-thirds of the convention in the new legislature, which was to consist of the Council of Five Hundred, and the Council of Ancients; and the second, that in default of the re-election of the two-thirds of the convention by the departments, that is to say, of Five Hundred of the actual members, the deficiency should be filled by their own nomination. *Note of the Editor.*

To change the constitution, and step into power by means of the *Société du Manège*. This society contained a great number of the rankest jacobins: they commanded the majority in the Council of Five Hundred, and a spirited minority in that of the Ancients. By making use of these men the victory was certain, no resistance would be offered. It was the most certain way to overthrow the existing state of things; but jacobins do not attach themselves to any leader: they are unbending, and violent in the extreme. It would, therefore, have been necessary, after succeeding by their aid, to get rid of them, and to persecute them. Such treachery would have been unworthy of a noble-minded man.

Barras tendered the support of his friends, but they were men of suspicious morals, and publicly accused of wasting the national wealth. How would it have been possible to govern with such people? for without strict probity it would have been impracticable to restore the finances, or to do any real good.

To Sieyes were attached many well-informed men, persons of integrity and republicans upon principle, possessing in general little energy, and much intimidated by the faction *du Manège*, and fearful of popular commotions; but

who might be retained after the victory, and be employed with success in an orderly government. No objection could be taken to the character of Sieyes: he could not, in any case, be a dangerous rival. But to side with this party was to declare against Barras and the *Manège*, who abhorred Sieyes.

On the 8th of Brumaire (30th of October), Napoleon dined with Barras; only a few persons were there. A conversation took place after dinner: "The Republic is falling," said the director, "things can go no farther; the government is powerless; a change must take place, and Hedouville must be named President of the Republic. As to you, General, you intend to rejoin the army; and for my part, ill as I am, unpopular, and worn out, I am fit only to return to private life."

Napoleon looked steadfastly at him without replying a word. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent. Thus the conversation ended. General Hedouville was a man of the most ordinary character. Barras did not give utterance to his thoughts; but his countenance betrayed his secret.

This conversation was decisive. A few minutes afterwards, Napoleon called upon Sieyes: he gave him to understand that for ten days

all parties had addressed themselves to him; that he was resolved to act with Sieyes and the majority of the Council of Ancients, and that he came for the purpose of giving him a positive assurance of this. It was agreed that the change might be effected between the 15th and the 20th of Brumaire.

On his return to his own house, Napoleon found there Talleyrand, Fouché, Rœderer, and Réal. He related to them unaffectedly, plainly, and simply, without any indication of countenance which could betray his opinion, what Barras had just said to him. Réal and Fouché, who had a regard for the director, were sensible how ill-timed his dissimulation was. They went to him on purpose to upbraid him with it. The following day, at eight o'clock, Barras came to Napoleon, who had not risen: he insisted on seeing him, entered, and told him he feared he had explained himself very imperfectly the preceding evening; that Napoleon alone could save the Republic; that he came to place himself at his disposal, to do whatever he wished, and to act whatever part he chose to assign him. He intreated Napoleon to give him an assurance that, if he had any project in agitation, he would rely upon him.

But Napoleon had already made up his mind: he replied that he had nothing in view; that he was fatigued, indisposed; that he could not accustom himself to the moisture of the atmosphere of the capital, just arrived, as he was, from the dry climate of the sands of Arabia; and he put an end to the interview by similar common-place observations.

Meanwhile Moulins went daily between eight and nine o'clock to the house of Napoleon, to request his advice on the business of the day. He always had military intelligence, or civil matters, on which he wished for instructions. On what related to military affairs, Napoleon replied as he felt; but with respect to civil concerns, thinking that he ought not to disclose his private opinions to him, he only answered in a vague manner.

Gohier came also occasionally to visit Napoleon, for the purpose of making proposals to him, and asking his advice.

The officers of the garrison, headed by General Moreau, commanding the citadel of Paris, demanded to be presented to Napoleon; they could not succeed in their object, and, being put off from day to day, they began to complain of his manifesting so little desire to see his old comrades again.

The forty adjutants of the national guard of Paris, who had been appointed by Napoleon, when he commanded the army of the Interior, had solicited as a favour to see him. He knew almost all of them; but, in order to conceal his designs, he put off the time for receiving them.

The eighth and ninth regiments of dragoons, which were in garrison at Paris, were old regiments of the army of Italy; they longed to muster before their former general. Napoleon accepted the offer, and informed them that he would fix the day.

The twenty-first light-horse, which had contributed to the success of the day of the 13th of Vindemiaire, was likewise at Paris. Murat came from this corps, and all the officers went daily to him, to ask him on what day Napoleon would review it. They were as unsuccessful as the rest.

The citizens of Paris complained of the general's keeping so close; they went to the theatres, and to the reviews, where it was announced he would be present, but he came not. Nobody could account for this conduct; all were becoming impatient. People began to murmur against Napoleon: "It is now," they observed, "a fortnight since his arrival, and

he has yet done nothing. Does he mean to behave as he did on his return from Italy, and suffer the Republic to be torn to pieces by these contending factions?"

But the decisive hour approached.

On the 15th of Brumaire, Sieyes and Napoleon had an interview, during which they resolved on the measures for the day of the eighteenth. It was agreed that the Council of Ancients, availing itself of the 102d article of the Constitution, should decree the removal of the Legislative Body to Saint Cloud, and should appoint Napoleon Commander-in-chief of the guard belonging to the Legislative Body, of the troops of the military division of Paris, and of the national guard.

This decree was to be passed on the eighteenth, at seven o'clock in the morning: at eight, Napoleon was to go to the Tuileries, where the troops were to be assembled, and there to assume the command of the capital.

On the seventeenth, Napoleon informed the officers that he would receive them the next day at six in the morning. As that hour might appear to be unseasonable, he feigned being about to set off on a journey: he gave the same invitation to the forty adjutants of the national guard; and he informed the three

regiments of cavalry that he would review them in the Champs-Elysées, on the same day, the eighteenth, at seven in the morning. He also intimated to the generals who had returned from Egypt with him, and to all those with whose sentiments he was acquainted, that he should be glad to see them at that hour. Each thought that the invitation was confined to himself alone, and supposed that Napoleon had some orders to give him; for it was known that Dubois-Crancé, the minister at war, had taken the reports of the state of the army to him, and had adopted his advice on all that was to be done, as well on the frontiers of the Rhine as in Italy.

Moreau, who had been at the dinner of the Legislative Body, and whom Napoleon had there, for the first time, become acquainted with, having learned from public report that a change was in preparation, assured Napoleon that he placed himself at his disposal, that he had no wish to be admitted into any secret, and that he required but one hour's notice to prepare himself. Macdonald, who happened then to be at Paris, had made the same tenders of service. At two o'clock in the morning, Napoleon let them know that he wished to see them at his house at seven o'clock, and on

horseback. He did not apply to Augereau, Bernadotte, &c.; however Joseph brought the latter.*

General Lefevre commanded the military division; he was wholly devoted to the Directory. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to him, at midnight, desiring he would come to him at six.

Every thing took place as had been agreed. About seven in the morning, the Council of Ancients assembled under the presidency of Lemercier. Cornudet, Lebrun, and Targues, depicted in lively colours the miseries of the Republic, the dangers with which it was surrounded, and the obstinate conspiracy of the leaders *du Manège* for the restoration of the reign of terror. Regnier, deputy for La Meurthe, moved that, in pursuance of the 102d article of the Constitution, the sittings of the Legislative Body should be transferred to Saint Cloud; and that Napoleon should be invested with the chief command of the troops of the seventeenth military division, and charged with the execution of this measure. He then spoke

* When Napoleon went to the Council of Ancients, Bernadotte, instead of following the cavalcade, slipped away, and went to join the faction *du Manège*.

in support of his motion. "The Republic," said he, "is threatened by anarchists and by the foreign party: measures for the public safety must be taken; we are certain of the support of General Bonaparte: under the shelter of his protecting arm the Councils may discuss the changes which the public interest renders necessary." As soon as the majority of the Council was satisfied that the motion was in concert with Napoleon, the decree passed; but not without strong opposition. It was couched in these terms:

"The Council of Ancients, by virtue of articles 102, 103, and 104, of the Constitution, decrees as follows:

"Art. 1. The Legislative Body is transferred to Saint Cloud; the two Councils shall there sit in the two wings of the palace.

"2. They shall assemble there to-morrow, the 19th of Brumaire, at noon; all exercise of their functions and all discussions, elsewhere and before that time, is prohibited.

"3. General Bonaparte is charged with the execution of the present decree. He will adopt all measures necessary for the safety of the national representation. The general commanding the seventeenth military division, the guards of the legislative body, the stationary

national guards, the troops of the line which are in the commune of Paris, and throughout the whole extent of the seventeenth military division, are placed immediately under his command, and enjoined to recognise him in that capacity; all the citizens are to aid and assist him on his first requisition.

"4. General Bonaparte is summoned to the council-table to receive a copy of the present decree, and to take the oath; he will act in concert with the committees of inspectors of the two Councils.

"5. The present decree shall be immediately transmitted by messengers to the Council of Five Hundred, and to the Executive Directory; it shall be printed, posted, proclaimed, and sent to all the communes of the Republic by couriers extraordinary."

This decree was made at eight o'clock; and at half-past eight, the state messenger who was the bearer of it arrived at the house of Napoleon. He found the avenues filled with officers of the garrison, adjutants of the national guard, generals, and the three regiments of cavalry. Napoleon had the folding-doors opened; and, his house being too small to contain so many persons, he came forward on the steps in front of it, received the compliments of the officers,

harangued them, and told them that he relied upon them all for the salvation of France. At the same time he gave them to understand that the Council of Ancients, under the authority of the Constitution, had just conferred on him the command of all the troops; that important measures were in agitation, designed to rescue the country from its alarming situation; that he relied upon their support and good will; and that he was at that moment going to mount his horse to ride to the Tuileries.

Enthusiasm was at its height: all the officers drew their swords, and promised their service and fidelity. Napoleon then turned towards Lefevre, demanding whether he would remain with him or return to the Directory. Lefevre, powerfully affected, did not hesitate. Napoleon instantly mounted, and placed himself at the head of the generals and officers, and of 1500 horse whom he had halted upon the boulevard, at the corner of the street of *Mont-Blanc*. He gave orders to the adjutants of the national guard to return to their quarters, and beat the generale; to communicate the decree that they had just heard, and to announce that no orders were to be observed but such as should emanate from him.

Napoleon presented himself at the bar of the

Council of Ancients, attended by this brilliant escort. "You are the wisdom of the nation," said he: "At this crisis it belongs to you to point out the measures which may save the country: I come, surrounded by all the generals, to promise you their support. I appoint General Lefevre my lieutenant; I will faithfully fulfil the task with which you have intrusted me: let us not look into the past for examples of what is now going on. Nothing in history resembles the end of the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century resembles the present moment."

All the troops were mustered at the Tuileries; Napoleon reviewed them, amidst the unanimous acclamations of both citizens and soldiers. He gave the command of the troops intrusted with the protection of the Legislative Body to General Lannes; and to General Murat the command of those sent to Saint Cloud.

He deputed General Moreau to guard the Luxembourg; and, for this purpose, he placed under his orders 500 men of the eighty-sixth regiment. But, at the moment of setting off, these troops refused to obey: they had no confidence in Moreau, who was not, they said, a patriot. Napoleon was obliged to harangue them, assuring them that Moreau would act

uprightly. Moreau had become suspected though his conduct in *Fructidor*.

The intelligence that Napoleon was at the Tuileries, and that he alone was to be obeyed, quickly spread throughout the capital. The people flew to the Tuileries in crowds: some led by mere curiosity to behold so renowned a general, others by patriotic enthusiasm to offer him their support. The following proclamation was every where posted.

"Citizens, the Council of Ancients, the depositary of the national wisdom, has just pronounced a decree; for this it has authority from articles 102 and 103 of the Act of the Constitution: it imposes upon me the duty of taking measures for the safety of the national representation. The immediate removal of the representation is necessary; the Legislative Body will then find itself in a condition to rescue the Republic from the imminent danger into which the disorganization of all branches of the administration is conducting us. At this important crisis it requires union and confidence. Rally round it: there is no other method of fixing the Republic upon the basis of civil liberty, internal happiness, victory, and peace."

To the soldiers he said:

"Soldiers, the special decree of the Coun-

cil of Ancients is conformable to articles 102 and 103 of the Constitutional Act. It has confided to me the command of the city and of the army. I have accepted that command, in order to second the measures which it is about to adopt, and which are all in favour of the people. Two years has the Republic been ill-governed; you have indulged in the hope that a period would be put to so many evils by my return. This event you have celebrated with an unanimity which imposes obligations upon me that I am about to discharge; you also will discharge yours, and you will second your general with the energy, firmness, and fidelity which I have always found in you. Liberty, victory, and peace will reinstate the French Republic in the rank which she held in Europe, and from which imbecility and treachery were alone capable of removing her."

Napoleon now sent an aide-de-camp to the guards of the Directory, for the purpose of communicating the decree to them, and enjoining them to receive no order but from him. The guard sounded to horse; the commanding officer consulted his soldiers, they answered by shouts of joy. At this very moment an order from the Directory, contrary to that of Napoleon, arrived; but the soldiers, obeying

only Napoleon's commands, marched to join him. Sieyes and Roger Ducos had been ever since the morning at the Tuileries. It is said that Barras, on seeing Sieyes mount his horse, ridiculed the awkwardness of the unpractised equestrian: he little suspected where they were going. Being shortly after apprised of the decree, he joined Gohier and Moulins; they then learnt that the troops followed Napoleon; they saw that even their own guard forsook them. Upon that Moulins went to the Tuileries, and gave in his resignation, as Sieyes and Roger Ducos had already done. Boutot, the secretary of Barras, went to Napoleon, who warmly expressed his indignation at the peculations which had ruined the Republic, and insisted that Barras should resign. Talleyrand hastened to the Director, and related this. Barras removed to Gros-Bois, accompanied by a guard of honour of dragoons. From that moment the Directory was dissolved, and Napoleon alone was invested with the executive power of the Republic.

In the mean while the Council of Five Hundred had met, under the presidency of Lucien. The constitution was explicit; the decree of the Council of Ancients was consistent with its privilege: there was no ground for objection.

The members of the council in passing through the streets of Paris, and through the Tuileries, had learnt the occurrences which were taking place, and witnessed the enthusiasm of the public. They were astonished and confounded at the ferment around them. They submitted to necessity, and adjourned their sitting to the next day, the 19th, at Saint Cloud.

Bernadotte had married the sister-in-law of Joseph Bonaparte. He had been two months in the war department of the administration, and was afterwards removed by Sieyes: all he did in office was wrong. He was one of the most furious members of the *Société du Manège*. His political opinions were then very violent, and were censured by all respectable people. Joseph had taken him in the morning to Napoleon's house, but, when he saw what was going forward, he stole away, and went to inform his friends of the *Manège* of the state of affairs. Jourdan and Augereau came to Napoleon at the Tuileries, while the troops were passing in review: he recommended them not to return to Saint Cloud to the sitting of the next day, but to remain quiet, and not to obliterate the memory of the services they had rendered the country; for that no effort could extinguish the flame which had been kindled. Augereau

assured him of his devotion, and of his desire to march under his command. He even added, "What! General, do you not still rely upon your little Augereau?"

Cambacérès, minister of justice, Fouché, minister of police, and all the other ministers, went to the Tuileries, and acknowledged the new authority. Fouché made great professions of attachment and devotion: being in direct opposition to Sieyes, he had not been admitted into the secret of the day. He had given directions for closing the barriers, and preventing the departure of couriers and coaches. "Why, good God!" said the General to him, "wherefore all these precautions? We go with the nation, and by its strength alone: let no citizen be disturbed, and let the triumph of opinion have nothing in common with the transactions of days in which a factious minority prevailed."

The members of the majority of the Five Hundred, of the minority of the Ancients, and the leaders of the *Manège*, spent the whole night in factious consultations.

At seven o'clock in the evening, Napoleon held a council at the Tuileries. Sieyes proposed that the forty principal leaders of the opposite parties should be arrested. The recommendation was a wise one; but Napoleon

believed he was too strong to need any such precaution. "I swore in the morning," said he, "to protect the national representation; I will not this evening violate my oath: I fear no such weak enemies." Every body agreed in opinion with Sieyes, but nothing could overcome this delicacy on the part of Napoleon. It will soon appear that he was in the wrong.

It was at this meeting that the establishment of three Provisional Consuls was agreed on; and Roger Ducos and Napoleon were appointed; the adjournment of the councils for three months was also resolved on. The leading members of the two councils came to an understanding on the manner in which they should act at the sitting of Saint Cloud. Lucien, Boulay, Emile Gaudin, Chazal, Cabanis, were the leaders of the Council of Five Hundred; Regnier, Lemercier, Cornudet, Fargues, were those of the Ancients.

General Murat, as has been observed, commanded the public force at Saint Cloud; Pansard commanded the battalion of the guard of the Legislative Body; General Serrurier had under his orders a reserve stationed at Point-du-Jour.

The workmen were actively employed in

getting ready the halls of the palace of Saint Cloud. The *orangerie* was allotted to the Council of Five Hundred; and the gallery of Mars, to that of the Ancients; the apartments since designated the Saloon of Princes, and the Emperor's Cabinet, were prepared for Napoleon and his staff. The inspectors of the hall occupied the apartments of the Empress. So late as two o'clock in the afternoon, the place assigned to the Council of Five Hundred was not ready. This delay of a few hours was very unfortunate. The deputies, who had been on the spot from twelve o'clock, formed groups in the garden: their minds grew heated; they sounded one another, interchanged declarations of the state of their feelings, and organized their opposition. They demanded of the Council of Ancients, what was its object? why it had brought them to Saint Cloud? was it to change the Directory? They generally agreed that Barras was corrupt, and Moulins entitled to no respect; they would name, they said, without hesitation, Napoleon and two other citizens, to fill up the government. The small number of individuals who were in the secret, then threw out that the object was to regenerate the state, by ameliorating the Constitution, and to adjourn

the councils. These hints not being successful, a degree of hesitation shewed itself, even among the members most relied on.

At length the sitting opened. Emile Gaudin ascended the tribune, painted in lively colours the dangers of the country, and proposed thanks to the Council of Ancients, for the measures of public safety which it had set on foot; and that it should be invited, by message, to explain its intentions fully. At the same time, he proposed to appoint a committee of seven persons, to make a report upon the state of the Republic.

The furious rushing forth of the winds inclosed in the caverns of Eolus never raised a more raging storm. The speaker was violently hurled to the bottom of the tribune. The ferment became excessive.

Delbred desired that the members should swear anew to the Constitution of the year III. —Chenier, Lucien, Boulay, trembled. The chamber proceeded to the *Appel Nominal*.*

During the *Appel Nominal*, which lasted more than two hours, reports of what was passing were circulated through the capital. The

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* The *Appel Nominal* was a calling over of the names of the deputies, each one giving his vote at the time of answering. *Note of the Editor.*

leaders of the assembly *du Manège*, the *tricoteuses*,* &c. hastened up. Jourdan and Augereau had kept out of the way; believing Napoleon lost, they made all haste to Saint Cloud. Augereau drew near to Napoleon, and said, "Well! here you are, in a pretty situation!" "Augereau," replied Napoleon, "remember Arcole: matters appeared much more desperate there. Take my advice, and remain quiet, if you would not fall a victim to this confusion. In half an hour you will see what a turn affairs will have taken."

The assembly appeared to declare itself with so much unanimity, that no deputy durst refuse to swear to the Constitution: even Lucien himself was compelled to swear. Shouts and cries of "bravo" were heard throughout the chamber. The moment was critical. Many members, on taking the oath, added observations, and the influence of such speeches might operate upon the troops. All minds were in a state of suspense; the zealous became neuter; the timid had deserted their standard. Not

* The *tricoteuses*, or knitters, were female jacobin clubs, chiefly encouraged by Robespierre: they took their place in the national assemblies to hear the debates, and often formed a very large proportion of the audience. *Note of the Editor.*

an instant was to be lost. Napoleon crossed the saloon of Mars, entered the Council of Ancients, and placed himself opposite to the president. (At the bar.)

"You stand," said he, "upon a volcano; the Republic no longer possesses a government; the Directory is dissolved; factions are at work; the hour of decision is come. You have called in my arm, and the arms of my comrades, to the support of your wisdom: but the moments are precious; it is necessary to take an ostensible part. I know that Cæsar, and Cromwell, are talked of—as if this day could be compared with past times. No, I desire nothing but the safety of the Republic, and to maintain the resolutions to which you are about to come.—And you, grenadiers, whose caps I perceive at the doors of this hall,—speak,—have I ever deceived you? Did I ever forfeit my word, when in camp, in the midst of privations, I promised you victory and plenty; and when, at your head, I led you from conquest to conquest? Now say, was it for my own aggrandisement, or for the interest of the Republic?"

The general spoke with energy. The grenadiers were electrified; and, waving their caps and arms in the air, they all seemed to

say, "Yes, true, true! he always kept his word!"

Upon this a member (Linglet) rose, and said with a loud voice, "General, we applaud what you say; swear then, with us, obedience to the Constitution of the year III., which alone can preserve the Republic."

The astonishment caused by these words produced the most profound silence.

Napoleon recollected himself for a moment; and then went on again emphatically: "The Constitution of the year III.!—you have it no longer—you violated it on the eighteenth of Fructidor, when the Government infringed on the independence of the Legislative Body; you violated it on the thirtieth of Prairial, in the year VII., when the Legislative Body struck at the independence of the Government; you violated it on the twenty-second of Floréal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the Government and the Legislative Body invaded the sovereignty of the people, by annulling the elections made by them. The Constitution being violated, there must be a new compact, new guarantees."

The force of this speech, and the energy of the General, brought over three-fourths of the members of Council, who rose to indicate their approbation. Cornudet and Regnier spoke

powerfully to the same effect. A member rose in opposition; he denounced the General as the only conspirator against public liberty. Napoleon interrupted the orator, and declared that he was in the secret of every party, and that all despised the Constitution of the year III.; that the only difference existing between them was, that some desired to have a moderate Republic, in which all the national interests, and all property, should be guaranteed; while, on the other hand, the others wished for a revolutionary government, as warranted by the dangers of the country. At this moment Napoleon was informed that the *Appel Nominal* was terminated in the Council of Five Hundred, and that they were endeavouring to force the president Lucien to put the outlawry of his brother to the vote. Napoleon immediately hastened to the Five Hundred, entered the chamber with his hat off, and ordered the officers and soldiers who accompanied him, to remain at the doors: he was desirous to present himself at the bar, to rally his party, which was numerous, but which had lost all unity and resolution. But to get to the bar, it was necessary to cross half the chamber, because the President had his seat on one of the wings. When Napoleon

had advanced alone across one-third of the orangery, two or three hundred members suddenly rose, crying, "Death to the tyrant! down with the dictator!"

Two grenadiers, who, by the order of the General, had remained at the door, and who had reluctantly obeyed, saying to him, "You do not know them, they are capable of any thing!" rushed in, sabre in hand, overthrowing all that opposed their passage, to join the General, and cover him with their bodies. All the other grenadiers followed this example, and forced Napoleon out of the chamber. In the confusion one of them, named Thomé, was slightly wounded by the thrust of a dagger; and the clothes of another were cut through.

The General descended into the court-yard, called the troops into a circle by beat of drum, got on horseback, and harangued them: "I was about," said he, "to point out to them the means of saving the Republic, and restoring our glory. They answered me with their daggers. It was thus they would have accomplished the wishes of the allied kings. What more could England have done? Soldiers, may I rely upon you?"

Unanimous acclamations formed the reply to

this speech. Napoleon instantly ordered a captain to go with ten men into the chamber of the Five Hundred, and to liberate the President.

Lucien had just thrown off his robe. "Wretches!" exclaimed he, "you insist that I should put out of the protection of the laws my brother, the saviour of the country, him whose very name causes kings to tremble! I lay aside the insignia of the popular magistracy; I offer myself in the tribune as the defender of him, whom you command me to immolate unheard."

Thus saying, he quitted the chair, and darted into the tribune. The officer of grenadiers then presented himself at the door of the chamber, exclaiming, "*Vive la République!*" It was supposed that the troops were sending a deputation to express their devotion to the councils. The captain was received with a joyful expression of feeling. He availed himself of the misapprehension, approached the tribune, and secured the President, saying to him in a low voice, "It is your brother's order." The grenadiers at the same time shouted, "Down with the assassins!"

Upon these exclamations, the joy of the members was converted into sadness; a gloomy

silence testified the dejection of the whole assembly. No opposition was offered to the departure of the President, who left the chamber, rushed into the court-yard, mounted a horse, and cried out in his stentorian voice, "General—and you, soldiers—the President of the Council of Five Hundred proclaims to you that factious men, with drawn daggers, have interrupted the deliberations of that assembly. He calls upon you to employ force against these disturbers. The Council of Five Hundred is dissolved."

"President," replied the General, "it shall be done."

He then ordered Murat into the chamber, at the head of a detachment in close column. At this crisis General B * * * ventured to ask him for fifty men, in order to place himself in ambuscade upon the way, and fire upon the fugitives. Napoleon replied to this request only by enjoining the grenadiers to commit no excesses. "It is my wish," said he, "that not one drop of blood may be shed."

Murat presented himself at the door, and summoned the Council to disperse. The shouts and vociferations continued. Colonel Moulins, aide-de-camp of Brune, who had just arrived from Holland, ordered the charge to be beaten. The drum put an end to the clamour.

The soldiers entered the chamber charging bayonets. The deputies leaped out at the windows, and dispersed, leaving their gowns, caps, &c.: in one moment the chamber was empty. Those members of the Council who had shewn most pertinacity, fled with the utmost precipitation to Paris.

About one hundred deputies of the Five Hundred rallied at the office and round the inspectors of the hall. They presented themselves in a body to the Council of the Ancients. Lucien represented that the Five Hundred had been dissolved at his instance; that, in the exercise of his functions as President of the assembly, he had been surrounded by daggers; that he had sent attendants to summon the Council again; that nothing had been done contrary to form, and that the troops had but obeyed his mandate. The Council of the Ancients, which had witnessed with some uneasiness this exercise of military power, was satisfied with the explanation. At eleven at night the two Councils re-assembled; they formed large majorities. Two committees were appointed to report upon the state of the Republic. On the report of Beranger, thanks to Napoleon and the troops were carried. Boulay de la Meurthe, in the Five Hundred, and Villetard in the Ancients,

detailed the situation of the Republic, and the measures necessary to be taken. The law of the 19th of Brumaire was passed; it adjourned the Councils to the 1st of Ventose following; it created two committees of twenty-five members each, to represent the Councils provisionally. These committees were also to prepare a civil code. A Provisional Consular Commission, consisting of Sieyes, Roger-Ducos, and Napoleon, was charged with the executive power.

This law put an end to the Constitution of the year III.

The Provisional Consuls repaired on the 20th, at two in the morning, to the chamber of the Orangery, where the two Councils were assembled. Lucien, the president, addressed them in these words:

"Citizen Consuls, The greatest people on earth intrusts its fate to you. Three months hence, your measures must pass the ordeal of public opinion. The welfare of thirty millions of men, internal quiet, the wants of the armies, peace,—such are to be the objects of your cares. Doubtless courage and devotion to your duties are requisite in taking upon you functions so important; but the confidence of our people and warriors is with you, and the Legislative Body

knows that your hearts are wholly with the country. Citizen Consuls, we have, previously to adjourning, taken the oath which you will repeat in the midst of us: the sacred oath of 'inviolable fidelity to the sovereignty of the people, to the French Republic one and indivisible, to liberty, to equality, and to the representative system.'"

The assembly separated, and the Consuls returned to Paris, to the palace of the Luxembourg.

Thus was the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire crowned with success.

Sieyes, during the most critical moments, had remained in his carriage at the gate of Saint Cloud, ready to follow the march of the troops. His conduct, during the danger, was becoming: he evinced coolness, resolution, and intrepidity.

PROVISIONAL CONSULS.

State of the capital—Proclamation of Napoleon—First sitting of the Consuls; Napoleon president—Ministry: changes therein—Maret, Dubois-Crancé, Robert-Lindet, Gaudin, Reinhart, Forfait, Laplace—First acts of the Consuls—Funeral honours paid to the Pope—Shipwrecked emigrants at Calais. Nappertandy, Blackwell—Suppression of the festival of the 21st of January—Interview of two royalist agents with Napoleon—La Vendée, Chatillon, Bernier, D'Autichamp; Georges—Pacification—Discussion on the Constitution—The opinions of Sieyes and Napoleon—Daunou—The Constitution—Nomination of the Consuls Cambaceres and Lebrun.

It would be difficult to describe the anxious suspense of the capital during the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire; the most alarming reports were universally circulated; it was said that Napoleon was overthrown; the renewal of the Reign of Terror was expected. It was not so much the danger of the Republic that was apprehended, as that which every private family dreaded.

About nine o'clock in the evening, the news from Saint Cloud spread throughout Paris: the public was informed of the events which had taken place; and the liveliest joy suc-

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ceeded to the most agonizing fears. The following proclamation was read by torchlight:

"Citizens!

"On my return to Paris I found discord pervading every department of government, and only this single truth unanimously agreed on, *that the Constitution was half destroyed, and no longer capable of maintaining our liberty.* Every party applied to me, confided to me its designs, disclosed its secrets, and solicited my support. I refused to become the head of any faction. The Council of Ancients called on me. I answered the appeal. A plan for a general reform had been devised by men in whom the nation is accustomed to behold defenders of liberty, of equality, and of property: this plan demanded calm, free, and impartial examination, unfettered by influence or fear. The Council of Ancients, therefore, determined upon the removal of the Legislative Body to Saint Cloud. It entrusted me with the disposal of the force necessary for the maintenance of its independence. I deemed it due from me to our fellow-citizens, to the soldiers who are laying down their lives in our ranks, to the glory purchased by their blood, to accept the command. The Councils met at Saint Cloud: the troops of the Republic gua-

ranteed safety without; but assassins spread terror within. Several deputies of the Council of Five Hundred, armed with daggers and fire-arms, dealt threats of death around them. The plans which were to have been brought forward, were withheld, the majority of the assembly was disorganized, the most intrepid orators were disconcerted, and the inutility of any sober proposition became but too evident. Indignant and grieved, I hastened to the Council of Ancients: I intreated it to allow me to carry my designs for the public good into execution. I urged the misfortunes of the country which had suggested them. The Council seconded my views, by new testimonies of its unaltered confidence. I offered myself to the Chamber of Five Hundred, alone, unarmed, my head uncovered, exactly as I had been received by the Ancients with so much approbation. I went to remind the majority of their designs, and to satisfy them of their power. Instantly the daggers which menaced the deputies, were raised against their defender. Twenty assassins rushed upon me, aiming at my breast. The grenadiers of the Legislative Body, whom I had left at the door of the chamber, hastily interposed between the assassins and myself. One of these brave grena-

diers (Thomé) received a thrust from a dagger, which pierced his clothes. They carried me off, and at the instant they were doing so, cries were heard to outlaw him who was at that very time the defender of the law. It was the savage yell of murderers against the power destined to crush them. They crowded round the President, threatening him, with arms in their hands; they ordered him to pronounce the outlawry. Apprised of this, I gave directions for rescuing him from their fury, and ten grenadiers of the Legislative Body charged into the chamber and cleared it. The factious parties, intimidated, dispersed and fled. The majority, relieved from their violence, returned freely and peaceably into the chamber, listened to the proposals made to them for the public safety; and on due deliberation, framed the wholesome resolutions which are about to become the new and provisional law of the Republic. Frenchmen! you will, doubtless, recognise in my conduct the zeal of a soldier of liberty, of a citizen devoted to the Republic. The principles of preservation, protection, and liberality, are restored to their due preponderance by the dispersion of those factious men who tyrannized over the Councils, and who, though

they have been prevented from becoming the most hateful of mankind, are nevertheless the most wretched."

On the morning of the 11th of November, the Consuls held their first sitting. It opened with a discussion respecting the election of a president. The decision of the question depended on the vote of Roger-Ducos; whose opinion, in the Directory, had always been governed by that of Sieyes; the latter, therefore, relied upon his observing the same line of conduct in the Consulate. The event proved otherwise. The Consul Roger-Ducos had scarcely entered the cabinet, when, turning towards Napoleon, he said: "It is useless to go to the vote on the Presidency; it belongs to you of right." Napoleon then took the chair; and Roger-Ducos continued to vote with Napoleon. He had some warm discussions with Sieyes on this subject; but he remained firm to his system. This conduct was the result of conviction that Napoleon alone was capable of re-establishing and maintaining order. Roger-Ducos was not a man of great talent; but he possessed sound common-sense, and his intentions were good.

Lagarde, the Secretary of the Directory, did not enjoy an unblemished reputation. Maret,

since Duke of Bassano, was appointed to that office. He was born at Dijon. He was attached to the principles of the Revolution of 1789, and was engaged in the negotiations with England before the 10th of August; he afterwards treated with Lord Malmesbury at Lisle. Maret is a man of great abilities, of a mild temper, and of great propriety of manners; his probity and delicacy proof against every temptation. He had escaped the Reign of Terror, having been arrested with Semonville as he crossed Lombardy on his way to Venice, intending from thence to go to Naples in the character of Ambassador. After the 9th of Thermidor he was exchanged for Madame the daughter of Louis XVI. then a prisoner in the Temple.

The first sitting of the Consuls lasted several hours. Sieyes had hoped that Napoleon would interfere only in military matters, and would leave the regulation of civil affairs to him; but he was much surprised when he observed that Napoleon had formed settled opinions on policy, finance, and justice: even on jurisprudence also; and, in a word, on all branches of administration; that he supported his ideas with arguments at once forcible and concise, and that he was not easily convinced. In the evening, on his return home, Sieyes said in the

presence of Chazal, Talleyrand, Boulay, Rœderer, Cabanis, &c.; "Gentlemen, you have a master; Napoleon *will* do all, and *can* do all. In our deplorable situation, it is better to submit, than to excite dissensions which would draw down certain ruin."

The first act of government was the organization of the ministry. Dubois de Crancé was Minister at War. He was incompetent for such a post; a party man, little esteemed, and altogether devoid of habits of business and order. His offices were filled by creatures of faction, who, instead of doing their work, spent their time in discussions: it was a downright chaos. It will hardly be believed that Dubois de Crancé could not furnish the Consul with a single report of the state of the army. Berthier was appointed Minister at War. He was obliged to send a dozen officers, one after another, among the military divisions and regiments, to obtain states of the different corps, their situation, pay, supplies, &c. The ordnance-office was the only one which possessed any returns. A great number of corps had been formed, as well by generals as by the administrations in the different departments; their existence was unknown to the ministry. It was said to Dubois de Crancé: "You pay the

army, you can surely give us a return of the pay."—"We don't pay it."—"You victual the army; let us have the returns of the victualling-office."—"We don't victual it."—"You clothe the army; let us see the statements of the clothing."—"We don't clothe it."

The army at home was paid by robbing the military chest; it was subsisted and clothed by means of requisitions, and the war-office exercised no kind of control. It took General Berthier a month to collect the materials for drawing up a state of the army; and until that had been accomplished, it was impossible to set about its re-organization.

The Army of the North was in Holland; it had just repulsed the English. Its condition was satisfactory. The Dutch, according to the treaty, supplied all its wants.

The Armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia suffered greatly; their state was most disorderly.

The Army of Italy, driven back upon the states of Genoa, was without subsistence, and deprived of every thing. Its insubordination had arrived at such a pitch that some corps quitted their position without orders, in presence of the enemy, and betook themselves to places where they hoped to find provisions.

The reform of the war department being effected, discipline was soon restored.

The post of Minister of Finance was held by Robert Lindet, who had been a member of the Committee of Public Safety, in the time of Robespierre. He was a man of integrity, but possessing none of the information necessary for the management of the finances of a great empire. Under the revolutionary government he had, however, obtained the reputation of an able financier; but in those days the true minister of finance was the printer of the assignats.

Lindet was succeeded by Gaudin, subsequently Duke of Gaëta, who had long occupied the place of chief clerk of finance. A man of mild manners, and of inflexible probity.

The treasury was empty; there was not wherewithal to dispatch a courier in it. Nothing came into it but cheques, bills, notes, schedules, and paper of all kinds, on which the receipts of the army had been consumed by anticipation. The contractors, paid in drafts themselves, drew directly on the receivers, as fast as any thing came into their hands; and yet they did no service. The rate of interest was at 6 per cent. Every source of supply was dried up; credit was annihilated; all was disorder, waste, and

destruction. The paymasters, who at the same time exercised the functions of receivers, enriched themselves by a system of jobbing, the more difficult to repress, because every species of the paper-money bore a different real value.

The new minister, Gaudin, adopted measures which checked these abuses and restored confidence. He suppressed the compulsory and progressive loan.*

* The law of compulsory and progressive loan for a hundred millions of livres, had produced an effect on property much more injurious than that which the law of hostages had produced on the liberty and safety of the citizens. The compulsory and progressive loan bore upon all agricultural and commercial property, real or personal. All citizens were to contribute according to the assessments of a jury; and these assessments were founded: 1st, upon the amount of the direct impost; and 2dly, upon an arbitrary basis. Taxable persons, paying under 300 francs, were not liable to this loan. Every one who paid 500 francs, was assessed at four-tenths; and every one paying 4000 francs and upwards, at the whole of his revenue for one year. The second ground of assessment was solely dependent on opinion: the relations of emigrants and of the nobility were taxable arbitrarily by the jury. The effect of this law was just what might have been expected. Registration ceased to be productive, for there were no transfers. The national domains were no longer the subjects of sale, for property was cried down; the rich became poor, though the poor grew no richer: in short, this absurd law produced a result quite contrary to

Several citizens offered considerable sums to Government. The trade of Paris supplied a loan of twelve millions; which at that moment was of great importance. The sale of the domains belonging to the House of Orange, which France had reserved to itself by the treaty of the Hague, was effected, and produced twenty-four millions, and cheques, called *bons de rescription*, for the redemption of annuities, were issued to the amount of 150 millions.

The direct impositions were in arrear in consequence of the delay which took place in the completion of the lists. The minister established a commission for the management of the public contributions. The Constituent Assembly, whose principles of administration were defective, because they were the result of an idle theory and not the fruit of experience,

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that looked for by its authors: it dried up all the sources of public revenue. The minister Gaudin would not go to bed or sleep a single night, after he received the portfolio of finance, until he had drawn up and proposed an act for repealing this mischievous law, for which he substituted twenty-five per cent. additional upon all contributions direct or indirect: this tax was collected without difficulty, and produced fifty millions. The sums already collected under the compulsory loan were placed to the account of the additional twenty-five per cent. or liquidated in the great book.

had charged the municipal authorities with the formation of lists, which were confirmed and adopted for use on the decision of the councils of departments. This organization was fraught with mischief; yet the evil was but little noticed: in 1792, 93, 94, the assignats provided for every thing. When the Constitution of 1795 was formed, 5000 superintendants were directed to form the lists. At the same time a mixed management was adopted, which cost five millions of livres extra, and effected its object no better than the law of the Constituent Assembly. Gaudin, instructed by experience, confided the formation of these lists to one hundred Directors-general, who had under them one hundred Inspectors and eight hundred and forty Comptrollers, the whole of which cost but three millions of livres. This was, therefore, a saving of two millions of livres.

He created the redemption fund; obliged the receivers of taxes to deposit the amount of a twentieth part of their receipts; and organized the system of the bonds of receivers-general, upon each of which was payable, every month, one twelfth of the amount of the receipts. From that moment all the direct contributions came into the treasury, even before the beginning of the year, and

in large sums; so that the minister was enabled to apply them for the service in all parts of France. It was no longer of importance that the levies might be delayed in any degree, or might be effected with more or less activity; that had no influence upon the operations of the treasury. This law was one of the causes of the prosperity and regularity which have since prevailed in the finances.

The Republic had forty millions of livres a year in forest land; but this source of revenue was ill-managed: the registration department appointed to receive this revenue and the stamp duties, as well as to exercise signorial rights, was inadequate to the management of matters which required a particular species of information, and considerable activity. The minister Gaudin appointed a special commission for the management of the woods and forests. This change gave rise to complaints. It was apprehended that the abuses of the ancient administration of the forests and rivers would be revived. "The commission," it was said, "is appointed; it will not be long before its jurisdiction and its special tribunals are renewed; we shall witness the return of all the abuses which excited our complaints in 1789." These apprehensions were unfounded: the abuses of

the ancient administration were gone for ever, and the new commissioners bestowed their care on the management of the forests, and the sale and felling of timber; they also paid the minutest attention to the seed-plots and plantations; and recovered to the demesne a large quantity of woodland encroached upon by communes or by private individuals; in short, it produced the most beneficial results, and entirely gained the good opinion of the public.

All that it was possible to effect in a short time, towards rooting out the errors of a vicious and oppressive sway, and restoring the principles of credit and moderation, was accomplished by the minister Gaudin. He was a statesman of integrity and regularity, who knew how to conciliate his subordinate agents; proceeding slowly, but surely. All that he did and proposed in this early period, he supported and perfected throughout fifteen years of able administration. He never had to withdraw any of his measures, because his knowledge was practical and the fruit of long experience.

Cambaceres retained the administration of Justice. A great number of alterations were made among the tribunals.

Talleyrand had been dismissed from the post

of Minister of Foreign relations, through the influence of the *Société du Manège.*

Reinhard, who had succeeded him, was a native of Wurtemberg. He was a well-behaved man, of ordinary capacity. The post was properly due to Talleyrand; but, in order to avoid too harsh an opposition to public opinion, which ran strongly against him, especially with regard to American affairs, Reinhard was at first retained in his office; besides, the place was of no great importance, considering the critical situation in which the Republic stood. In fact, it was impossible to enter upon any sort of negotiation without previously re-establishing internal order, reuniting the nation, and gaining some advantage over our foreign enemies.

Bourdon was succeeded in the Admiralty department by Forfait, and appointed commissioner of marine at Antwerp. Forfait, a native of Normandy, had the reputation of being a naval architect of first-rate talent; but he was a mere projector, and did not answer the expectations formed of him. This department was of the highest importance, because the Republic was under the necessity of sending succours to the army in Egypt, the garrison of Malta, and the colonies.

In the interior, the minister Quinette was removed to make way for Laplace, a geometrician of the first rank; but who soon proved himself below mediocrity as a minister: on his very first essay, the Consuls found that they were deceived; not a question did Laplace seize in its true point of view; he sought for subtleties in every thing; had none but problematical ideas, and carried the doctrine of infinite littleness into the business of administration.

The appointments made by the Consuls had been hitherto unanimous; their first difference in opinion arose respecting Fouché, who had been Minister of Police. Sieyes detested him, and considered the government insecure, so long as he presided over the police. Fouché was born at Nantes; he had been a public haranguer before the Revolution; he afterwards filled a subaltern situation in his department, and distinguished himself by the violence of his principles. Deputed to the Convention, he trod in the same path with Collot d'Herbois; and, after the revolution of Thermidor, he was proscribed as a Terrorist. While in the Directory, he had attached himself to Barras, and had commenced his fortune by being a sharer in some contracts to which Government

had contrived to recommend a great number of revolutionary characters; a circumstance which had drawn additional odium upon men already rendered unpopular by political events. Fouché, who had now held the administration of the police for several months, had taken a part in opposition to the faction *du Manège*, which still exerted itself, and which it was necessary to destroy. Sieyes, however, ascribed this conduct, not to any fixed principles, but to the absolute hatred which he bore to those societies, wherein incessant declamations were openly held against malversations, and against those who had shared in the public contracts. Sieyes proposed Alquier in the place of Fouché: this alteration did not appear to be indispensably necessary; for, although Fouché was not in the secret of the 18th of Brumaire, he had conducted himself extremely well. Napoleon agreed with Sieyes, that it was impossible to rely in the least on the morality of such a minister, or on his versatile disposition; but remarked, at the same time, that after all he had been useful to the Republic. "*We are creating a new era,*" said Napoleon: "*of the past we must remember only the good, and forget the evil. Time, habits of business, and experience, have formed many able men, and modified many*

characters." Fouché accordingly retained his place.

The nomination of Gaudin to be minister of finance, left vacant the place of Government commissioner in the department of the Posts, which is one of great trust. It was confided to Lafôret, who was then at the head of the department of Funds for the exterior relations. He was a clever man, and had been a long time consul-general for France in America.

The Polytechnic School was then only in its infancy. Monge was charged with that definitive organization of it, which has since received the sanction of experience. This school has become one of the most celebrated in the world. It has furnished a great number of officers, mechanists, and chymists, who have either recruited the scientific departments of the army, or, dispersed throughout our manufactories, have contributed to that perfection in the arts, which have given to French industry the high superiority it possesses.

The new Government was nevertheless surrounded by enemies, who openly carried on their operations. La Vendée, Languedoc, and Belgium, were convulsed by disputes and insurrections. The foreign party, which, for

many months, had been daily increasing, saw with vexation a change so well adapted to destroy its hopes. The anarchists listened to nothing but their hatred against Sieyes.*

The law passed on the 19th of Brumaire at Saint Cloud, had enjoined the Government to take the measures necessary for restoring the tranquillity of the Republic. It had expelled fifty-five deputies from the Legislative Body. A great many others were dissatisfied at the adjournment of the chambers; they persisted in remaining at Paris and assembling there. It was the first time since the Revolution, that the tribune had been silent, and the Legislative Body in recess. Opinions were kept unsettled by the most sinister reports; the Minister of Police, therefore, proposed measures for repressing the audacity of the

* Sieyes was often alarmed at the plots of the jacobins in Paris, and their threats of assassinating the Consuls. He once came in great agitation, and awoke Napoleon at three o'clock in the morning, to tell him something of this kind which he had just heard from the police. "*Let them alone,*" said Napoleon; "*in war as well as in love, we must come to close quarters to make an end of it. Let them come; it may as well be settled one day as another.*"

These fears were unfounded. Threats are more easily made than carried into execution; and with anarchists, they precede, by a very long interval, any kind of action.

anarchist party. A decree was passed, by which fifty-nine of the chief disturbers were condemned to deportation; thirty-seven to Guiana, and twenty-two to the island of Oleron: this decree was generally blamed, for public opinion ran against all violent measures; nevertheless it had a salutary effect. The anarchists, alarmed in their turn, dispersed. This was all that was desired; shortly afterwards, the decree of deportation was changed for a mere measure of observation—and in a little time the observation itself ceased.

The public claimed the merit of the repeal of this decree. It was thought that the administration had retracted; this was an error, it desired only to terrify, and it had attained its object. The public mind throughout France soon experienced a change. The citizens had assembled, addresses of adhesion poured in from the departments, and the malevolent, of whatever party, ceased to be dangerous. The law of hostages, which had thrown a great number of citizens into prison, was repealed.* Intolerant laws had been made

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* The law of hostages was passed on the 12th July, 1799; it was dictated by the jacobins of the *Manège*, and oppressed from 150 to 200,000 citizens, whom it placed out of

by the preceding governments against the priesthood; persecution had been carried as far as the hatred of theophilanthropists would go. Refractory priests, and priests who had submitted to the oaths, were all under the same proscription; some had been sent to the island of Rhé, some to Guiana, some into foreign countries, and others languished in the prisons. It was agreed on, as a principle, that conscience was not amenable to the law,

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the protection of the laws; it made them answerable, in person and property, for all transactions arising out of our civil troubles. These individuals were the relations of emigrants, the nobles, the grandfathers, grandmothers, fathers and mothers, of all who formed part of any armed band, whether Vendéans, Chouans, or plunderers of public carriages. By Article 5. the officers of the departments were authorized to assemble hostages selected from those classes, in a central spot of each department, and to transport to Guiana four of these hostages for every public functionary, every soldier, or purchaser of national domains, who might be assassinated: these classes were moreover to provide, by extraordinary fines, for the expenses occasioned by informers and spies; they were to bear the indemnifications made to patriots, for losses sustained in consequence of the civil troubles. In pursuance of this law, many thousands of women, and old men, were arrested. A great number fled. This law was repealed. Couriers were immediately sent into all the departments, to cause the prisons to be opened.

and that the right of the sovereign extended only to the exaction of obedience and fidelity.

If the question had been thus put to the Constituent Assembly, and no oath as to the civil constitution of the clergy, which was, in fact, entering upon theological discussions, had been required, there would not have been any refractory priests. But Talleyrand, and other members of that assembly, imposed that oath, the consequences of which have been so lamentable to France.

The civil constitution of the clergy having become part of the law of the state, it was necessary to protect a great number of priests who had conformed to it, and it is probable that this clergy would have formed the national church; but, when the Legislative Assembly and the Convention shut up the churches, suppressed the observance of the sabbath, and treated with the same contempt the priests who had taken the oaths, and those who refused to take them, they gave the latter a clear advantage.

Napoleon, who had meditated much upon religious matters, in Italy and in Egypt, had formed clear ideas on that topic; and he lost no time in putting a stop to persecution. His first step was to order that all priests, married

or sworn, who were imprisoned or deported, should be set at liberty. Such had been the indiscriminate violence of the factions, that these two classes had actually been persecuted without distinction. It was decreed that every priest banished, or imprisoned, who would take an oath of fidelity to the established government, should be instantly set at liberty. Within a short time after the passing of this law, more than twenty thousand old men returned to their families. A few ignorant priests persisted in their obstinacy, and remained in exile; but in that they condemned themselves, for the precepts of Christianity admit only of one interpretation on this point, and, according to them, an oath of fidelity to the Government cannot be refused without crime.

At this period also, the law of the decades was repealed, the churches were again devoted to public worship, and pensions were granted to persons of both sexes under religious vows, who took the oath of fidelity to the Government. The greater part submitted, and thereby thousands of individuals were snatched from misery; the country churches were re-opened, domestic religious rites were suffered; all forms of worship were protected;

and the number of theophilanthropists rapidly diminished.

Pope Pius the sixth died at the age of eighty-two, at Valence, to which place he had retired after the events in Italy. Napoleon, in returning from Egypt, had conversed a few minutes in that city with Spina, the pope's almoner, whom he subsequently appointed cardinal and archbishop of Genoa; he learnt that no funeral honours had been paid to the Pope, and that his corpse was laid in the sacristy of the cathedral. A decree of the Consuls ordered that the customary honours should be rendered to his remains; and that a monument of marble should be raised upon his tomb. It was an homage paid by the First Consul and the majority of the French people, to an unfortunate sovereign, and the head of religion.

The Consular government, by daily acts of justice and generosity, sought to repair the faults and oppressions of the preceding governments. The members of the Constituent Assembly, who had acknowledged the sovereignty of the people, were erased from the list of emigrants, by a decision agreed upon as fundamental: this caused great uneasiness. "The emigrants will return in crowds," it was

said; "the royalist party will raise its head, as it did in Fructidor; the Republicans will be massacred." La Fayette, Latour-Maubourg, and Bureau de Puzy, returned to France, and to the peaceable enjoyment of their property, which had not been alienated.

Meanwhile a few unfortunate wretches were groaning in perpetual apprehension of death. Some years before, a vessel which had left England for La Vendée, having on board nine persons of the most ancient families of France—Talmonts, Montmorencys, and Choiseuils—had been wrecked on the coast of Calais. These passengers were emigrants: they were arrested, and from that time had been dragged from prison to prison, from tribunal to tribunal, without having their fate decided. Their arrival in France was not a voluntary act; they were unfortunate castaways: but they were attacked on account of their place of destination. They affirmed, indeed, that they were going to India; but the vessel and its stores testified that they were going to La Vendée. Without entering into that question, Napoleon saw that the condition of these men rendered them inviolable; they were under the laws of hospitality. To consign to punishment unfortunate men who had

preferred committing themselves to the generosity of France, to throwing themselves into the waves, would have been an act of singular barbarity. Napoleon decided that the laws against émigrants were political laws, and that their policy would not be violated by the exercise of indulgence towards persons who were so peculiarly situated.

He had already decided a similar question, when, as general of artillery, he was fortifying the coasts of the south. Some members of the Chabrillant family, in the passage from Spain to Italy, had been taken by a corsair and carried into Toulon; they were immediately thrown into prison. The populace, knowing that they were emigrants, would have massacred them. Napoleon availed himself of his popularity; and, by means of the cannoneers and workmen of the arsenal, who were foremost in the disturbance, saved this unhappy family: dreading another insurrection of the people, he placed them in empty ammunition-waggons that he was sending to the isles of Hyeres; and thus he preserved them.

The English government did not show equal generosity towards Nappertandy, Blackwell, and other Irishmen, who, after being shipwrecked on the coast of Norway, were crossing

the territory of Hamburgh to return to Paris. They had been naturalized as Frenchmen, and were officers in the service of the Republic. The British minister at Hamburgh compelled the Senate to arrest them on their passage; and—who would credit it?—all Europe rose up against these unfortunate people! The Russian and Austrian governments seconded the demands of that of England, to have them given up. The citizens of Hamburgh resisted for some time; but, seeing France sinking in importance, and crippled by reverses, in Germany as well as in Italy, they at last yielded.

France had the greater reason to feel herself offended at this conduct, inasmuch as the city of Hamburgh had long been the refuge of 20,000 French emigrants, who had there organized armies, and concerted plots against the Republic; while two unfortunate officers in the service of the Republic, saved on account of their misfortunes and shipwreck, were delivered up to the executioner.

In consequence of this, the Consuls laid an embargo upon all shipping belonging to Hamburgh in the ports of France; recalled from Hamburgh the French agents, both commercial and diplomatic: and dismissed those of Hamburgh back to that place.

Shortly after all this, the French arms having been successful, and the happy changes of the 18th of Brumaire being daily more generally felt, the Senate of Hamburgh lost no time in addressing a long letter to Napoleon, to testify its repentance to him. Napoleon replied thus:

"I have received your letter, gentlemen; it does not justify you. Courage and virtue are the preservers of states: cowardice and crime are their ruin. You have violated the laws of hospitality—a thing which never happened among the most savage hordes of the Desert. Your fellow-citizens will for ever reproach you with it. The two unfortunate men whom you have given up, die with glory; but their blood will bring more evil upon their persecutors than it would be in the power of an army to do."

A solemn deputation from the Senate arrived at the Tuileries to make public apologies to Napoleon. He again testified his indignation: and when the envoys urged their weakness, he said to them, "Well! and had you not the resource of weak states? was it not in your power to let them escape?"

The Directory had adopted the plan of supporting the French prisoners in England,

long as England should support its own people who might be prisoners in France: we had more prisoners in England than that power had in France. Provisions were dearer in the former than in the latter country; and, consequently, this state of things was burdensome to France. To this inconvenience was added that of suffering the English government to have, under pretence of keeping accounts, sources of intelligence in the interior of the Republic. The Consular government lost no time in altering this arrangement. Each nation became responsible for the support of the prisoners it detained.

In the existing state of men's minds it became requisite to rally and unite the different parties who had divided the whole nation and laid it open to its external enemies.

The oath of hatred to royalty was suppressed as useless and contrary to the majesty of the Republic, which, acknowledged as it was, on all sides, stood in need of no such support. It was in a similar way resolved that the 21st of January should be no longer observed.

This anniversary could be viewed only as a day of national calamity. Napoleon had already explained himself respecting it, while discussing the subject of the 10th of August.

"We celebrate a victory," said he, "but we weep over its victims, even though our enemies. The festival of the 21st of January is immoral," continued he, "without pronouncing whether the death of Louis XVI. was just or unjust, politic or impolitic, useful or of no use; and even if we decide that it was just, politic, and useful, it was nevertheless a calamity. Under such circumstances, oblivion is, of all things, the best."

Offices were bestowed upon men of all parties and of all moderate opinions. The effect of this was such, that in a few days there was a general alteration in the temper of the nation. He who a few days before listened to proposals from the foreign powers and the emissaries of the Bourbons, dreading above all things the principles of the *Société du Manège* and the return of the reign of terror, now put confidence in the Government, so truly national, powerful, and generous—which had just established itself, broken former bonds, and once more sided with the nation and the revolution. The foreign faction was for a moment disconcerted at this; it soon recovered, and sought to effect another change in public opinion, by endeavouring to create a persuasion that Napoleon was labouring for the Bourbons.

One of the principal agents of the diplomatic body demanded and obtained an interview with Napoleon. He confessed to him that he was acquainted with the committee of the agents of the Bourbons, in Paris; that, in despair of the salvation of the country, he had entered into engagements with them, because he preferred any thing to the reign of terror: but that, the 18th of Brumaire having once more formed a national government, he not only renounced that connexion, but came for the purpose of informing him of all he knew; upon condition, nevertheless, that his honour should not be compromised, and that the individuals in question should have liberty to depart in safety.

He even presented to Napoleon, Hyde-de-Neuville and Dandigné, two of the agents. Napoleon received them at ten at night in one of the small chambers of the Luxembourg. "A few days ago," said they to him, "we felt confident of triumph; now every thing is altered. But, General, you will never be imprudent enough to rely upon such events? You have it in your power to re-establish the throne, and to restore it to its legitimate master; we are acting in concert with the leaders of La Vendée, we can bring them all here,

Disclose to us what you wish to do; how you purpose to conduct yourself; and if your intentions agree with ours, we shall all be at your disposal.

Hyde-de-Neuville appeared to be a young man of talent; ardent, but not violent. Dandigné seemed an outrageous madman. Napoleon answered them, "that it was useless to think of re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons in France; that they could never ascend it but by striding over 500,000 dead bodies; that his intention was to forget the past, and to receive the submission of all who were willing to concur with the nation; that he would willingly treat with Chatillon, Bernier, Bourmont, Suzannet, D'Autichamp, &c.: but upon condition that those chiefs should thenceforward be faithful to the national government, and should break off all communication with the Bourbons, and with foreigners."

This conference lasted half an hour, and both parties were mutually convinced that there was no possibility of their coming to an understanding upon such a basis.

The new principles adopted by the Consuls and the new functionaries, appeased the troubles of Toulouse, the discontents of the South, and the insurrection of Belgium. The reputa-

tion of Napoleon was dear to the Belgians, and had a happy influence upon the public affairs of those departments which the persecution of the priests had so highly exasperated the preceding year.

Nevertheless, La Vendée and the Chouans still disturbed eighteen departments of the Republic. Affairs went on so ill, that Chatillon, chief of the Vendéans, took Nantes: he remained there, indeed, scarcely twenty-four hours. But the Chouans carried their ravages to the very gates of the capital. The leaders replied to the proclamation of Government by counter proclamations, in which they asserted that they fought for the re-establishment of the throne and altar, and that they beheld only usurpers in the Directory and Consuls.

A great number of generals and officers of the army were betraying the Republic, and in league with the heads of the Chouans. The little confidence that the Directory had inspired in them, the disorder that had prevailed in every department of the administration, had tempted these officers to forget their honour and their duty, in order to join a party which they thought on the point of carrying the day. Many were shameless enough to tell this in confidence

to Napoleon, declaring to him, that they had only yielded to circumstances, and were ready to redeem a moment of irresolution by services which might be the more important, as they were in the secrets of the Chouans and the Vendéans.

Negotiations were entered into with the chiefs in La Vendée, and a considerable force was sent against them at the same time. Every thing announced the approaching destruction of their bands; but moral causes acted yet more powerfully: the fame of Napoleon was so great in La Vendée, that the chiefs in that province were fearful of being deserted by public opinion.

On the 17th of January, Chatillon, Suzannet, D'Autichamp, and the Abbé Bernier, the leaders of the insurrection on the left of the Loire, submitted, at Montluçon.

General Hedouville negotiated the treaty which was signed on the 17th of January at Montluçon. This treaty of peace had nothing in common with any which had preceded it. It was made with Frenchmen returning to the bosom of their country, and submitting with confidence to the Government. The steps, financial or ecclesiastical, taken by the administration, contributed every day more and more to the

tranquillity of these departments. These Vendéan chiefs were frequently received at Malmaison: when once peace was made with them, Napoleon had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

Bernier was rector of Saint Lô. He was short and slender in person. He was a good preacher, and had skill enough to diffuse fanaticism among his flock, without partaking in it himself. He had possessed great influence in La Vendée; his credit had somewhat lessened; but he still retained enough to enable him to be useful to Government. He attached himself to the First Consul, and was faithful to his engagements. He was charged with negotiating the concordat with the Court of Rome; and Napoleon made him Bishop of Orleans.

Chatillon was an old gentleman of sixty; brave and faithful, without much quickness, but not deficient in vigour. He was lately married, which contributed to keep him true to his promises. He lived alternately at Paris, Nantes, and his own estates. He subsequently obtained many favours of the First Consul. Chatillon thought that the war in La Vendée might have been carried on some months longer; but that after the 18th of Brumaire the chiefs could no longer calculate on the mass of

the population. He confessed that towards the conclusion of the campaigns of Italy, the reputation of General Bonaparte had so heated the imaginations of the Vendéan peasantry, that they had been on the point of abandoning the interests of the Bourbons, and sending a deputation to him, offering to submit themselves to his authority.

D'Autichamp had served in many campaigns, as a private hussar, in the Republican troops, during the reign of terror. He was a man of limited powers of mind, but possessed the elegance of manners and address, which became his education and acquaintance with the great world.

Georges and La Prevelaye were at the head of the bands in Britany, on the right of the Loire; Bourmont commanded those of the Maine; Frotté those of Normandy. La Prevelaye and Bourmont submitted, and came to Paris. Georges and Frotté chose to continue the war. It was a state of licentiousness, which allowed them, under the colour of political motives, to give themselves up to every species of plunder; to lay the rich under contribution, on pretence that they were the purchasers of the national domains; to rob the public coaches, because they carried the revenues

of the state; to pillage the bankers, because they were connected with the treasury, &c. They interrupted the communications between Brest and Paris. They kept up an intelligence with all the vilest people in the capital; with men who lived in gaming-houses, and places of the worst description. Thither they brought their plunder; there they gained recruits, and information how to render the snares and ambuscades which they were accustomed to lay on the roads, most profitable.

Generals Chambarlhac and Gardanne entered the department of the Orne, at the head of two moveable columns, to secure Frotté. This chief, young, active, and full of stratagems, was held in dread, and caused many disorders. He was surprised in the house of Guidal, general commandant at Alençon, who had an understanding with him, was admitted into his confidence, and betrayed him. He was tried, and shot.

This prompt proceeding restored tranquillity to this province. There only remained Brulard, and a few chiefs of little consequence, who availed themselves of the facility afforded them by the English cruisers, to land on the coasts, circulate libels, and turn spies in the service of England.

Georges maintained himself in Morbihan with the assistance of the money and arms which the English supplied him with. Attacked, beaten, and hemmed in, at Grand-Champ, by General Brune, he capitulated, gave up his artillery and arms, and promised to live as a good and peaceable subject. He solicited the honour of being presented to the First Consul, and received permission to go to Paris for that purpose. Napoleon tried in vain to make the same impression upon him that he had made upon a great number of Vendéans, to awaken a sentiment of French patriotism, the honour of the nation, the love of country; but not one of these chords would vibrate. The war in the West being thus brought to an end, many good regiments were ready to be otherwise disposed of.

Whilst the state of public affairs continued to improve, the labour of re-modelling the Constitution drew towards an end; the two Consuls and the two Committees were incessantly employed in it. The Government concerned itself but little with foreign politics. All its proceedings were confined to Prussia, whose sovereign was raising an army just at the time when the Duke of York was landing in Holland, which inspired some distrust. Duroc,

Napoleon's aide-de-camp, was sent to Berlin, with a letter to the King. His object was to sound the cabinet. He succeeded in his mission, and was received with respect, even with kindness, by the Queen.

The people about this court, being themselves all military, listened with great interest to accounts of the wars in Italy and Egypt: they were pleased, also, with the triumph which the military party had obtained in France, by wresting the reins of government out of the hands of the lawyers. There was every reason to be satisfied with the disposition of the Prussian government, which disbanded its army soon after.

The intermediate Legislative Committee of the Five Hundred was successively presided over by Lucien, Boulay de la Meurthe, Daunou, and Jacqueminot: that of the Ancients by Lemercier, Lebrun, and Regnier.

Boulay was afterwards Minister of State, and President of the Legislative Section in the Council of State.

Daunou was an orator, deputed from the Pas-de-Calais, a man of good address, and a good writer. He drew up the Constitutions of the years III. and VIII. of the Republic. He became keeper of the Imperial records.

Jacqueminot came from Nancy. He was a senator when he died.

Lebrun was third Consul.

Regnier was made Duke of Massa and Chief Judge.

The intermediate Legislative Committees held their meetings privately. Bad effects might have resulted from publishing the debates of an assembly, which often consisted of only fifteen or sixteen members. These two commissions, according to the law of the 19th of Brumaire, could do nothing but on the proposition of Government, which directed the attention of the Committee of the Five Hundred to any particular point: their resolutions were then drawn up, and carried into a law by the Committee of the Ancients.

The first law of importance passed by this session extraordinary was relative to the constitutional oath; which, in fact, could only be taken, as it then stood, to a constitution that no longer existed. It was conceived in these words: "I swear fidelity to the Republic, one and indivisible, founded on the sovereignty of the people, the representative system, the maintenance of liberty and equality, and the protection of persons and of property."

According to law the two Councils were to

meet on the 19th of February, 1800; the only method of preventing them was to promulgate a new Constitution, and offer it to the people for acceptance before that epoch. The three Consuls, and the two intermediate Legislative Committees, resolved themselves into a committee for that purpose, during the month of December, in Napoleon's apartment, from nine in the evening until three in the morning. Daunou acted as clerk. The confidence of the assembly fully rested upon the reputation and experience of Sieyes. The constitution that he had by him, in his portfolio, had long been extolled. He had given some hints respecting it, which were eagerly caught at by his numerous admirers, and from them they found their way to the public, and carried to its height the reputation which Mirabeau was pleased to compliment him on, when he said in the tribunal, "*the silence of Sieyes is a national calamity.*" He had, indeed, made himself known by many publications, which evinced profound thought. He it was who originally suggested to the Chamber of the Third Estate the grand idea of declaring itself a National Assembly; he likewise proposed the oath of the *jeu de paume**, the sup-

* So called from the Tennis Court, in the *Rue de vieux*

pression of the provinces, and the division of the republican territory into departments. He professed to have composed a theory respecting the representative government, and the sovereignty of the people, full of luminous ideas, which were laid down as fundamental principles. The committee expected to have this long-meditated scheme for the constitution laid before them, and that they should have nothing to do but to revise and modify it; and bring it to perfection by their profound discussions. At the first sitting, however, Sieyes said nothing; he acknowledged that he had a great accumulation of materials in his portfolio, but they were neither classed nor digested. At the following sitting he read a report on lists of notables. The sovereignty resided in the people; it was from the people that every officer, directly or indirectly, received his trust; but the people, however capable of discerning those who deserve its confidence, is not at all capable of allotting the respective duties which its officers are to fulfil. He established three lists of nota-

Versailles, where the National Assembly first met, and where the deputies took an oath never to separate until the constitution should be formed, and the regeneration of France completed.—*Editor*.

bility: 1st, the communal; 2d, the departmental; 3d, the national. The first consisted of a tenth of all the citizens of each commune, selected by the inhabitants themselves; the second, of a tenth of the citizens named in the communal lists of each department; and the third, of a tenth of the individuals whose names appeared in the departmental list: the latter list reduced itself to 6000 persons, who formed the national notability. This operation was to take place every five years; and all public functionaries, of all orders, were to be selected from the lists. Thus—the government, the ministers, the legislature, the senate or grand jury, the council of state, the tribunal of cassation*, and the ambassadors, were to be included in the national list; the prefects, judges, and administrators, in the departmental; and, lastly, the communal administrations, and justices of peace, in the communal list. By this arrangement all public functionaries, even the ministers, would become representatives of the people, and would bear a popular character. These projects had the greatest success: when spread among the public, they gave birth to the most sanguine hopes; they were novel, and the peo-

* Court of Repeal.—*Editor.*

ple were weary of all that had been proposed since 1789; they emanated, moreover, from a man of great reputation in the Republican party; they looked like an analysis of something that had existed in all ages. These lists of notability might be described as lists of nobility, not hereditary, but elective. Yet the defect of this system was at once evident to men of sense: they saw that it would cripple the Government, by preventing it from employing many individuals fit for office, merely because they were not to be found on the lists. And still the people would have no direct influence in the nomination of the Legislature; they would possess but a mere illusory and metaphysical participation in it.

Encouraged by his success, Sieyes, in the following sittings, detailed the theory of his constitutional jury, which he agreed to call Conservative Senate. He had conceived it so early as the Constitution of 1795; but it had been rejected by the Convention. "The Constitution," said he, "is not endowed with life: it requires a permanent body of judges, to enter into its interests, and interpret it in all doubtful cases. Whatever the social organization may be, it must consist of different parts; one will undertake the care of governing; the

other that of discussing and giving sanction to the laws. These assemblies, the attributes of which will be fixed by the constitution, will sometimes clash, and will give different interpretations of the constitution; but the national jury will be at hand to reconcile them, and to confine each body to its proper orbit." The number of members was settled at eighty, each to be at least forty years of age. These eighty sages, whose political career was terminated, could no longer hold any public office. This idea gave general satisfaction, and was commented upon in various ways: the senators were to be such for life,—this was a novelty since the Revolution, and the public laughed at the very idea of stability; it was tired of the vicissitudes and changes which had succeeded each other for the last ten years.

Shortly afterwards, Sieyes explained his theory of national representation; it was composed of two branches: a Legislative Body of 250 deputies, not intended to enter into discussions, but, like the great chamber of parliament, to vote and determine by scrutiny; and a Tribunal of 100 deputies, which, like an inquest, was to discuss, report, and argue against the resolutions formed by a Council of State, named by the Government, which should

have the prerogative of drawing up the laws. Instead, then, of a turbulent Legislative Body, swayed by factions, and its ill-timed motions to order, there would be a solemn assembly to determine on questions, after dispassionately listening to ample discussion respecting them. To the tribunal also, would belong the further duty of denouncing in the senate the unconstitutional acts of the Government, even such laws as had been adopted by the Legislative Body; and to enable them to do this, the Government was to be restrained from proclaiming laws until the expiration of ten days after their adoption by the Legislative Body. These outlines were favourably received by the Committee and the public. The latter was so weary of the empty declamations of the tribunes, and of their untimely motions to order, which had done so much evil and so little good, and whence had sprung so many follies and so few advantages, that they flattered themselves with a prospect of more stability in the legislation, of tranquillity and rest, which were ardently desired.

Several sittings were spent in reducing the plans into form in writing, and in matters of detail relative to the public accounts and the laws. At last the time arrived when Sieyes

explained the organization of his government; this was the capital—the most important part of that beautiful piece of architecture, and the influence of which was to be most felt by the people. He proposed a Grand Elector for life, to be chosen by the Conservative Senate, to possess a revenue of six millions of livres, and guard of 3000 men, and to reside in the palace of Versailles; foreign ambassadors were to be accredited to him; and he was to furnish credentials to the French ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts. All acts of government, all laws, and all judicial proceedings, were to be in his name. He was to be the sole representative of the national glory, power, and dignity; he was to nominate two consuls, one for peace, and the other for war; but to these points his influence upon affairs was to be limited: it is true he was to have the power of removing the consuls, and of replacing them by others; but at the same time the senate was to be allowed, whenever it should deem such an exercise of power arbitrary and opposed to the national interest, *to merge the grand elector.* The effect of this merger was to be equivalent to a removal; the post was to become vacant, but the grand elector was to have a seat in the senate for the rest of his life.

Napoleon had said but little in the preceding sittings, he had had no experience in such assemblies; he could only refer on this subject to Sieyes, who had participated in the formation of the Constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795; to Daunou, who was accounted one of the principal framers of the latter; and in short, to twenty or thirty members of the Committees, who had all distinguished themselves in legislating, and who took the greater interest in the creation of those bodies which were to make the laws, inasmuch as they were to be themselves a component part of such bodies. But the Government concerned himself, he therefore rose to oppose such strange plans. "The grand elector, if he confines himself strictly to the functions you assign him, will be the shadow, but the mere fleshless shadow, of a *Roi faineant*. Can you point out a man base enough to humble himself to such mockery? if he abuses his prerogative, you give him an absolute power. If, for example, I became grand elector, when I appointed the consul for war and the consul for peace, I would say, 'If you nominate a single minister, if you sign a single act without my previous approbation, I will remove you.' 'But,' you reply, 'the senate in its turn will

merge the grand elector:' the remedy is worse than the evil—nobody, according to this scheme, has any guarantee. In another point of view, what will be the situation of these two prime ministers? One will have the ministers of justice, of the interior, of police, of finance, of the treasury under his control; the other, those of the marine, of war, of external relations. The first will be surrounded only by judges, administrators, financiers, men of the long robe; the second only by epaulettes, and military men;—the one will be wanting money and recruits for his armies; the other will not furnish any. Such a government would be a monstrous creation, composed of heterogeneous parts presenting nothing rational. It is a great mistake, to suppose that the shadow of a thing can be of the same use as the thing itself."

Sieyes answered unsatisfactorily, and was at length reduced to silence; he appeared embarrassed and undecided;—was he concealing some deep design? or was he the dupe of his own theory? These points will never be cleared up; but ultimately, this part of his scheme was found untenable. If he had begun with the developement of his whole constitutional project, and described his head of the government first, nothing would have passed, and he

would have lost his influence at the outset; but through the confidence which was reposed in him, a partial adoption of the scheme had already taken place.

The adoption of forms purely Republican was proposed; as was also the creation of a President, in the manner of the United States; this President was to hold the government of the Republic for ten years, and was to have the choice of his ministers, of his council of state, and of all the agents of the administration. But circumstances were such that it was thought necessary to disguise the sole magistracy of the President. All opinions were, at length, conciliated by composing a Government of three Consuls, of which one as head of the government was to possess all the authority, since he alone would appoint to all places, and would have a determining voice; and the two others were to be his indispensable counsellors. With a first Consul unity would be gained in the Directory; and with the two other Consuls, who would of course be consulted, and possess the privilege of inscribing their opinions on public documents, unanimity would be preserved, and the spirit of Republicanism conciliated. It was evident that the situation of things and the state of popular feeling could then suggest

no better plan. The object of the Revolution which had just been effected, was not the possession of a form of government more or less aristocratical or democratical; but its success depended on the consolidation of all interests, on the triumph of every principle for which the wishes of the nation had been unanimously pronounced in 1789. Napoleon was convinced that France could only exist as a monarchy; but the French people being more desirous of equality than of liberty, and the very principle of the Revolution being established on the equalization of all classes, there was of necessity a complete abolition of the aristocracy. If it was difficult to construct a republic on a solid basis without an aristocracy, the difficulty of establishing a monarchy was much greater. To form a constitution in a country without any kind of aristocracy, would be as vain as to attempt to navigate in one element only. The French Revolution undertook a problem as difficult of solution as the direction of a balloon. Sieyes might, if he had chosen it, have obtained the situation of second Consul; but he wished to retire: he was appointed a member of the Senate, contributed to organize that body, and was its first President. In gratitude for his many impor-

tant services, the Legislative Body, by vote, conferred on him the estate of Crosne as a national recompense. He afterwards observed to the Emperor, "I was not aware that you would treat me with so much distinction, or that you would allow an influence to the Consuls which might possibly importune and embarrass you." Sieyes was the most unfit man in the world for power; but his opinions were very desirable, for his perceptions were often luminous, and of the highest importance. He was fond of money; but of strict integrity: a quality that was extremely agreeable to Napoleon, who considered it as of the first importance in a public character.

During the whole of the month of December, the health of Napoleon was much shaken, and threatened to give way entirely.

These nightly sittings and long discussions, in which he was forced to listen to so much nonsense, wasted time that was precious to him, yet were nevertheless interesting to him in a certain degree. He remarked that many men who wrote well and were not without eloquence, were yet entirely devoid of solidity of judgment, had nothing logical in their reasoning, and argued most miserably; the fact is, that there are people who are gifted by nature

with the faculty of writing and expressing their thoughts well, as others are with a genius for music, painting, or sculpture. Public affairs, either civil or military, require deep thought, profound discrimination, and the power of giving unwearied attention for a great length of time.

Napoleon chose Cambaceres as second Consul, and Lebrun for the third. Cambaceres was of an honourable family in Languedoc, he was fifty years of age; he had been a member of the Convention, and had conducted himself with moderation; he was generally esteemed; his political career had not been dishonoured by any excess, and he had a just claim to the reputation which he enjoyed of being one of the ablest lawyers in the Republic. Lebrun was sixty years of age, he came from Normandy; he had been deputed to the Council of Anciens by the department of La Manche. He had been formerly employed in drawing up the decrees of the Chancellor Maupeon, and had distinguished himself by the purity and elegance of his style. He was one of the best writers in France, of inflexible integrity; and approved of the changes of the Revolution only in consideration of the advantages which resulted from them to the mass of the people,

for his own family were all of the class of peasantry.

The Constitution of the year VIII., so impatiently expected by all ranks of citizens, was published and submitted to the sanction of the people on the 13th of December, 1799, and proclaimed on the 24th of the same month: thus the Provisional Government lasted forty-three days.

The ideas of Napoleon were fixed; but the aid of time and events were necessary for their realization. The organization of the Consulate had presented nothing in contradiction to them: it taught unanimity, and that was the first step. This point gained, Napoleon was quite indifferent as to the forms and denominations of the several constituted bodies; he was a stranger to the Revolution: it was natural that the will of those men who had followed it through all its phases, should prevail in questions as difficult as they were abstract. The wisest plan was to go on from day to day without deviating from one fixed point, the polar star by which Napoleon meant to guide the Revolution to the haven he desired.

ULM.—MOREAU.

Defects of the plans of the campaigns of 1795, 1796, 1797—Position of the French armies in 1800—Position of the Austrian armies—Plan of the First Consul—His dispositions—Opening of the campaign—Battle of Engen—Battle of Moeskirch—Battle of Biberach—Manœuvres and engagements round Ulm—Kray quits Ulm—Taking of Munich—Battle of Neuberg—Armistice of Pahrsdorf, July 15, 1800—Critical remarks.

GERMANY.

Defects of the Plans of the Campaigns of 1795, 1796, *and* 1797.

The French Republic had maintained three armies on the Rhine during the campaigns of 1795, 1796, and 1797. That called the Army of the North had its head-quarters at Amsterdam, and was composed of 20,000 Batavians, and as many French troops. By the treaties existing between the two Republics, that of Holland was to maintain a body of 25,000 French to protect the country. This army of from 40 to 45,000 men was to guard the coast of Holland, from the Scheldt to the Ems, and on the land

side, the frontiers as far as opposite Wesel. The second army, or that of the Sambre and Meuse, had its head-quarters at Dusseldorf, and blockaded Mentz and Erenbriesten. The head-quarters of the third, called the Army of the Rhine, were at Strasburg; it was supported on Switzerland, and blockaded Philipsburg.

The army of the North was, in reality, only an army of observation, intended to awe the partisans of the house of Orange, and to oppose any attempt the English might make to land troops in Holland. The peace concluded at Basle with Prussia, and the houses of Hesse and Saxony, had established tranquillity throughout all the north of Germany.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was necessary as long as Prussia formed part of the coalition, became useless from the moment the French Republic had only to maintain war against Austria, and the southern part of Germany. In the campaign of 1796, this army, commanded by Jourdan, marched upon the Maine, took Wurtzburg, and took up a position on the Rednitz; its left supported on the entrance of Bohemia by Egra, whilst its right debouched in the Valley of the Danube. The army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau, marched from Strasburg, crossed the

black mountains and Wurtemberg, passed the Lech and entered Bavaria. Whilst these two armies of the Rhine and the Sambre and Meuse were manœuvring under the command of two generals who acted independently of each other, the Austrian army opposed to them had united under the sole command of the Archduke Charles. Its forces being concentrated on the Danube at Ingoldstadt and Ratisbon, and being placed between the French armies, succeeded in preventing their forming a junction. The Archduke Charles defeated Bernadotte, who commanded the right of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, forced him to retreat towards Wurtzburg, and at length compelled him to repass the Rhine. The army of the Rhine remained spectators of this march of Prince Charles upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse; Moreau, when too late, ordered Desaix to pass over to the left bank of the Danube to the aid of Jourdan; this want of resolution in the general of the army of the Rhine soon obliged that army to retreat. It repassed the Rhine, and took up its first position on the left bank. Thus the Austrian army, which was very inferior to the two French armies, overthrew, without coming to any general engagement, all the plans formed

by the French for the campaign, and reconquered the whole of Germany.

The plan of the French was as defective for the defensive as the offensive. From the moment when they had only Austria to contend with, there should have been only one army, having only one line, and directed only by one commander in chief.

In 1799, France was mistress of Switzerland. Two armies were formed; the one called the Army of the Rhine, the other the Army of Helvetia. The first, which afterwards took the name of the Army of the Danube, under the command of Jourdan, passed the Rhine, crossed the black mountains, and arrived at Stockach, where, being defeated by Prince Charles, it was obliged to repass the Rhine at the very time the army of Helvetia remained in its position, commanding all Switzerland. Thus the French again fell into the error of having two independent armies, when there should have been only one; and when Jourdan was beaten at Stockach, it was upon Switzerland he should have fallen back, and not upon Strasburg and Brisac. The army of the Rhine was afterwards intrusted with the defence of the left bank of the river, opposite Strasburg; and the army of Helvetia, which became the principal army

of the Republic, lost part of Switzerland, and remained on the Limath for some time; but at Zurich, under the command of Massena, it took advantage of the error the Allies fell into by dividing themselves likewise into two armies, defeated the Russians, and regained all Switzerland.

In the month of January 1800, this army of Helvetia cantoned in Switzerland; that of the Lower Rhine, under General Lecourbe, in winter-quarters, on the left bank of the Rhine; that of Holland, under Brune, witnessed the embarkation of the Duke of York's last division.*

The army of Italy, being defeated at Genoa, rallied in disorder in the passes of the Apennines: Coni capitulated; Genoa was menaced; but Lieutenant-general Saint-Cyr repulsed a corps of the Austrian army beyond the Bocchetta, which gained him a sword of honour; this was the first national reward decreed by Napoleon, as

* Generals Massena, Brune, Lecourbe, and Championnet, were personally attached to Napoleon, but very inimical to Sieyes; they participated more or less in the opinions of the Jacobins of the *Manège*. It became necessary to break all these connexions, by changing, without delay, the generals-in-chief. If ever the army could give cause for alarm, it could only arise from the influence of the violent party, and not from that of the moderates, which was then greatly in the minority.

head of the state. The two armies went into winter-quarters: the Austrians on the beautiful plains of Piedmont and Mont-Ferrat; the French on the other side of the Apennines, from Genoa to the Var. This country, which had long been blockaded by sea, and without communication with the Valley of the Po, was exhausted. The French administration, which was ill-organized, was intrusted to faithless hands.

The cavalry and other horses were perishing for want; contagious diseases and desertion were disorganizing the army; and the evil rose to such a height, that whole corps abandoned their positions, and, with drums beating and colours flying, repassed the Var. These disorders gave rise to many general orders from Napoleon to the soldiers of Italy. He said to them, "Soldiers, the circumstances which detain me at the head of the Government, prevent my being in the midst of you; your wants are great; every measure is taken to supply them. The first quality of a soldier is patient endurance of fatigue and privation; valour is but a secondary virtue. Several corps have quitted their positions; they have been deaf to the voice of their officers; the seventeenth light demi-brigade is of this number. Are, then, the heroes of

Castiglione, of Rivoli, of Neumark, no more? They would rather have perished than have deserted their colours; they would have called their young comrades back to honour and duty. Soldiers, do you complain that your rations have not been regularly distributed? What would you have done, if, like the fourth and twenty-second light demi-brigades, the eighteenth and thirty-second of the line, you had found yourselves in the midst of the Desert, without bread or water, subsisting on horses and camels? *Victory will give us bread,' said they;* and you—you desert your colours! Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you; he was always in the foremost ranks, in the moments of your brightest glory; rest your confidence in him, he will bring back victory to your ranks. I shall cause a daily account to be sent me of the conduct of all the troops, and particularly of that of the seventeenth light demi-brigade and the sixty-third of the line; *they will remember the confidence I once had in them.*"

These magic words put a stop to the evil as by enchantment: the army was re-organized, subsistence was provided, and the deserters returned.

Napoleon recalled Massena from Helvetia, and gave him the command of the army of

Italy. This general, who was well acquainted with all the passes of the Apennines, was more fit than any other person for this war of manœuvres; on the 10th of February he arrived at his head-quarters at Genoa.

General Brune, who was at first summoned to the Council of State, was some weeks after sent to the Loire to command the army of the West; General Augereau succeeded him in the command in Holland. The following proclamation was issued to the armies:

"Soldiers! in promising peace to the people of France, I spoke for you; I know your valour, you are the same men who conquered in Holland, on the Rhine, in Italy, and who gave peace under the walls of Vienna. Soldiers! it is no longer the frontiers that you are called on to defend, the countries of your enemies are to be invaded. There is not one of you who has made a campaign who does not know that the most essential quality of a soldier is the power of bearing hardships with patience: many years of a faulty administration cannot be repaired in a day. As first magistrate of the Republic, it will be gratifying to me to make known to the whole nation those troops, who, by their discipline and valour, shall deserve to be regarded as the supporters of the country.

Soldiers! at a fit season I will be in the midst of you, and Europe shall be made to remember that you belong to a valiant race."

Such was the situation of the armies; the First Consul immediately ordered the junction of those of the Rhine and Helvetia into one, under the denomination of the Army of the Rhine; he gave the command to general Moreau, who had shewn himself wholly devoted to Napoleon, on the 18th of Brumaire.* The French troops were in want of every thing, their distress was extreme; all the winter was employed in recruiting, clothing, and paying the arrears of this army. A detachment from the army of Holland was directed towards Mentz, and the army of the Rhine soon became one of the finest the Republic ever had; it amounted to 150,000 men, and was formed of all the old troops.

* Moreau was an enemy to the Directory, and still more so to the *Société du Manège;* although he had met with nothing but losses in the campaign just ended, and was less esteemed than the generals who had lately saved Switzerland at Zurich, and Holland at Alkmaar, by making a son of the King of England capitulate, he was well acquainted with the country which was to be the scene of action for the army of Germany, which determined the First Consul to place entire confidence in him, and put him at the head of that army.

Paul I. was dissatisfied with the policy of Austria and England; the flower of his army had perished in Italy under Suwarrow, in Switzerland under Korsakow, and in Holland under Hermann. The ancient and new pretensions of the English respecting the navigation of neutral vessels, rendered him daily less favourably disposed towards them; the commerce of neutral vessels, particularly those of the states on the Baltic, was interrupted; fleets of merchant ships, convoyed by men of war, were insulted, and subjected to being searched. On the other hand, the changes which had taken place in the principles of the French government, since the 18th of Brumaire, had lessened, or suspended his hatred to the French Revolution: he admired the firmness which the First Consul had shewn in Italy and Egypt, and which he continued every day to display: these circumstances determined his conduct, and if he did not abandon the coalition, he at least ordered his armies to quit the field of battle, and repass the Vistula.

The withdrawing of the Russian army did not discourage Austria. She called forth all her resources, and raised two great armies. The one in Italy consisted of 140,000 men; it

was commanded by Field-marshal Melas, and intended to act on the offensive, and to take Genoa, Nice, and Toulon. It was to be joined under the walls of the latter place by an English army of 18,000 men, who were to assemble at Mahon, and by the Neapolitan army of 20,000 men. Willot was at the head-quarters of Melas, for the purpose of exciting an insurrection in the Southern departments of the Republic, where the Bourbons imagined they had partisans.

The other army, in Germany, commanded by Field-marshal Kray, was 120,000 strong, including the troops of the Empire, and those in the pay of England. This latter army was intended to remain on the defensive, to protect Germany. The experience of the last campaign had convinced Austria of all the difficulties attached to a war in Switzerland. Field-marshal Kray had his head-quarters at Donau-Schingen; his principal magazines at Stockach, Engen, Mœskirch, and Biberach. His army was composed of four corps.

The right, commanded by Lieutenant-field-marshal Starray, was upon the Maine. The left, under the command of the Prince De Reuss, was in the Tyrol. The two others were on the

Danube, with van-guards, one under Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, opposite Kehl; the other under Major-general Giulay, in Brisgaw: a third, under Prince Ferdinand, in the Forest-Towns in the environs of Bâle; a fourth, under the Prince De Vaudemont, opposite Schaffhausen.

Under these circumstances it became necessary for the army of the Rhine to act vigorously on the offensive: its numbers were nearly double those of the enemy; whilst the Austrian army of Italy was more than double the French army, which, consisting of 40,000 men, guarded the Apennines, and the heights of Genoa. An army of reserve, of 35,000 men, was assembled on the Saone, to be in readiness to support the army of Germany, if necessary, to debouch through Switzerland, on the Po, and attack the Austrian army of Italy in the rear.

The Cabinet of Vienna calculated that its armies would be in the heart of Provence by the middle of summer; and the Cabinet of the Tuileries expected that its army of the Rhine would be on the Inn, before that time.

The First Consul ordered General Moreau to act on the offensive, and to enter Germany, in order to arrest the progress of the Austrian army of Italy, which had already reached

Genoa. The whole army of the Rhine was to assemble in Switzerland; and pass the Rhine at Schaffhausen: as the movement of the left of the army on its right, was to be screened by the Rhine and to be prepared long beforehand, the enemy would know nothing of it. By throwing four bridges at once across the river, at Schaffhausen, all the French army would get over in twenty-four hours, would reach Stockach, overthrow the left of the enemy, and take in the rear all the Austrians placed between the right bank of the Rhine, and the defiles of the Black Forest. In six or seven days from the opening of the campaign the army would be before Ulm; those who could escape from the Austrian army, would retire into Bohemia. Thus the first movement of the campaign would have produced the separation of the Austrian army from Ulm, Philipsburg and Ingolstadt, and placed Wirtemberg and the whole of Suabia and Bavaria in our power. This plan of operation would have produced events more or less decisive, according to the chances of war, and the boldness and rapid movements of the French general. But General Moreau was incapable of executing, or even comprehending such a movement. He sent General Dessolles to

Paris, to submit another project to the Minister of War: following the routine of the campaigns of 1796 and 1797, he proposed to pass the Rhine at Mentz, Strasburg, and Bâle. The First Consul, much dissatisfied, thought at first of going himself to head the army: he calculated that he should be under the walls of Vienna before the Austrian army of Italy could reach Nice; but the internal agitations of the Republic prevented his leaving the capital and remaining at a great distance for so long a time. Moreau's project was modified, and he was authorised to take a middle course, which consisted in making his left pass the river at Brisach, his centre at Bâle, and his right above Schaffhausen. He was, above all, enjoined to have only one single line of operation; yet this last plan appeared too bold to him when he came to execute it, and he accordingly made some alterations.

Moreau's head-quarters were at Bâle; his army was composed of four corps of infantry, a reserve of heavy cavalry, and two detached divisions, that is to say:

Lieutenant-general Saint-Suzanne, commanding the left, the divisions of Souham, and Legrand; Lieutenant-general Saint-Cyr, commanding the centre, the divisions of Baraguay-

d'Hilliers and Ney; the General-in-chief commanding the reserve, the divisions of Delmas, Leclerc, and Richepanse; Lieutenant-general Lecourbe commanding the right, the divisions of Vandamme, Montrichard, and Lorge.

General d'Hautpoult commanding the reserve of heavy cavalry; General Eblé the artillery.

The detached corps were commanded by Generals Collaud and Moncey, in Switzerland.

On the 25th of April, Sainte-Suzanne commanding the left, passed the Rhine at Strasburg; Saint-Cyr with the centre, passed it the same day at Brisach; General Moreau, at the head of the corps of reserve, passed it on the 27th at Bâle. The corps of Sainte-Suzanne overthrew a body of the enemy consisting of between 12 and 15,000 men, who occupied a position before Offemberg; Saint-Cyr entered Friburg without opposition from the enemy; thence he advanced to Saint Blaise, where the reserve, which had passed at Bâle, was already arrived. Richepanse remained at Saint Blaise; the two other divisions, re-ascending the right bank of the Rhine, advanced to the mouth of the Alb. On the 26th and 27th the three divisions effected a junction on the Wuttach. On the 28th they took up a position at Neukirch; Saint-Cyr

advanced from Saint-Blaise upon the Wuttach to Stühlingen.

Meanwhile Moreau felt the necessity of recalling Sainte-Suzanne, who was to pass at Kehl on the 27th, and of making him come by the left bank of the Rhine to Vieux Brisach, repass the river, and form a second line to the corps of Saint-Cyr: he marched upon Friburg, crossed the Val d'Enfer, and took up a position at Neustadt.

Such were the positions of the reserve, of the centre, and of the left of the French, when the right, under Lecourbe, passed the Rhine near Stein, on the 1st of May, scarcely meeting with any impediment, and marched against Fort Hohentwœl, which capitulated. It was lined with eighty pieces of cannon. Thus, in five days from the opening of the campaign, Lecourbe was ready to begin operations. The 2d of May the army remained inactive in its positions, where it occupied a line of fifteen leagues, sloping towards the Danube, from Fort Hohentwœl to Neustadt.

Field-marshal Kray had thus time to assemble his troops. On the 2d of May, he occupied a position with 45,000 men before the little town of Engen, having on his left at Stockach, six leagues distant, the Prince de Vaudemont, with

a corps of 12,000 men, which connected his position of Engen with Lake Constance, guarded his magazines, and secured his retreat upon Mœskirch. On the 3d, at daybreak, Lecourbe, with his three divisions, advanced on Stockach; Moreau, with the three divisions of the reserve, on Engen; Saint-Cyr and Sainte-Suzanne, being too distant from the field of battle, could not reach it in time. Lecourbe's corps marched in three columns; Vandamme, on the right, turned Stockach; Montrichard, in the centre, entered the city in charging time; General Lorge, on the left, with one brigade cut off the communication between Stockach and Engen, and with his other seconded the attack of the reserve. The Prince de Vaudemont was routed, and fell back precipitately on Mœskirch, leaving 3000 prisoners, five pieces of cannon, and his colours, in the hands of Lecourbe. During this time the three divisions of reserve engaged the advanced guards of Field-marshal Kray, on one of the roads to Engen, at the approaches of the river Aach. The engagement quickly became warm at Wetterdingen and Mulhausen; but Moreau soon extended his line on the left: he ordered Richepanse to attack the little promontory of Hohenhoven, which

attack was carried on the whole day without success. The three divisions of reserve, with the brigade of Lorge's division, and the reserve of heavy cavalry, formed a force of 40,000 men; which was something less than the number the enemy had before Engen. Victory inclined to the Austrians, when Kray was informed of the defeat of the Prince de Vaudemont, the great success of Lecourbe, and the arrival of Saint-Cyr at Hohenhoven: he beat a retreat. Saint-Cyr had left Stuhlingen in the morning; he had re-ascended the right bank of the Wuttach, and had been stopped at the defile of Zolhaus; at night his van-guard brigade, commanded by General Roussel, occupied the level of Hohenhoven. The loss was from 6000 to 7000 men on each side; the Austrians lost, also, 4000 men who were made prisoners, and some pieces of cannon, most of them taken by Lecourbe at Stockach.

BATTLE OF MŒSKIRCH.

During the 4th, Field-marshal Kray joined the Prince de Vaudemont at Mœskirch, and was joined by the division under Prince Ferdinand. He ordered his magazines to be evacuated, and prepared to move towards the Danube, which he wished to pass at the bridge of Sigmaringen.

During this day, the French army made no movement; but General Lecourbe marched from Stockach upon Mœskirch; Saint-Cyr, who had not engaged at Engen, marched upon Liptingen; the three divisions of the reserve marched in a second line to support Lecourbe, who marched upon Mœskirch in three columns: Vandamme to the right upon Klosterwald; Montrichard in the centre, supported by the reserve of heavy cavalry; Lorge to the left, by Neuhausen: he thus covered a front more than two leagues in extent.

General Lecourbe discovered the vicinity of the enemy by meeting their light troops; the three divisions were soon engaged with the whole Austrian army, and exposed to great danger, when three divisions of the reserve came up in the afternoon to their support. The action became very warm, each army maintained its ground. Saint-Cyr might have decided the victory, but he did not arrive till night at Liptingen, where he was still several leagues distant from the field of battle. During the night Kray beat a retreat: half his troops had passed the Danube at Sigmaringen—the other half was on the right bank, when Saint Cyr, who had followed the right bank of the Danube, arrived on the 6th, at the heights which command the

river. If Moreau, on his side, had marched in pursuit of the enemy, a part of the Austrian army would have been destroyed; but Moreau did not know the value of time, he always passed the day after a battle in fatal indecision.

BATTLE OF BIBERACH.

Some days after the battle of Mœskirch, Lecourbe moved upon Wurzach, and sent his flankers to the foot of the mountains of the Tyrol. Saint-Cyr moved upon Buchau; Moreau, with the reserve, marched in a second line; Sainte-Suzanne continued his movement along the left bank of the Danube, and proceeded to Geissengen, separated from the army by the river. Kray had effected his retreat without molestation. On the 7th, he was at Riedlingen, and having intelligence of the irregular movement of the right of the army upon the Tyrol, and of that of Sainte-Suzanne upon the left bank of the Danube, he passed the river at the bridge of Riedlingen, and directed his march behind Biberach, placing an advanced-guard of 10,000 men on the road to Buchau, and all his army behind the Riess—the left at Ochsenhausen, the right on the level of Mettenberg. On the 9th of May, Saint-Cyr set out from Buchau, attacked this

advanced-guard, which was separated from the main body by the Riess, drove it into the river, made 1500 prisoners, and took some cannon; he followed it on the right bank: two divisions of the reserve having come up during the action. Kray directed his march along the Iller; Lecourbe attacked him at Memmingen, took 1200 prisoners and some pieces of cannon, and forced him to take refuge in his camp at Ulm.

MANŒUVRES AND SKIRMISHES ROUND ULM.

From the 10th to the 12th of May, the French armies occupied the following positions: the right, under Lecourbe, had its head-quarters at Memmingen; the reserve and the centre along the Iller to the Danube; and General Sainte-Suzanne, on the left of the Danube, at a day's march from Ulm. The Austrian army was completely united in the intrenched camp of Ulm, excepting the corps of the Prince de Reuss, consisting of 20,000 men, which was in the Tyrol. Ulm had an enceinte with bastions; mount St. Michael, which commanded it, was defended by field fortifications, constructed with care and lined with a numerous artillery; on the right bank strong intrenchments protected two bridges; great magazines of

forage, provisions, and military stores were collected there. The Austrian general might manœuvre on both banks of the Danube, protecting at the same time Suabia and Bavaria, and covering Bohemia as well as Austria; he received recruits and provisions every day, and seemed determined to maintain himself in this central position, notwithstanding the well-known inferiority of his forces and the checks he had received.

In order to displace him, Moreau resolved to advance, with his right in front. Lecourbe quitted Memmingen and drew near the Lech. The head-quarters were removed across the Gunt; Saint-Cyr, with the centre, followed in echelon along the Danube; Sainte-Suzanne approached Ulm by the left bank. The division of Legrand took up a position at Erbach on the Danube, two leagues from the place; the division of Souham, at the same distance, on the Blau. The two divisions thus covered a line of two leagues. Sainte-Suzanne had no bridge on the Danube; he faced, with his single corps, the whole army of Kray, who had contented himself with sending General Merfeld behind the Lech, and continued to occupy all the left bank of the Danube, from Ulm to the mouth of that river, with his forces, advancing his van-

guard as far as the Augsburg road, where it skirmished with the flankers of the left of the French army.

On the 16th, at break of day, the Archduke Ferdinand debouched against General Legrand, as did another column against General Souham. The advanced posts of the two French divisions were soon forced to fall back, their communications were cut off, and the corps of these divisions were driven back two leagues; as they fell back, the distance which separated them kept increasing.

Sainte-Suzanne's division was penetrated; he ordered General Legrand to abandon the Danube, in order to approach Souham's division: this concentrative movement, which was advantageous in that point of view, was attended with the dreadful inconvenience of removing him farther from the army; but Saint-Cyr, on hearing the cannonade, fell back with his rear-guard, and placed batteries on the right bank of the Danube, which played upon the road from Ulm to Erbach, and much perplexed the Archduke; he imagined the whole army was going to pass the river and cut him off; he fell back upon Ulm. The loss of Sainte-Suzanne's corps, in killed and wounded, was considerable: it was, however, less than might have

been expected from the false position in which he had been abandoned; the intrepidity of the troops, and the skill of the General, saved this corps from total destruction.

Moreau, astonished at this event, countermanded the march upon the Lech, ordered Saint-Cyr and Hautpoult to pass the Danube at Erbach to support Sainte-Suzanne, directed his own march upon the Iller, and recalled Lecourbe. Sainte-Suzanne passed the Blau, so that of the eleven divisions which composed his army, five were on the left, and six on the right bank of the Danube; in this position, encamped on both sides of the river, and occupying a line of fourteen leagues, he passed several days.

Was he to attack Kray on the left bank? or to repass the river to the right? He determined on the latter. Lecourbe returned to Landsberg, where he arrived on the 27th of May, and on the 28th to Augsburg, where he passed the Lech; Saint-Cyr moved on the Gunzt; Sainte-Suzanne passed to the right bank of the Danube, and took up a position on both sides of the Iller. The French army was posted in line with its left to the Danube, and its right to the Lech, occupying a line of twenty leagues. On the 24th of May, Field-marshal

Kray caused an advanced-guard to pass over to the right bank, which attacked both Sainte-Suzanne's divisions at the same time; the engagement was severe, it lasted the whole day; the loss on both sides was considerable; but in the evening the Austrians repassed the Danube.

When General Moreau received intelligence of what had taken place, he again changed his resolution; he stopped his movements, and drew near the Danube. Lecourbe for the second time abandoned the Lech. But on the 4th of June, Field-marshal Kray, having rallied part of his forces, passed the bridge of Ulm, and attacked the corps of Sainte-Suzanne which was led by Richepanse. Sainte-Suzanne was gone to take the command of the Mentz troops, which were posted on the Iller. Richepanse, surrounded by a superior force, fell back during the whole day; his situation became very critical, when General Grenier, who had succeeded Saint-Cyr when that general was sent from the army by Moreau, debouched with Ney's division by the bridge of Kellmuntz upon the Iller. The engagement recommenced; Moreau concentrated the whole of his force on the Iller; this was just what Kray wanted, who, being too weak to make

head against the French army, wished to prevent its making progress, and to destroy it in partial engagements.

After having remained several days in this position, emboldened by the defensive posture of Kray, who remained in his intrenched camp without making any movement, Moreau for the third time resumed his project of attacking Bavaria; and appeared to prepare to pass the Lech.

Lecourbe again passed the Lech, and on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of June, all the army drew towards that river. Thus a month after the battle of Biberach, the army was still in the same position; the time had been consumed in marches and countermarches, which had brought it into danger, and given rise to actions in which the French troops, who were inferior in number, had met with severe losses. The rear-guard of Lecourbe had lost 2000 men in evacuating Augsburg, at the battle of Schabmunchen. This hesitation had given much dissatisfaction to some of the generals of the army. Moreau had dismissed Saint-Cyr, whom he replaced by Grenier; he blamed the former general for the delays in his march to Engen, and particularly at Mœskirch, and for misconduct, in suffering the other divisions to

be overpowered, when it was in his power to assist them; Saint-Cyr on his side, severely criticised the conduct of his General-in-Chief, and loudly declared his disapprobation of the manœuvres which had taken place from the opening of the campaign. The despatches of Lecourbe contain many letters full of energy, and complaints of his delays, his indecisions, his hesitations, his orders and counter-orders, which at length determined the General-in-Chief to move to the left bank of the Danube, and to pass the river on the 19th and 20th of June, after arriving upon it at the point of Ulm.

Lecourbe, with the right, advanced opposite Hochstett; Moreau, with the reserve, opposite Dilingen; Grenier, with the centre, opposite Guntzburg; and Richepanse, with the left, remained in observation upon the Iller, opposite Ulm. On the 19th, at daybreak, Lecourbe repaired the bridge across the Danube at Blindheim, passed with his main body, and advanced with one division upon Schwoningen, descending two leagues towards Donawerth, and detached two other divisions towards Lauingen, reascending the Danube. Scarcely had he arrived at Schwoningen when the division was attacked by a brigade of 4000 men, commanded

by General Devaux, who had his head-quarters at Donawerth. The action was sharp, but the brigade was defeated, leaving one-half of its number upon the field, and in the hands of the French. Shortly after this, the enemy attacked the division posted at Lauingen: after a very brisk engagement he was repulsed there also. Moreau, with the reserve, crossed at the bridge of Dilingen. Grenier was desirous of repairing the bridge at Guntzburg, but he was prevented from doing so by General Giulay; which compelled him to resort for a passage to the bridge of Dilingen. As soon as Kray learned that the passage was effected, he resolved to retire; which he did under the protection of a body of cavalry that he posted upon the Brenzt; but, during the days of the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d, the French army remained inactive. This was losing time of great value, and which if well employed might have been fatal to the enemy. The Austrian General availed himself of this error; he passed through Neresheim and Nordlingen, and arrived upon the Wernitz on the evening of the 23d. General Richepanse surrounded Ulm with his troops. The army commenced its pursuit of the Austrians too late, it succeeded only in

overtaking their rear-guard. The division of Decaen was directed on Munich; after a slight encounter with General Merfeld, it entered that capital.

Lecourbe passed again to the right bank of the Danube, and advanced upon Rain and Neuburg. Kray was in position, with 2500 men, before the latter town, upon the right bank of the Danube. Montrichard, who ventured to attack him there, was smartly repulsed and compelled to fall back two leagues. Lecourbe renewed the battle with the division of Grandjean: the bravery of the troops and the energy of the General remedied an evil which might have been much greater. The enemy remained in possession of the field; but during the night they felt there was not time for them to gain the Lech, and that the rest of the French army was about to overwhelm them. They repassed the Danube, reached Ingolstadt, passed the river a second time, and removed their head-quarters to Landshut, behind the Iser. General Moreau entered Augsburg, and there established his head-quarters. He detached Leclerc's division upon Freysing, which entered the place after a very brisk action with the Austrian van-guard.

At this time Sainte-Suzanne left Mentz with two divisions united on that side, and entered Franconia, approaching the Danube.

Meanwhile, the Prince de Reuss still occupying Feldkirch, Fuessen, and all the debouches of the Tyrol, Lecourbe re-crossed the Lech with 20,000 men, and advanced in three columns, the left upon Scharnitz, the centre upon Fuessen, and the right upon Feldkirch. On the 14th of July Molitor entered the latter place; the enemy abandoned the intrenched camp to him. The Prince de Reuss withdrew himself behind the defiles and intrenchments which covered the Tyrol.

The armistice was concluded at Pahrsdorf on the 15th of July. The three fortresses of Ingolstadt, Ulm, and Philipsburg were to remain blockaded, but to be daily supplied with provisions during the time fixed for the suspension of arms. The whole of the Tyrol remained in the power of Austria, and the line of demarcation passed by the Iser, to the foot of the Tyrolese mountains. From the 24th of June Field-marshal Kray had proposed to observe the armistice concluded at Marengo, of which he had just received intelligence. The remainder of the month of July, and during the months of August, September, October,

and part of November, the armies remained in presence of each other; and hostilities were not resumed until November. The armistice ran thus:

Article 1.—There shall be an armistice and suspension of hostilities between the army of His Imperial Majesty and his allies in Germany, Switzerland, the Tyrol, and the Grison country, and the French army in the same countries. The resumption of hostilities shall be announced respectively twelve days previous to their commencement. Art. 2.—The French army shall occupy all the country comprehended within the following line of demarcation: this line extends from Balzers in the Grisons, upon the right bank of the Rhine as far as the source of the Inn, the whole valley of which it is to include; thence to the source of the Lech, by the back of the mountains of the Vorarlberg, as far as Reuti, along the left bank of the Lech. The Austrian army retains possession of all the passes which lead to the right bank of the Lech; it forms a line which includes Reuti, extends beyond Schebach, near Breitenwang, along the northern bank of the lake from which the Scebach issues, ascends upon the left in Lechtal, as far as the source of the

Ammer; thence by the frontiers of the county of Werdenfets, as far as the Loisach. It extends as far as the left bank of that river, to Kochelsee, which it crosses, to the Walchensée, where it intersects the lake so named, and is continued along the northern bank of the Jachnai, to its confluence with the Iser; and, crossing that river, it proceeds upon Reuti, upon the Tegernsee, beyond the Manguald, near Gmünd, and upon the left bank of the latter beyond the Falley; thence it runs by Ob-laus, Reifing, Elkhofin, Frafing, Ecking, Ebersberg, Malckirchen, Hohenlinden, Krainacher, Weting, Reting, Aidberg, Isen, Penzing, Zuphtenbach, along the Iser as far as Furden and Sendorff, where it runs towards the source of the Vilz, which it follows to where it falls into the Danube, and then upon the right bank of the Vilz to Vilsbibourg, and beyond that river to Binabibourg, whence it follows the course of the Bina to Dornaich. It cuts near Sculmshausen, extends towards the source of the Colbach, then along the left bank, to its union with the Vilz; and, bearing upon the left towards Vilz, it extends to where it falls into the Danube. The same line runs upon the right bank of the Danube to Kehlheim, where it crosses the river, and runs upon the

right bank of the Altmühl to Pappenheim: it then bears by the town of Weissemburg towards the Rednitz, the left bank of which it runs along, until that river joins the Maine; thence it follows the left bank of the latter river to its mouth. The line of demarcation upon the right bank of the Maine, between that river and Dusseldorff, shall not extend towards Mentz, beyond the Nidda. In case, during the interval, the French troops shall have made any progress on this side, they shall preserve or resume the same line which they occupy this day the 15th of July. Art. 3. —The Imperial army shall re-occupy the upper and lower Engadine, that is to say, that part of the Grisons, the rivers of which fall into the Inn, and of the valley of Sainte Marie, into the Adige. The French line of demarcation shall extend from Balzers upon the lake of Como, by Coira, Tossanna, Splugen, and Chiavenna, including the Luciensteig. The part of the Grisons, which is situated between this line and the Engadine, shall be evacuated by both parties. That country shall retain its existing form of government. Art. 4.—The fortified places which are included in the line of demarcation, such as Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, which are occupied by the Imperialists, shall

remain, in every respect, in the same state in which they shall be found by the commissioners named for this purpose by the generals in chief; their garrisons shall not be increased, nor shall they impede the navigation of the rivers, or the passage of the high roads. The territory of each of these fortified places is to extend as far as 2000 toises from its fortifications; they shall provision themselves every ten days, and, as far as relates to this fixed provisioning, they shall not be considered as included in the countries occupied by the French army, which, on its part, is not to impede the carriage of stores into the said fortresses. Art. 5.—The general commanding the Imperial army, is authorized to send into each of those places an officer to communicate to its commander, the line of conduct which he is to observe. Art. 6.—There shall be no bridges upon the rivers which separate the two armies, unless these rivers be crossed by the line of demarcation, and then the bridges shall be erected only within the line, without prejudice, however, to such future arrangements as may be made for the benefit of the armies and of commerce. The respective commanders will have an understanding upon this article. Art. 7. —Wherever navigable rivers separate the two

armies, their navigation shall be free for them and for the inhabitants. The same rule shall apply to the main roads comprised within the line of demarcation, during the time of the armistice. Art. 8.—Those territories of the empire and of the Austrian states, which are found within the line of demarcation of the French army, are under the safeguard of honour and good faith. Private property and existing governments shall be respected, and none of the inhabitants of these countries shall be disturbed, either for services rendered to the Imperial army, or for political opinions, or for having taken an active part in the war. Art. 9.—The present convention shall be carried into effect as quickly as possible. Art. 10. —The out-posts of the two armies shall have no communication.

REMARKS ON THE PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

First Remark.—1st, A plan of campaign should anticipate all that the enemy can do, and embrace the means of counteracting him. The frontier of Germany was, in this campaign, the most important; the frontier of the territory of Genoa was the secondary frontier. In fact, the events which might take place in Italy could have no direct, immediate,

or necessary effect upon the affairs of the Rhine; while, on the other hand, events in Germany would have a necessary and immediate influence upon Italy. The First Consul, therefore, assembled upon the more important frontier all the forces of the Republic, that is to say, the army of Germany, which he reinforced, and the army of Holland and the Lower Rhine; the army of reserve, which he assembled upon the Saône, whence they could enter Germany if expedient.

The Aulic Council concentrated its principal army upon the secondary frontier, in Italy. This absurdity, this violation of the grand principle, was the true cause of the failure of the Austrians in this campaign.

2dly—The Government had directed General Moreau to collect his army behind the lake of Constance, by Switzerland; to conceal his march from the enemy, by precluding all communication from the left to the right bank of the Rhine; towards the close of April to throw four bridges across the river, between Schaffhausen, Stein, and the lake of Constance; to pass upon the right bank of the Danube with his whole army; to advance upon Stockach and Engen; to support his right on the Danube and his left on the lake of Constance; to take in

rear all the hostile divisions which should be found in position upon the Black Mountains and in the valley of the Rhine, separate them from their magazines, and afterwards to advance upon Ulm before the enemy. Moreau did not understand this plan; he sent General Dessolles to the Minister at War, for the purpose of proposing that the Rhine should be passed at Mentz, Strasburg, and Basle. Napoleon then resolved to place himself at the head of this army; but circumstances required that it should commence operations in April, and the internal state of the Republic forbidding him to quit Paris at that moment, he contented himself with prescribing that the army of the Rhine should have but one line of operation.

Second remark. —(MOREAU.)— 1st, Sainte-Suzanne passed the Rhine at Kehl; Saint-Cyr at Neuf-Brisach: they were to unite in Brisgaw. Moreau felt the danger of this; he recalled Sainte-Suzanne upon the left bank, that he might recross the Rhine by the bridge of Neuf-Brisach: that was a false movement, and not a stratagem. The thirty leagues march from Vieux-Brisach to Basle and Schaffhausen was inconvenient; the army exposed its right flank to the Rhine, and its left flank to the enemy; the army was in a *cul-de-sac* without an

opening, in the midst of ravines, forests, and defiles. Field-marshal Kray hence perceived which way his enemy was tending; he had eight days to concert his measures; the consequence was, that his forces were all posted in line at Engen and Stobach, and he was enabled to cover his magazines and Ulm, before the French general, with whom the movement originated, could effect his object. If Moreau had debouched by the lake of Constance with the whole army, he would have surprised, defeated, and taken the half of the Austrian army; the remains of it could only have rallied upon the Neckar: he would have been at Ulm before them! How important would these results have been. The campaign would have been decided within the first fortnight.

2dly—The French army was much stronger than that of the enemy within a circle of fifteen leagues, and yet the enemy was superior in point of number in the field at Engen. Moreau scattered his army, and compromised it; he manœuvred upon his left to join Saint-Cyr, who was too far off; he ordered the peak of Hohenhowen, which was a strong position, to be attacked by Richepanse alone. He ought to have kept his troops together, and manœuvred by his right, to have made Lecourbe his appui,

and to have cut off the enemy's line of retreat; there he would not have been obstructed by any position of strength.

3dly.—Kray effected his retreat during the night of the 3d upon Mœskirch: he was six leagues from that place; Lecourbe was but three leagues from it. If the latter had received orders to march on the 4th, he would have cut off the enemy's army, would have attacked it in front and in flank, while Saint-Cyr and the reserve were attacking it in the rear; Kray would have been quite entangled, and the battle of Mœskirch would never have taken place. Moreau remained inactive on the 4th without any adequate reason. This fatal piece of indecision hazarded again the next day all that had been decided at Engen, and rendered the blood spilt upon the field of battle of no avail.

4thly.—Sainte-Suzanne was at Donauschingen during the battle of Engen: he might at least have been at the action of Mœskirch; neither he nor Saint-Cyr was there, so that the six divisions of Lecourbe and the reserve were alone in that battle; and our force was consequently inferior to that of the enemy.

5thly.—The conduct of Saint-Cyr gave rise to complaints; it was night before he arrived at Liptingen, several leagues from the field of battle.

6thly.—If Moreau had marched on the 6th, at daybreak, in pursuit of the enemy; if he had supported Saint-Cyr on that day, he would have destroyed a part of the hostile army, while it was occupied in crossing the Danube: but on the 6th, as on the 4th, Moreau remained inactive upon the field of battle.

7thly.—What ought the French general to have done in order to drive Field-marshal Kray from his intrenched camp? But one single thing: he should have had one intention, and followed one plan; for he had the advantage of being the first to move: he was conqueror, was stronger in point of numbers, and had a better army under him. On the 14th of May, he ought to have passed the Iller, put his army in march in three columns, so as not to have covered more than six leagues of ground, passed the Lech, and arrived in two days, or three at the utmost, at Augsburg. The Austrian general would immediately have followed the movement by the left bank of the Danube, and would have advanced by Neuburg, behind the Lech, to cover Bavaria and the hereditary states; he would not have exposed himself by following the French army upon the right bank, because he must have advanced under the walls of Augsburg to wait for it, when, facing about,

it might have beaten him, cut him off from Ulm, and driven him into the Black Mountains. The Austrian army might still have fought and conquered insulated divisions; but it was not in a condition to engage the united corps of the French army.

The French ought to have been at Munich, and masters of Bavaria on the 18th of May. Kray would have thought himself fortunate in regaining the Inn in time: it may be seen by his despatches, that he formed a perfectly correct judgment of the irresolution of his enemy. When the latter pushed a corps upon Augsburg, he wrote thus: "The French army is making a demonstration upon Bavaria, but it is not serious, because its divisions are in echelon as far as the Iller, and its line is already too much extended:"—he was right.

8thly.—Thrice, in forty days, Moreau reiterated the same demonstrations; but all three times without giving them a character of truth: he only encouraged his rival, and gave him opportunities of defeating insulated divisions. In fact, the French army had, in its manœuvres, its left upon Ulm, and its right twenty leagues off, threatening Bavaria; this was really defying the enemy and fortune at the same time. During this campaign, the French army, superior

in numbers upon the whole, was almost always inferior in strength in the field: this will happen to generals who are irresolute, and who act without principles and without plans; tampering and half-measures, in war, ruin every thing.

9thly.—The scheme of passing upon the left bank of the Danube, above Ulm, was full of peril and extremely hazardous; if Kray and the Prince of Reuss united, had manœuvred with the left on the Danube, and the right on the Tyrol, the French army might have been taken *in flagrante delicto*, and greatly endangered. But, since the French general was bent upon this useless and rash operation, he should have executed it resolutely and at once; the passage having been surprised on the 19th, the whole army should have been on the left bank on the 20th, leaving only a few moveable columns in observation upon the right bank, and should have advanced directly upon Ulm and Nordlingen, in order to attack the Austrian army in flank, and to oblige it, if Kray had resolved on retreating, to receive battle; and to seize its intrenched camp, if Kray had determined to pass upon the right bank in order to march against the French army. On this plan Moreau had nothing to fear; his army, superior as it was in strength

and confidence, if it had lost the right bank, would have established itself upon the left: all chances were in its favour; having planned the movement it would have marched united to surprise the enemy during his movements, while it would leave nothing exposed to measures which might originate with the enemy. This is the advantage possessed by every army which marches united. What could General Richepanse, who was nearest to Ulm, have done, if Kray and the Prince of Reuss had attacked him with 60,000 men; and what would have become of the army if Richepanse's corps had been defeated, and had lost its line of operation on the right bank, sustaining there so considerable a check before it had gained a footing upon the left bank?

10thly.—The march of General Decaen upon Munich, that of Lecourbe upon Neuburg, and that of Leclerc upon Fressing, were insulated movements, in all of which the French troops found themselves inferior to the enemy in number; they braved the matter out, attained the point they sought to occupy, gained little by it, and lost as much as the enemy did.

11thly.—Lecourbe's retrograde march upon the Vorarlberg was useless; he ought to have marched upon Inspruck; he would have ar-

rived there ten days sooner, with less difficulty and with the sacrifice of fewer men than he lost in all those debouches of the Tyrol, without obtaining any end: the possession of Inspruck was an object of great importance, the army would then have been in line upon the Inn.

12thly.—The armistice did not accomplish the aim of Government, which, in order to secure the position of the armies, was desirous of possessing the four places of Ulm, Philipsburg, Ingolstad, and Inspruck.

Third remark.—(KRAY.)—1st. Field-marshal Kray committed his army by keeping it in a scattered state on the approach of the opening of the campaign; it was wrong to establish his head-quarters at Donauschingen, and particularly so to place his magazines at Stockach, Engen, and Mœskirch. He conducted himself as if Switzerland was in a state of neutrality; if that had really been the case, his head-quarters and magazines would have been covered by the defiles of the Black Mountains. But, in fact, the French were masters of Switzerland, and of the whole course of the Rhine from Constance to Basle; and his magazines were within half-a-day's march of them, and absolutely in contact with the outposts.

2dly.—Field-marshal Kray manifested skill

in the neighbourhood of Ulm ; he succeeded in an important point—since, with an army which had been defeated thrice within one month, and which was very inferior, he detained a superior and victorious army forty days under the cannon of his intrenched camp: marches, manœuvres, and fortifications, were designed for no other purpose. But might not the Marshal have done something more on the 16th of May, when Sainte-Suzanne, with less than 20,000 men, was separated from the rest of the army by the Danube, within one hour's march of Kray's intrenched camp? why did not the latter attack him with his concentrated strength? Such favourable opportunities occur but seldom; he ought to have debouched upon Sainte-Suzanne's two divisions with 60,000 men, and destroyed them.

3dly.—Why did he not, on the 26th of May, when the French army was dispersed over a line of twenty leagues; from the Danube to the Lech, debouch with all his forces upon the two divisions of Sainte-Suzanne and Richepanse? He attacked them with but 16,000 men. His attack upon the Iller, on the 4th of June, was made with too much circumspection and too few troops: the Prince of Reuss ought to have assisted in it, descending the Tyrol with

all his forces. If the Austrian general had availed himself of the advantages he possessed, and of the indecision and erroneous manœuvres of his adversary, he would, in spite of the successes and superiority of the latter, have driven him back into Switzerland.

GENOA.—MASSENA.

1800.

Respective positions of the Armies of Italy—Genoa—Melas intersects the French army—Massena endeavours ineffectually to re-establish his communications with his left. He is invested in Genoa—Blockade of Genoa—Melas marches upon the Var: Suchet abandons Nice—Massena attempts to raise the blockade—Pressed by famine, Massena negotiates. Surrender of Genoa—The Austrians recross the Alps in order to advance to meet the Army of reserve. Suchet pursues them—Consequences of the victory of Marengo. Suchet takes possession of Genoa—Critical remarks.

The principal army of the house of Austria was that of Italy: it was commanded by Field-marshal Melas; his effective strength amounted to 140,000 men, of which 130,000 were under arms. The whole of Italy was at the command of the Austrians—from Rome to Milan, from the Isonzo to the Alps contiguous to the coast: neither the Grand Duke, nor the King of Sardinia, nor the Pope, had been able to obtain permission to return to their dominions. The minister Thugut re-

tained the first at Vienna, the second at Florence, and the third at Venice.

The operations of the Austrian administration extended over the whole of Italy. Nothing checked it: all the treasures of this beautiful country were devoted to the restoration and improvement of the stores and ammunition of that army, which, proud of the successes it had obtained during the preceding campaign, had now to render itself worthy of fixing the attention of all Europe, and being called upon to perform the principal part in the campaign about to be opened. Nothing seemed above its reach: its generals flattered themselves with the certainty of entering Genoa and Nice; passing the Var, and joining the English army of Mahon in the port of Toulon; planting the Austrian eagle upon the towers of the ancient city of Marseilles, and taking up their winter-quarters upon the Rhone and the Durance.

In the beginning of the month of March, Field-marshal Melas raised his cantonments, leaving all his cavalry, parks of reserve, and heavy artillery, which would have been useless to him until after passing the Var, in the plains of Italy. He placed 30,000 foot under the command of Generals Wuccassowich, Laudon,

Haddich, and Kaim, to guard the fortified places and debouches of the Splugen, Saint Gothard, the Simplon, Saint Bernard, Mont Cenis, Mont Genèvre, and Argentiere; and he himself, with from 70 to 80,000 men, approached the Ligurian Apennines. His left, under the command of Lieutenant-field-marshal Ott, advanced on Bobbio, whence he pushed a vanguard forward upon Sestri di Levante, to communicate with the English squadron, and draw off the attention of the French general. He marched the centre to Acqui, and fixed his head-quarters there. His right he intrusted to Lieutenant-field-marshal Ulsnitz.

The French army beheld with confidence the conqueror of Zurich at its head. It was called on to fight upon ground, every step of which brought some glorious event to its recollection. Four years had not yet elapsed since it had, although scanty in number and in want of every thing, but supplying all its deficiencies by courage and undeviating determination, obtained numerous victories, planted its standards upon the banks of the Adige and the confines of the Tyrol within fifty days, and raised to so lofty a pitch the glory of the French name. During the months of January, February, and March, its internal management

had been regulated; the pay had been distributed, and considerable supplies of provisions had changed dearth to abundance; the ports of Marseilles, Toulon, and Antibes, were still full of vessels employed in provisioning it. It was beginning to forget the defeats which it had sustained during the year preceding; and it was as well off as the poverty of the country in which it was would admit of. This army amounted to 40,000 men; but it had establishments for 100,000. All the intelligence which it received from the interior of France during the former campaign, had excited the spirit of faction, discussion, and dejection: the Republic seemed at that time writhing in the pangs of death; but now all things concurred to rouse it to emulation, for France was regenerated. Thirty millions of French people, united around their leader and strong in the mutual confidence which they inspired, represented the Hercules of Gaul, armed with his club, and ready to fell the enemies of his liberty and independence, to the earth.

The head-quarters were at Genoa. Brigadier-general Oudinot commanded the staff, and General Lamartelliere the artillery. Massena had confided the left of his army to Lieutenant-general Suchet, who commanded

four divisions. The first of these occupied Rocca-Barbena; the second, Settepani and Melagno; the third, Saint-James and Notre-Dame de Neves; and the fourth was in reserve at Fiscale, and upon the heights of San Pantaleone: the whole of his force amounted to 12,000 men. Lieutenant-general Soult commanded the centre, which was 12,000 strong, and formed into three divisions. That of General Gardanne defended Cadibona, Vado, Montelegino, and Savona—the flankers defended the heights of Stella; General Gasan defended the debouches in front and rear, and upon the flanks of the Bocchetta; General Marbot commanded the reserve; and Lieutenant-general Miollis the right, 5000 strong: he covered the eastern coast, occupying Recco by his right, Monte Cornua by his centre, and by his left the Col de Toriglio situated at the beginning of the valley de la Trébia. There was a reserve of 5000 men in the town; and the whole army amounted to from 34 to 36,000 men. The passes from Argentieres to the sources of the Tanaro were still choaked up with snow. A division consisting of 4000 men, under the command of General Garnier, was detached to observe them, and to furnish supplies to the garrisons of Saorgio, Nice, Montalbano, Vinti-

miglia, and the coast batteries. The approach of the hostile army determined the Commander-in-chief to order that the cantonments should be raised; when, although the season was severe and there was still snow upon the mountains, the troops struck their tents, and occupied positions on the heights. It was not long before skirmishes began to take place between the out-posts. The situation of the French army was critical, and required great vigilance. Every day it sent out strong reconnoitring parties, which in their encounters always got the advantage. It continued to make prisoners, and to carry off magazines and baggage. The occupation of Sestri di Levante obstructed the arrival of the convoys of corn; the peasants of the valley of Fontana-Bona, at all times devoted to oligarchy, now availing themselves of the neighbourhood of the Austrian army, took up arms, and declared for the enemy. Lieutenant-general Miollis marched against them in two columns: one of these entered the valley, disarmed the insurgents, burnt five of their villages, and took hostages; the other marched along the seashore, drove Ott's van-guard from Sestri, pushed it beyond the Apennines, and possessed itself of a convoy of 6000 quintals of corn, which it sent into Genoa.

The city of Genoa is situated on the sea-shore, behind an almost inaccessible branch of the Apennines which is detached above the Bocchetta. This mountain is intersected perpendicularly by two torrents, the Polcevera on the west, and the Bisagno on the east, which fall into the sea at 2000 toises distance from each other. Genoa has two walls fortified with bastions; the first is a triangle of 9000 toises in extent. The south side, bounded by the sea, extends from the light-house at the mouth of the Polcevera, to the lazaretto at the mouth of the Bisagno; the two moles, the port, and the quays, occupy its whole extent. The west side runs along the left bank of the Polcevera; the east side along the right bank of the Bisagno: each is 3500 toises in extent, and they unite, forming an acute angle, at fort Eperon. The plane which passes through these three angles forms an angle of 15° with the horizon. The enceinte is well covered and strengthened, well designed and strongly flanked; the ground has been well understood. The west side commands the whole valley of the Polcevera, in which the suburb of San Pietro d'Arena is situated. The east side, on the contrary, is commanded by the hills of Monte Ratti, and Monte Faccio; which compelled

the engineer to occupy them with three external forts, namely: Quezzi upon Monte Valpura, Richelieu upon the Manego, and Santa Tecla, between Monte Albaro and La Madona del Monte. Beyond these mountains is the torrent of Sturla; above fort de l'Eperon is the level of Deux-Freres, parallel with the sea, and commanded in the rear by fort Diamant, which is 1200 toises distant from fort de l'Eperon. The town of Genoa is built near the mouth of the Bisagno. It is covered by the second wall, (which is skilfully planned,) and is capable of some resistance. It cannot be bombarded either on the north or the west side, because it is above 2000 toises from fort de l'Eperon, and 900 from the lighthouse; nor can it be bombarded from the east, unless the attacking party have first gained possession of the three exterior forts, and occupied the position of La Madonna del Monte. The first wall was erected in 1632; the second is more ancient. There are no roads to the port, and the sea beats strongly into the interior of it, which renders an extension of the moles necessary, as was projected in 1807. The two walls were completely lined; the arsenal was abundantly furnished with all kinds of ammunition. The

democratic party, which had ruled the Republic from the time of the Convention of Montebello, was wholly devoted to France. The dislike of the people to the Austrians had been carefully kept up by the senate from 1747. Genoa, in the spirit of its government, in its political opinions, and in its devotedness, was thoroughly French.

In the month of March, Vice-admiral Keith, who commanded the English squadron in the Mediterranean, notified to the consuls of the different nations the blockade of all the ports and coasts of the Republic of Genoa, from Vintimiglia to Sarsana; he forbade neutrals to trade with an extent of coast of sixty leagues, which, however, he could not actually watch: this was, at one stroke of the pen, to declare them out of the protection of their sovereign's flag. At the beginning of April, he was cruising before Genoa, which rendered communications with Provence, and the arrival of the provisions, which were in abundance in the magazines of Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Nice, &c. extremely precarious.

The grand operations commenced on the 6th of April. Field-marshal Melas, with four divisions, attacked Montelegino and Stella at

the same time; Lieutenant-general Soult hastened up with his reserve to the assistance of the left. The action was kept up briskly the whole day; Palfy's division entered Cadibona and Vado; those of Saint-Julien and Lattermann entered Montelegino and Arbizola; Soult rallied his left upon Savona, strengthened the garrison of the citadel, and retired upon Vareggio to cover Genoa; three English ships of war moored in the road of Vado. Melas moved his head-quarters to La Madona di Savona, and invested the fort; he found at Vado several six-and-thirty pounders, and large mortars with which the coast-batteries were lined. The French line was intersected the very first day. Suchet, on the left, was separated from the rest of the army; but he preserved his communication with France.

On the same day, Ott, with the left, debouched in three columns upon Miollis; the left column along by the sea, the centre by Monte Cornua, and the right by the Col di Toriglio: he was victorious at all points; occupied Monte Faccio and Monte Ratti, invested the three forts of Guezzi, Richelieu, and Santa Tecla; and lighted the fires of his bivouacs a cannon-shot from the latter town. The atmosphere was inflamed by them to the very skies. The

Genoese, men, women, old people, and children, ran out upon the walls to gaze on a spectacle so new and so important to them: they waited with impatience for the morning; they were then to become the prey of the Germans, whom their forefathers had, with so much glory, defeated and driven out of their city! Those of the oligarchical party smiled in secret, and with difficulty dissembled their gladness; but the bulk of the people was in consternation. At the first appearance of sunrise, Massena opened the gates and marched out with the division of Miollis and the reserve. He attacked Monte Faccio and Monte Ratti, took them in rear, and precipitated the divisions of the imprudent Ott, who had advanced so inconsiderately alone and so far from the rest of his army, into the ravines and bogs. The victory was complete; Monte Cornua, Recco, and the Col di Toriglio, were retaken. In the evening, 1500 prisoners, one general, some cannon, and seven colours, the trophies of the day, entered Genoa amidst the acclamations and rejoicings of all its worthy citizens.

During this day, the 7th, Elsnitz, with the right of Melas's army in five columns, attacked Lieutenant-general Suchet. The column which debouched by the Tanaro and Saint-Bernard,

was defeated and repulsed beyond the river, by the French division which was at Rocca-Barbena. Those which attacked Settepani, Melagno, Notre-Dame de Neve, and Saint-James, met with various success. General Seras sustained himself at Melagno; but Saint-James was occupied by Elsnitz, as the heights of Vado had been, the preceding day, by Palfy. Suchet retired upon La Pietra and Loano; he took the line of Borghetta, and strengthened his left in order to secure his communications with France—his only retreat.

On the 9th, Field-marshal-lieutenant Ott caused General Hohenzollern to attack and occupy the Bocchetta. Melas had carried his principal point; he had cut off the French army from France, and had separated one body of it from the remainder: but it was necessary to prevent the offensive operations of the French, to march upon Genoa, surround the city, and concentrate his army. The interval of fourteen leagues, existing between his left and centre, was a perilous circumstance: on the 10th he debouched with his centre in several columns: the right column, commanded by Lattermann, proceeded along the sea-coast by Veraggio; the centre, led by Palfy,

ascended the heights above the town; that of Saint-Julien left Sospello to move upon Monte Fayale, while Hohenzollern, from the Bocchetta, moved upon Ponte Decimo, and directed his flankers of the right by Marcarolo, upon the heights of La Madona-dell'Aqua, near Voltri, in order to effect his junction with the centre.

On the same day, the 9th of April, Massena was at Veraggio with half his forces; Soult at Voltri with the other half; Miollis kept Genoa; Suchet, having received directions by sea, left the lines of Borghetta, and moved to the attack of Saint-James. The aim of General Massena was to restore, at any price, his communications with his left and with France. Soult was to move from Voltri upon Sassello, Massena upon Melta, and Suchet upon Cadibona; the junction was to take place upon Upper Montenotte. Soult put himself in march at dawn; but, his scouts having learned that some flankers belonging to Hohenzollern were approaching Voltri, he quitted his road, wheeled to the right, marched upon them, drove them from one eminence to another, and, in the evening, precipitated them into the bog of the torrent de la Pioto; he killed, wounded, or took prisoners, 3000 men. On the 11th

he executed his movement upon Sassello, which he entered, and there learned that General Saint-Julien had left it in the morning to move upon Monte Fayale. He immediately marched up to him, defeated him, and repulsed him upon Montenotte, after having made a great number of prisoners. From thence he moved upon Monte L'Hermette, which he carried, after some smart actions, in which bravery, intrepidity, and the necessity for conquering, supplied the want of numbers. Meanwhile Massena was less fortunate; he waited during the 10th with impatience for Soult's arrival on his right. The latter not appearing, he left Veraggio on the 11th, and marched upon Stella; but Lattermann, who marched along the sea-shore, entered Veraggio, and threatened Voltri, while Palfy and Bellegarde attacked him in front: he was fearful of being surrounded, and retreated upon Cogareto. On the next day he detached General Fressinet on the right to support Soult. Fressinet came up opportunely, and decided the contest for the occupation of Monte L'Hermette. Suchet, on his side, attacked and took Settepani, Melagno, and San-Pantaleone; but he was repulsed at Saint-James. The 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th, were spent

in marches, manœuvres, and combats. It often happened that the columns of the two armies were moving, side by side, in opposite directions, separated by torrents or bogs, which prevented their fighting in their marches, though very close to each other. Massena saw the impossibility of restoring his communication: the want of concert between the attacks of Massena and those of Suchet prevented their being simultaneous; but the loss of the enemy, in the various engagements, was double that of the French. On the 21st, Massena evacuated Voltri to approach the ramparts of Genoa, into which town he made 5000 prisoners file off before him. Colonel Mouton, of the third of the line, since created Count de Lobau, acquired honour in all these attacks; he saved the rear-guard at the passage of the bridge of Voltri, by his intrepidity. The people of Genoa, witnessing the bravery of the French soldiers, and the devotion and resolution of the generals, became filled with enthusiasm and affection for the army.

From this day, the 21st of April, Massena's army no longer bore the character of a campaigning army; it seemed only the strong and brave garrison of a place of the first order. This situation presented him with fresh laurels;

few positions were more favourable than that occupied by Massena. Master of so vast an intrenched camp, which bars the whole chain of the Apennines, he was able, by crossing the town, to move from the right to the left in a few hours; which the enemy could not accomplish under several days' march. The Austrian general soon became sensible of all the advantages which such a theatre afforded to his enemy. On the 30th, in a combined attack, he approached the walls of Genoa, while Admiral Keith exchanged a warm cannonade with the batteries of the moles and quays. At first fortune smiled upon all his arrangements. He carried the level of Deux Freres, surrounded fort Diamant, blockaded that of Richelieu, occupied the sides of Monte Ratti, of Monte Faccio, and even of La Madona del Monte, where he was desirous of placing, during the night, upon the position of Albana, a battery of twenty mortars, in order to burn the proud city of Genoa, and to destroy it by conflagration and revolt. But, in the afternoon, Massena, having concentrated all the forces behind his ramparts, intrusted the defence of the town to the National Guard, and debouched upon Monte Faccio, which he surrounded on all sides, and re-took it in spite of the most

obstinate resistance: his troops re-entered the fort of Guezzi. Soult then marched upon the level of Deux Freres, and made himself master of it. The enemy lost all the positions they had gained in the morning. In the evening, the General-in-chief returned to Genoa, with 1200 prisoners, several flags, and the ladders which the Austrian army had provided for the escalade it had determined to attempt at the uniting point of the two enceintes, on the Bisagno side.

Suchet maintained himself a long time in possession of Saint-Pantaleone and Melagno; but at length he retired into the position of Borghetta, no longer hoping that any efforts of his could re-establish the line of the army.

After the disasters of this day the Austrian generals declined any farther attack upon a place so inauspicious to them. Genoa was without provisions, and could not long avoid a capitulation. According to the principles of warfare in mountainous regions, they occupied strong positions round the place, to prevent the arrival of provisions by land, while the English squadron intercepted them by sea; the French general was, therefore, under the necessity of acting on the offensive and driving them from their posts, if he wished to com-

municate with the country, and to open the roads in order to procure the necessary forage and victuals.

On the other side, the Court of Vienna was alarmed at the vast superiority of the French army of the Rhine, and at the immense preparations making by the First Consul to carry the war upon the Danube; it hastened a diversion upon Provence. Melas proceeded to the Var, leaving Lieutenant-field-marshal Ott, with 30,000 men, to blockade Genoa in concert with the English squadron. Ott occupied several camps already fortified by nature, to which he added all the resources of art; which gave him the double advantage of commanding the debouches, and thus opposing the arrival of convoys, and also of placing the troops in strong positions, where they had nothing to fear from the impetuosity of the French.

At ease with respect to the fate of Genoa, which was sure to open its gates to him within a fortnight, Melas marched with 30,000 men against Suchet; he turned the line of Borghetta by means of a division which debouched from Ormea, Ponte di Nave, and La Pieva. On the 7th of May he attacked the heights of San Bartolomeo, in hopes to cut off the French from the road from the Cornice to Porto Maurizio,

and thus oblige Suchet to lay down his arms. But General Suchet, who was in position at San Pantaleone, gave his General time to make a retreat, though with some disorder and no small loss, behind La Taggia, where he might have held out a few days, if Gorrup's brigade, leaving Coni, had not seized (which it did on the 6th) the Col di Tende. His outposts were already at the defile of Saorgio. Suchet rightly decided that it was his business to recross the Roya and the Var, with the utmost expedition. He immediately set to work, and intrenched the tête-de-pont; sent for heavy artillery from Antibes, and gunners from the coast; he had left garrisons in fort Vintimiglia, in the castle of Villa Franca, and at fort Montalbano, which, situated as it is upon the height that separates the gulf of Villa Franca from the roadstead of Nice, commands these two towns and the whole course of the Paglione. He there established a telegraph; he had thus a vedette on the rear of the enemy, which gave information of all their movements, whether on the way to Genoa by the Col di Turbie, or on the high road of Turin by the valley of the Paglione.

The General of division, Saint-Hilaire, commanded the eighth military division: he hast-

ened towards the Var, collecting all the disposable troops at Marseilles and Toulon; some companies of the National Guard placed themselves under his command. The fortified places, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes, were in a good state of defence; by the 15th of May, the body of troops collected upon the Var amounted to 14,000 men.

All the couriers from Paris brought intelligence to Provence of the march of the army of reserve; the van-guard had already appeared at the Saint-Bernard: the result of this manœuvre was evident alike in soldiers and citizens; the confidence of the troops, like that of the inhabitants, was exalted to the highest pitch of hope. General Willot, who was following the Austrian army, was forming a line of deserters; Pichegru was to put himself at the head of the disaffected of the South. Willot had commanded in Provence, in 1797, before the 18th of Fructidor: at that moment of reaction, when the enemies of the Republic exerted so much influence in the interior, he corresponded with them; and he had secretly organized a kind of *Chouanerie* in the departments of the Var and of the mouths of the Rhone. In the South the passions are strong; the partizans of the Republic were enthusiastic; they were the most

furious anarchists in France: the opposite party was not more moderate; it had raised the standard of revolt and civil war after the 31st of May, and delivered up Toulon, the principal arsenal of France, to its most mortal enemy. Marseilles subsists only by commerce: the maritime superiority of the English had reduced it to a mere coasting-trade, and this weighed heavily upon it. Of all France, this is the country in which fewest national domains were sold; monks and priests had but few benefices in it, and except in the district of Tarracona, its property experienced but few changes. All the efforts of the partisans of the Bourbons, however, were impotent; the principles of the 18th of Brumaire had reunited a large majority of the citizens; and at length the movements of the army of reserve suspended all opinions, fixed universal attention, and excited universal interest.

On the 11th of May, Melas made his entry into Nice; the enthusiasm of the Austrian officers was extreme; they had arrived at last upon the territory of the Republic, after having seen the French armies at the gates of Vienna. An English cruiser moored at the mouth of the Var; it announced the arrival of the army embarked at Mahon, which was to invest the fort-

ress of Toulon. England longed to blow up these superb docks, and utterly destroy that arsenal, whence the army which threatened her Indian empire had issued.

The Var is a torrent which, though generally fordable, occasionally swells in a few hours. Its fords are not to be relied on; and, besides, the line which Suchet defended was short; the left rested upon difficult mountains, and the right upon the sea, at 600 toises distance. He had had time to cover the tête-de-pont which he occupied in advance of the village of Saint-Laurent with retrenchments and batteries of large calibre. From the first entrance of the French into the county of Nice, in 1792, the engineers had constructed a considerable number of batteries upon the right bank, for the defence of the bridge, which is 300 toises in length; this important defile had attracted the utmost solicitude of the French generals, during the years 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795. The field which Suchet was to defend had been long prepared. On the 14th, after a few days rest, the divisions of Elsnitz, Bellegarde, and Lattermann, attacked the tête-de-pont with obstinacy; the defence was brilliant; the enemy, overwhelmed by the batteries of the right bank, saw the impossibility of success; they took up a position,

pushed posts on the left as far as the English cruisers, and rested their right upon the mountains. Melas resolved to pass the Var higher up: Suchet's corps, if turned, would have been obliged to fall back upon Cagnes, and the defiles of the Esterelles. But at length, on the 21st, he received intelligence of the passage of the Saint-Bernard by the army of reserve, and of the arrival of Napoleon at Aoste. Melas set out immediately with two divisions, passed the Col di Tende, and entered Coni on the 23d; on the 24th he learned, at Savigliano, the taking of Ivrée: he had sent Palfy before him some days previously. He still flattered himself that these pieces of intelligence were exaggerated; that this very formidable army would turn out to be only a body of 15, or at most 20,000 men, which he could easily keep in check with the troops he had brought with him, and those he had concentrated in the plain of Italy, without giving up Genoa, but merely by postponing his plans upon Provence. He ordered Elsnitz to remain, and to take up a position behind the line of the Roya, resting his right upon the Col di Tende, his centre upon the heights of Breglio, and his left at Ventimiglia. Some officers of engineers, and a numerous body of sappers, went to this line of retreat in order to construct

intrenchments upon it. The Roya is in fact the best line for covering Genoa on the side of France, and at the same time the high road of Tende; for the Taggia, which is in the rear, leaves the road from Nice to Sospello, Tende, and Turin, open.

As soon as Massena was apprised that he was blockaded by no more than from 30 to 35,000 men, and that Melas had advanced with a part of the army upon the Var, he marched out of Genoa with no ill-founded hope of overthrowing the blockading body of the army, and terminating the campaign. Fifteen thousand Frenchmen in his position were superior to 30,000 Austrians: and, in fact, the enemy were repulsed from all their advanced posts.

On the 10th of May, Lieutenant-general Soult with 6000 men, entered the eastern coast, upon the rear of Ott's left, and re-entered Genoa with provisions and prisoners by the way of Monte Faccio; the attacks were renewed on the 13th of May. Ott concentrated his troops upon Monte Creto: the action was obstinate and bloody; Soult, after having performed prodigies of valour, fell severely wounded, and remained in the power of the enemy.

Massena re-entered Genoa, having lost all

hope of raising the blockade; and provisions becoming scarce and extremely dear. The inhabitants were suffering from privation, and the rations of the soldiers were diminished; however, in spite of the vigilance of the English, some vessels from Marseilles, Toulon, and Corsica, succeeded in entering Genoa. This succour would have done very well for the army, but was quite insufficient for a population of 50,000 souls. There was some talk of capitulating, when, on the 26th of May, arrived the Chief of squadron Franceschi, who, on the 24th of April, had left Genoa for Paris: having been an eye-witness of the passage of the Saint-Bernard, he announced the approach of Napoleon to the walls of Genoa. This intrepid officer had embarked at Antibes in a light vessel; at the moment he was entering the port, his felucca being on the point of capture, he had, in order to save the despatches, no other resource than to trust to his exertions in swimming. The intelligence which he brought cheered the army and the Genoese; the idea of prompt relief made them endure present evils patiently. The enemies of France were in consternation, their plots confounded, and the people were tracing upon maps, exposed at the shop-doors, the advance of an

army in which their confidence reposed, and headed by a general beloved by them: they knew from the experience of former campaigns what they might expect from him.

A convoy of corn, announced to be coming from Marseilles, was however expected with the greatest impatience; one of the vessels forming a part of it entered the port on the 30th of May, and gave intelligence that she was followed by the rest of the convoy: the whole population was to be seen on the quay at the very break of day, to await the arrival of the succour so impatiently looked for. Their hopes were frustrated, no convoy arrived, and in the evening they were informed that it had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This greatly discouraged the people, and the magistrates of the city had recourse to the warehouses of cocoa, a large quantity of which article was in the hands of the merchants. Genoa is the mart which supplies the whole of Italy with it. There were also warehouses of millet, barley, and beans, in the place. On the 24th of May the distribution of bread had ceased; and nothing but cocoa was from that time served out. Articles of the strictest necessity were beyond all price: a pound of bad bread cost 30 francs; a pound of meat 6 francs; a

fowl 32 francs. During the night of the 1st of June, at two o'clock, it was supposed that cannon were heard. The soldiers and inhabitants ran out before day upon the ramparts; it was a vain illusion, and hopes thus defeated increased the dejection: desertion, a rare occurrence among French troops, became frequent; but in fact the soldiers had not sufficient food. There were 8000 Austrian prisoners in the hulks and the bagnios: up to this period they had received rations equally with the soldiers, but now it was impossible to give them any. Massena informed General Ott of this state of things, and requested that provisions might be sent in to the prisoners, giving his word that no part of them should be diverted from the purpose for which they were intended. Ott begged the English Admiral to send in provisions for his prisoners, which the latter refused to do: this was one of the first causes of ill-will between them. The blockading army itself subsisted only by the assistance it received over sea: and depended for that assistance upon the fleet. On the 2d of June, the patience of the people appeared to be exhausted; the women assembled, tumultuously demanding bread or death. Every thing was to be apprehended from the despair of so nu-

merous a population; only ten days had elapsed since the arrival of Colonel Franceschi, but ten days are an age to those who are famishing! "Since the army of reserve was announced to us," said they, "if it were coming at all, it would have been here before now; Napoleon does not march so slowly, he has been stopped in his progress by insurmountable obstacles; he might by this time have marched four times the distance. The Austrian army is too strong, and his too weak; he has been unable to debouch from the mountains; we have no chance, and meanwhile the whole population of our city is contracting diseases which will destroy us all. Have we not manifested sufficient patience, and sufficient attachment to the cause of our allies? Is it not cruel to exact more from so numerous a population, composed of old people, of women and children, and of quiet citizens little accustomed to the horrors of war?"

At length Massena yielded to necessity; he promised the people that if he were not succoured within twenty-four hours, he would treat. He kept his word; on the 3d of June, he sent Adjutant-general Andrieux to General Ott. Oh the fatality of human affairs! Andrieux met, in the antichamber of the general,

an Austrian staff-officer, who had just arrived post from the general head-quarters of Melas; he was the bearer of an order to raise the blockade, and to move with the utmost expedition upon the Po; and he announced to Ott that Napoleon had been at Chivasso ever since the 26th, and was then marching upon Milan. There was not a moment to be lost in providing for the safety of the army.

Andrieux was shewn in, in his turn; he opened the matter, in the usual way, by declaring that his general still had a month's provision for his army; but that the population was suffering, that his heart was touched at it, and that he would surrender the place, if he were permitted to quit it with his arms, cannon, and baggage, without being made prisoner.

Ott, disguising his surprise and joy, agreed to the proposal with eagerness. The negotiations were begun immediately; they lasted twenty-four hours. Massena attended the conferences on the bridge of Conegliano, in person; he there met Admiral Keith and General Ott; the embarrassment of the latter was extreme; time was exceedingly precious, and he felt all the possible consequences of an hour's delay under such circumstances. On

the 4th, during the day, Ott learned that the army of reserve had forced the passage of the Tesino, and entered Milan, occupying Pavia; and that the scouts were already upon the Adda; and yet, if he should accede to Massena's terms, and suffer him to quit Genoa without being a prisoner of war, and retaining his arms and guns, he would have gained nothing. General Massena had still 12,000 men, he would join Suchet, who had as many, and thus united, they would manœuvre against him, weakened as he would be by the loss of a division, which he must of necessity leave at Genoa. He would therefore be unable to move upon the Po with more than about thirty battalions, which, reduced as they were by the losses of the campaign, would hardly furnish 15,000 men.

Ott proposed that the French army should proceed to Antibes by sea, with their arms and baggage, and without being prisoners. That was rejected, and then it was agreed that 8500 men of the garrison should quit the place by land, and take the high road to Voltri, and that the rest should be conveyed away by sea. (See the Capitulation.) The next day, the 6th, the greater part of the garrison, to the number of 8500 men, with arms and baggage,

but, without cannon, marched out and proceeded to Voltri; the General-in-chief with 1500 men, and twenty field-pieces, embarked on board of five French cruisers; the sick and wounded remained in the hospitals, under the care of French medical officers. Ott intrusted Genoa to General Hohenzollern, with whom he left 10,000 men. The English Admiral took possession of the port and maritime establishments; convoys of provisions arrived from all quarters, and in a few days the greatest abundance took place of scarcity. The conduct of the English displeased the people; they laid hands on every thing; according to them, it was they who had taken Genoa, since it had yielded only to famine, and it was their cruisers which had stopped all the convoys of provisions.

General Elsnitz had spent six days in preparing for his retreat; he quitted Nice during the night of the 28th of May, with the intention of taking the line of the Roya, and covering the blockade of Genoa. Before exposing his movement in retreat, conformably to an established usage among the Austrian generals, he twice, on the 22nd and 26th of May, insulted the *tête-de-pont* of the Var. He was repulsed, and had from 5 to 600 men disabled.

The object of these attacks was to deceive Suchet, to conceal from him his real intention, and prevent his detaching a column, by the upper ridge of the Alps, upon the Col di Tende. It was not till the 29th, that Suchet was informed, by means of the telegraph of fort Montalbano, that his enemy had retreated: he immediately passed the bridge and entered Nice in the course of the day. The inhabitants sent a deputation to implore mercy at his hands. They stood in need of it, for their conduct had been extremely bad.

Generals Menard and Rochambeau marched rapidly by the high road of Nice to Turin, to overtake the enemy's right; they regained the lost time, and encountered upon the heights of Breglio, Braillo, and Saorgio, the troops of General Gorrup, which formed the Austrian right; they outfronted them, defeated them, and obliged them to retire on the side towards the sea, thus abandoning the route of the Col di Tende, which was taken possession of by the French. Meanwhile General Elsnitz had long wished to maintain himself upon the Roya. He had just received an order to hasten upon the Po, through the Col di Tende, which, in consequence of the defeat of General Gorrup, was now impossible. He

determined to execute his movement of retreat by the way of the Corniche. Having reached Oneglia, he moved upon Pieva, Ormea, and Ceva. This march was full of difficulty; he performed it successfully. His rear-guard, on being attacked at Pieva, experienced a check; nevertheless, in this remarkably difficult movement, he lost only from 1500 to 2000 men, a few cannon, and a small quantity of baggage. Suchet arrived on the 6th of June at Savona; he was there joined by General Gazan, who commanded the 8500 men who had quitted Genoa by land. He took cantonments upon the Bormida, and surrounded the citadel of Savona, which was garrisoned by the Austrians. From the 29th of May to the 6th of June, during which time the French troops pushed the enemy with the greatest activity, they made from 1500 to 2000 prisoners, and displayed the highest intrepidity in several engagements. They possessed an inestimable advantage over their enemy, in a knowledge of the country: besides, the inhabitants were entirely favourable to them.

After the battle of Marengo, Suchet was ordered to march on Genoa: he established his head-quarters at Conegliano, and entered the place on the 24th of June, conformably to

the convention of Alessandria. On the 20th of June, however, he signed a particular convention with General Hohenzollern. (See Official Documents.) As soon as the people of Genoa ceased to feel the pangs of famine, they resumed their natural sentiments. The avidity of the English powerfully excited their indignation; the latter wished to carry off every thing. They even coveted the merchandize in the open port. Warm discussions and affrays took place between them and the people: several Englishmen were massacred. Suchet, informed of the conduct of the English Admiral, appealed to the clauses of the Convention; which gave rise to a curious correspondence between him and General Hohenzollern, who opposed all the undertakings of the English, and placed guards over the arsenal and at the port, to prevent their taking any thing away: he conducted himself honourably.

The first intelligence of the surrender of Genoa was brought to Napoleon by some Milanese patriots, who had taken refuge in that city, and afterwards regained their country by crossing the mountains; it was but twenty-four hours later that he received official information of it. When the Genoese heard of the victory of Marengo, their joy was extreme;

their country was delivered. They participated sincerely in the glory of their allies. The oligarchical party shrunk again into nothing. The English and Austrians became more and more objects of menace and insult from the populace; blood was shed; and one Austrian regiment was almost entirely destroyed. Hohenzollern was obliged to apply to Suchet for redress, and for his influence with the people to keep them quiet, during the few days he had to remain in the place before the arrival of the moment fixed for its restoration. The entry of Suchet into this great city was a triumph: 400 young ladies dressed in the French and Ligurian colours met the army. General Hohenzollern fulfilled all his engagements; the English squadron stood off; and the Genoese regretted that they had not held out longer. They accused one another of pusillanimity, and of having reposed too little confidence in the fortune of the first magistrate of France; for, had they been certain of not being obliged to suffer for more than five or six days, they would have still found strength to do it.

While these important events were passing, Massena landed at Antibes, and there remained for some time. He arrived afterwards at Milan, before the departure of Napoleon to return to

Paris, and assumed the command of the new Army of Italy.

CRITICAL REMARKS.

First Observation.—(MASSENA.)—The Austrian army was more than double that of the French; but the positions which the latter might have occupied were so strong, that it ought to have triumphed. Massena committed a fatal error in his mode of defence.

The two armies were separated by the Alps and the Apennine, of which the Austrians occupied the side towards Italy from the foot of the Col d'Argentiere as far as Bobbio; the French occupied the upper height and all the side towards the sea; their head-quarters were at Genoa. The distance between Genoa and Nice is forty leagues, while the division of Kuinel, which was in advance of Coni, was but eighteen leagues from Nice; Oneglia is twenty leagues from Genoa. The Austrian division which occupied the Tanaro was but nine leagues off: Savona is ten from Genoa; the division which occupied the Bormida was but three leagues from Savona. The Austrian army was the most numerous; it acted on the offensive; it had the advantage of the first move, and could reach Nice, Oneglia, and Sa-

vona, before the French head-quarters. The country from Genoa to Nice is called by the name of River, on account of its narrowness; this country is comprehended between the crest of the Apennines and the sea; with relation to its length, it is a strait which has not depth and width enough to be defended throughout the whole of its length. It was necessary then to choose, whether to move the head-quarters to Nice, and defend upon the upper crest from Argentiere to Tende, thence to the Tanarello, the Taggia, or the Roya; or to concentrate the defence round Genoa: it was the latter branch of the alternative which was conformable with the First Consul's plan of campaign. Genoa is a very large city which presents many resources; it is a strong place; it is, besides, covered by the little fort of Gavi, and has the citadel of Savona upon its left flank. This scheme once adopted, General Massena ought to have acted as if he had been a General of the Ligurian Republic, and his only object had been to defend the capital. The division of from 3 to 4000 men which he left at Nice, and for the observation of the passes, was sufficient. General Massena did not know how to decide; he wished to keep up the communications of his army with Nice and Genoa: that

was impossible; and he was intersected. He ought to have posted his army in one of the three following manners:

To have given General Suchet, who commanded the left, 14,000 men, and established him with his principal forces upon the heights of Monte Legino, covering them with intrenchments; observed Settepani, the tower of Melagno, La Madone di Neve, Saint-James, and Cadibone, by light columns. To Lieutenant-general Soult, who commanded the centre, 10,000 men, to defend the Bocchetta and Monte Fayale. To General Miollis, who commanded the right, 3000 men, who should have intrenched themselves behind the torrent of the Sturla, upon Monte Ratti and Monte Faccio. Lastly, he should have kept 7000 men in reserve in the town.

The attack of Monte Legino, of the Bocchetta, and of Monte Faccio, would have been difficult; the enemy, compelled to divide into a great number of columns, might have been attacked and defeated in detail: instead of extending twenty leagues, as did the position which Massena occupied, this would have extended but ten; the hostile army would have intersected the road of the Corniche, and would have turned the whole army by its left;

it would have seized Saint-James, Cadibone, and Vado; but the French army would have remained entire and concentrated. On its left being forced upon the heights of Monte Legino, it would have fallen back upon Monte Fayale, under the cannon of Voltri, and lastly upon Genoa.

2dly.—Or Massena might have placed the left at Voltri, at La Madone dell' Aqua, the centre behind the Bocchetta, and the right behind the Sturla. This line, of much less extent, might have been occupied with fewer troops; the fortifications might have been made with more care; and more than half the army might have been kept in reserve at the gates of Genoa. Massena might have acted on the offensive by the eastern coast, the valley of Bisagno, the Bocchetta, the mountains of Sassello, and the western coast, and crushed the hostile columns, compelled as they would have been to separate in this difficult country.

3dly.—Or he might have occupied, upon the heights of Genoa, an intrenched camp, threatening Italy; supported the flanks upon two field forts, covered its front by redoubts and a hundred garrison-guns, independently of the field train; and lastly, kept a reserve in garrison at Genoa. A French army of 30,000

men, commanded by Massena, and placed in this formidable position, could not have been forced by an army of 60,000 Austrians. If Melas had been held in check by this army, and manœuvred to cut it off from Nice, that would have been of no consequence; Massena would have entered Piedmont. If Melas had wished to manœuvre upon Genoa, the places of Gavi and Seravale, and the nature of the ground would not have permitted him: or would have presented favourable opportunities to Massena for taking the first move, and falling upon the flank of the hostile army, and destroying it.

Second Observation. 1st.—Genoa opened its gates after it was saved. General Massena knew that the succouring army had reached the Po; he was certain that it had experienced no check since, for the enemy would have been eager enough to let him know it. When Cæsar besieged Alesia, he blockaded it with so much care, that the place had no intelligence of what was passing without. The period at which the army of assistance had promised to come up was expired; the Council of the Gauls assembled under the presidency of Vercingetorix; Critognatus rose and said, "You have no news from your army of assistance; but does not Cæsar give you intelligence of it every

day? Can you believe that he would labour so arduously, in raising intrenchments within intrenchments, if he was not apprehensive of the army which the Gauls have collected, and which is approaching? Persevere, then; you will be relieved." And, in fact, the Gallic army did arrive, 20,000 strong, and attacked Cæsar's legions.

2dly.—Was not the slightest attention on the part of General Ott and Admiral Keith to the proposal that the garrison should be permitted to quit the city, with their arms, and without being prisoners of war, as indicative as even a letter from Napoleon himself, of his near approach? When this basis was agreed to by the enemy, when they insisted that the garrison should proceed to Nice by sea, did they not discover the critical position in which they stood? Massena ought to have broken off, upon the certainty that within four or five days the blockade would be raised; in fact, it would have been raised twelve hours afterwards. The hostile generals knew the extreme dearth which prevailed in the city; they would never have agreed to that condition of the capitulation, that the French army should go out without being prisoners of war, if the

army of assistance had not been at hand, and in a situation to raise the siege.

3dly.—8500 men of the garrison marched out of the city of Genoa, by land, but without cannon. Massena embarked with twenty field-pieces and 1500 men, and landed at Antibes. He left 1500 men in the city to take care of the sick; his duty was to share the fortune of his troops, and he ought readily to have comprehended the interest the enemy took in separating him from them. In fact, the troops had no sooner reached Voltri, than they learned the approach of the army of assistance and Suchet's corps, at Finale. If Massena had been at their head, he would have reinforced Suchet, and marched upon the field of Marengo. His conduct in this last measure, is not a subject for imitation. It was a grievous error, and one which included lamentable consequences; his motives are still unknown. Much has been said of the flattery which the hostile generals lavished upon him during the conferences; but that should have increased his mistrust. When Napoleon wished to have the Austrian general, Provera, a very inferior officer, put forward, he praised him highly, and succeeded in deceiving the Court of Vienna, who employed him again. He was subse-

quently retaken at La Favorite. When General Foissac-Latour, who commanded at Mantua, so basely surrendered that place, Field-marshal Kray presented him with a flag, passing many encomiums on his valour. The praises of an enemy are suspicious—they cannot flatter a man of honour, until after the cessation of hostilities. Heaven forbid that the hero of Rivoli and Zurich, should be compared to a man without energy or character. Massena was eminently noble and brilliant in the midst of the fire and confusion of a battle: the din of the cannon cleared his ideas, and gave him penetration, spirit, and even gaiety.

The bad condition of the army of Italy has been much exaggerated; the evil had been considerable, but it had been in great measure repaired during February, March, and April. It has been said that the army was but 25,000 strong: it contained 40,000 men, under arms, between the Var and Genoa; and, moreover, the national guard of Genoa was formed out of the democratic faction, entirely devoted, and passionately attached to France. There were, besides, at Genoa, many patriots and Italian refugees, who were formed into a battalion.

At the moment of the surrender of Genoa, there were in it 12,000 Frenchmen under

arms; 3000 Italians, Ligurians, or Sardinians, who did not follow the army; and 6000 men in the hospitals: Suchet had, upon his arrival at Savona, 10,000 men. Here were, then, 25,000 men, under arms, of that army, which had lost in killed, wounded, or prisoners, or returned to France, 17,000 men.

On the 6th of Prairial, Major Franceschi, aide-de-camp of General Soult, sent by General Massena to the First Consul in the early part of Floreal, arrived and brought despatches from Bonaparte, which occasioned the following notice, transmitted officially and immediately to the Army and the Ligurian Government:—

"One of the officers whom I sent to the First Consul at Paris, is returned this night.

"He left General Bonaparte descending the great Saint-Bernard, having with him General Carnot, the minister at war.

"General Bonaparte informs me that from the 28th to the 30th of Floreal, he will have arrived, with all his army, at Ivrée, and from thence he will advance, by forced marches, upon Genoa.

"General Lecourbe is performing, at the same time, his movement upon Milan, by the Valteline.

"The army of the Rhine has obtained fresh advantages over the enemy; it has gained a decisive victory at Biberach, made a great number of prisoners, and directed its march upon Ulm.

"General Bonaparte, to whom I made known the conduct of the inhabitants of Genoa, testifies to me the reliance he

has on them; and writes, '*You are in a difficult position; but what gives me confidence is, that you are in Genoa.*' This city, actuated by an excellent spirit, and enlightened upon its true interests, will soon find, in its deliverance, the reward of the sacrifices it has made.

(Signed,) "MASSENA."

"SOLDIERS!

I learn by the reports that are made to me, that your patience and your courage are expiring; that complaints and intrigues exist in your ranks; that some of you desert to the enemy, and that plots are formed for carrying such base designs into execution, by whole troops.

"I am bound to remind you of the glory of your defence in Genoa, and what you owe to the fulfilment of your duty, to your honour, and to your deliverance, which depends only upon a few days of perseverance.

"Let the conduct of your generals and officers be your example; see them sharing your privations, eating the same bread and other food as yourselves; think too, that to secure your subsistence, they must watch day and night. You endure some physical wants; they endure all that you do, and bear, in addition, the anxieties arising from your situation. What! have you hitherto made so many sacrifices, only to give yourselves up to feelings of weakness or cowardice? the very idea ought to be revolting to French soldiers.

Soldiers, an army commanded by Bonaparte is marching towards us; there is but a moment between us and relief; and, this moment lost, we should lose with it the reward of our toils, and a future of captivity and privation, much more bitter, would open before you.

"Soldiers, I charge your officers to assemble you and read this proclamation to you; I hope you will not give these brave men, so respectable for their virtue, and whose blood

has so frequently flowed while they were fighting at your head—those brave men who possess my entire esteem and who deserve all your confidence—the pain of laying before me new grounds of complaints, and me that of punishing.

" Honour and glory were always the most powerful stimulus to French soldiers, and you will still prove that you deserve that respectable title.

" This proclamation shall be inscribed in orders, and read at the head of every company.

(Signed,) " MASSENA."

SUCHET, *Lieutenant of the General-in-chief, to the Inhabitants of Liguria.*

Head-quarters, Conegliano, 5 Messidor, VIIIth year of the Republic.

" LIGURIANS,

" The celebrated battle of Marengo has just produced the conclusion of a Convention between the Generals-in-chief Berthier and Melas, which has been approved of by the First Consul Bonaparte. It purports that there shall be an armistice and suspension of hostilities between the Imperial army and that of the French Republic, in Italy, until an answer arrives from Vienna; and that hostilities shall not be resumed without ten days' previous notice.

" That the Austrian army shall retire behind the Oglio and upon the left bank of the Po; and that the French shall take immediate possession of the fortified places Tortona, Alessandria, the Castle of Milan, the Citadel of Turin, Pizzighettone, Arona, and Placenza; and that Coni, the fortresses of Ceva and Savona, and the City of Genoa, shall be restored to the French army, between the 16th and the 24th of June, otherwise the 27th of Prairial and the 5th of Messidor.

" Fort Urbino, on the 26th of June, otherwise the 7th of Messidor.

" That the individuals arrested in the Cisalpine Republic, on account of their political opinions, and still remaining in the fortresses occupied by the Imperial troops, shall be immediately released.

" That no individual shall be molested on account of any services rendered to the Austrian army, or of political opinions.

" Being charged by the General-in-chief Massena, with the duty of conducting the French troops into your capital, I enter it with a firm determination that persons and property shall be respected, public worship and its ministers protected, and all private revenge restrained.

" Inhabitants of the valleys of Fontana-Bona, of the Polcevera, and the Bisagno, return into the bosom of your families; go and get in your harvest, lay down these arms which your forefathers would never have turned against Frenchmen, and henceforward submit to the laws; mistrust those brigands, of no country, who have disturbed your repose and misdirected your arms: the General-in-chief promises you oblivion for the past.

" People of Liguria, the genius of the First Consul, Bonaparte, the hero of the world, will henceforth watch over the fortunes of Italy. Once more has victory, faithful to his arms, opened the gates of that country to him: he will there establish happiness, and doubtless peace also. All Liguria will be free within a few days. Let the good which is again tendered to you by a generous nation, be duly appreciated, and let it restore you to all your virtues.

" Inhabitants of Genoa, peace is ready to heal all your wounds: the ravages of war, and the sufferings of a blockade which does you honour, will soon be forgotten.

"The General-in-chief Massena, and the soldiers whom he commands, and who have displayed so much bravery and firmness under our eyes, shared in your privations, and witnessed your sufferings; they proclaim it to Europe, which is astonished at your constancy.

"Do not alarm yourselves, Ligurians, at the proceedings of those islanders, who are accustomed to violate all treaties, who have no other god than crime, no other object than ruin and destruction. Victory and Frenchmen offer and insure you abundance: the Cisalpine plains, and those of Piedmont, are loaded with a noble harvest. Yet a few days, and the fury of the English shall be again as impotent as their attempts upon the Continent are despicable.

(Signed,) "LOUIS GABRIEL SUCHET."

KELLERMAN, *General of Brigade, to General Dupont, Chief of the Staff of the Army.*

Head-quarters, 3 Messidor, year VIII.

"GENERAL,

"I hasten to acquaint you that the city of Genoa will not be evacuated until the 24th instant. I have seen General Hohenzollern, who told me he had received an order from M. de Melas, to deliver up the city and forts of Genoa, with the stores and artillery agreed upon, to the French troops, on the 24th of June, at four o'clock in the morning. He assured me in a manner which left no room for doubt, that he would execute the orders he had received with all possible exactness and good faith, though he did not conceal the dissatisfaction he felt on account of the Convention, with which Melas had not acquainted him.

"You may, therefore, be easy with regard to him, as well as with respect to the English, who were yesterday prepared

to sail, but who go with much ill-humour: they intended to seize all the stores and artillery; but M. Hohenzollern opposed their design, and even marched two battalions to prevent it. We cannot but praise his candour and good faith, and the Genoese themselves had no ground of complaint against him.

"The English carry off all the grain that is not landed: 60,000 loads of corn will be sent from Genoa back into Leghorn, though the merchants have offered six francs premium per load to retain it.

"For this once the spite of the English has got the better of their cupidity: and Lord Keith has declared that he will resume, with greater strictness than ever, the blockade of the port and coast, in order to avenge our victories on this innocent city.

"Yesterday General Willot embarked with a corps formed of a few adventurers, and paid by England. Pichegru was hourly expected: I learn this from Count de Bussy. A contribution of one million has been laid upon Genoa: 200,000 francs is already paid towards it.

"The city has suffered severely, and yet has preserved some attachment for the French. As soon as the Convention was known, the people desired to resume the cockade; this gave rise to some broils, which were appeased: the use of the cockade was permitted to officers of the line.

"Salutation and respect,

(Signed,) "KELLERMAN."

CONVENTION

Relative to the occupation of the city of Genoa and its forts, the 5th of Messidor, year VIII. *otherwise the 24th of June,* 1800, *conformably with the treaty made between the Generals-in-chief Berthier and Melas.*

Commissioners and officers, bearing orders from General Suchet, shall enter to-morrow at eight o'clock.

Agreed.

The forts without the city shall be occupied by the French troops at three o'clock in the afternoon.

Agreed.

The three or four hundred sick, who cannot be moved, shall have the same attention as the French troops.

Agreed.

The flotilla shall remain in port until the wind shall serve for its sailing: it shall be neutral as far as Leghorn.

Agreed.

At four in the morning, the 5th of Messidor (24th of June) Count Hohenzollern shall march out with the garrison.

Agreed.

Despatches, and transports of recruits and oxen, which shall arrive after the departure of the present occupants, shall be free to follow the Austrian army.

Agreed.

At the request of General Count Hohenzollern, no honours shall be paid to his troops.

Agreed.

(Signed,) Le Comte de Bussy, Major-general, empowered by Count de Hohenzollern.

Conegliano, 3d of Messidor, year VIII. of the French Republic, otherwise the 22d of June, 1800.

(A true copy.)

(Signed,) Lieutenant-general L. G. Suchet.

NEGOTIATION

For the evacuation of Genoa, by the right wing of the French army, between Vice-admiral Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet, Lieutenant-general Baron d'Ott, commanding the blockade, and the General-in-chief Massena.

Art. 1st. *The right wing of the French army, intrusted with the defence of Genoa, the General-in-chief and his staff, shall march out, with arms and baggage, to rejoin the centre of the said army.*

Answer: *The right wing, intrusted with the defence of Genoa, shall march out to the number of* 8110 *men, and shall take the land route to go by Nice into France; the rest shall be transported by sea to Antibes. Admiral Keith engages to supply this force with subsistence in biscuits, equally with the English. On the other hand, all Austrian prisoners, taken in the states of Genoa, by the army of Massena, during the present year, shall be restored* en masse. *With the exception, however, of those already exchanged, up to the present time; in other respects the article shall be executed in full.*

2d. All that belongs to the said right wing, such as artillery and ammunition of all kinds, shall be carried by the English fleet to Antibes, or to the gulf of Juan.

Answer: *Granted.*

3d. Convalescents and those who are not in a fit state to march, shall be transported by sea to Antibes, and maintained as expressed in the first article.

Answer: *They shall be transported by the English fleet, and maintained.*

4th. The French soldiers remaining in the hospitals of Genoa shall be treated like the Austrians: as fast as they are in a state to leave the place, they shall be transported as expressed in the first article.

Answer: *Granted.*

5th. The city of Genoa, as well as its port, shall be declared neutral; the line which shall determine its neutrality shall be fixed by the contracting parties.

Answer: *This article, turning upon objects purely political, it is not in the power of the Generals of the Allied troops to give to it any assent whatever. However, the undersigned are authorized to declare that his Majesty the Emperor, determining to grant his august protection to the inhabitants of Genoa, the city of Genoa may be assured that all provisional establishments that circumstances may require, shall have no other object than public happiness and tranquillity.*

6th. The independence of the people of Liguria shall be respected: no nation actually at war with the Ligurian Republic shall have power to effect any change in its government.

Answer: *The same as that to the preceding article.*

7th. No Ligurian, having exercised, or still exercising any public function, shall be molested for his political opinions.

Answer: *No person shall be molested for his opinions, nor for having taken a part in the preceding government, at the actual epoch. The disturbers of the public peace, after the entry of the Austrians into Genoa, shall be punished conformably with the laws.*

8th. Frenchmen, Genoese, and Italians domiciled, or who have taken refuge at Genoa, shall be at liberty to retire with all that belongs to them, whether money, merchandise, furniture, or any other effects, either by sea or land, to whatever place they shall think proper; passports shall be given to them for this purpose, which shall be available for six months.

Answer: *Granted.*

9th. The inhabitants of the city of Genoa shall be free to communicate with the two coasts, and to continue to trade freely.

Answer: *Granted, according to the answer to article 5.*

10th. Armed peasants shall not enter either singly or in bodies into Genoa.

Answer: *Granted.*

11th. The population of Genoa shall be supplied with provisions with the least possible delay.

Answer: *Granted.*

12th. The movements of evacuation by the French troops, in conformity with the first article, shall be regulated during the day, by the head of the staff of the respective armies.

Answer: *Granted.*

13th. The Austrian general, commanding at Genoa, shall grant all necessary guards and escorts, for protecting the embarkation of the property belonging to the French army.

Answer: *Granted.*

14th. There shall be left a French commissioner for the care of the sick and wounded, and to superintend their evacuation of the place: another commissioner at war shall be named to secure, receive, and distribute the subsistence of the French troops, whether at Genoa or on their march.

Answer: *Granted.*

15th. General Massena shall send an officer to Piedmont, or wherever else may be found necessary, to General Bonaparte, to apprise him of the evacuation of Genoa; he shall be furnished with passport and escort.

Answer: *Granted.*

16th. Officers of all ranks, of the army of the General-in-chief Massena, made prisoners of war subsequently to the commencement of the present year, shall return to France on parole, and shall not serve until exchanged.

Answer: *Granted.*

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

The light-house gate, where the drawbridge is situated, and the entrance of the port, shall be given up to a detachment

of the Austrian troops, and to twelve English vessels, this day, the 4th of May, at two o'clock in the afternoon.

Immediately after signature, hostages shall be exchanged.

The artillery, ammunition, plans, and other military effects, belonging to the city of Genoa and its territory, shall be faithfully delivered up, by the French Commissioners, to the Commissioners of the Allied troops.

Done in duplicate upon the bridge of Conegliano, the 4th of May, 1800.

(Signed,) B. D'OTT, Lieutenant-general.
KEITH, Vice-admiral, Commander-in-chief.

MARENGO.

Army of Reserve—Departure of the First Consul—Review at Dijon—Head-quarters at Geneva—Lausanne—Passage of the Saint-Bernard—The French army passes the Sesia and the Trebbia—Entry into Milan—Position of the French army at the moment of receiving intelligence of the taking of Genoa—Action of Montebello—Arrival of General Desaix at head-quarters—Battle of Marengo—Armistice of Marengo—Genoa restored to the French—Return of the First Consul to France.

On the 7th of January, 1800, a decree of the Consuls directed the formation of an Army of Reserve. All the veteran soldiers were called upon to come forward and serve the country, under the command of the First Consul. A levy of 30,000 conscripts was decreed in order to recruit the army. General Berthier, minister at war, set out from Paris, on the 2d of April, to head the army; for the principles of the Constitution of the year VIII. forbade the First Consul to take the command himself. The Consular magistracy was essentially civil; the principle of the division of the powers and responsibility of the ministers, did

not permit the First Magistrate of the Republic to command an army immediately in chief; but no provision or principle opposed his being present. In fact, the First Consul commanded the Army of Reserve, and Berthier, his Major-general, had the title of General-in-chief.

As soon as intelligence was received of the commencement of hostilities in Italy, and of the turn which the operations of the enemy were taking, the First Consul judged it indispensable to march at once to the assistance of the Army of Italy; but he preferred debouching by the great Saint-Bernard, in order to fall upon the rear of the army of Melas, to carry off his magazines, parks, and hospitals, and at last to give him battle, after having cut him off from Austria. The loss of a single battle would thus occasion the total destruction of the Austrian army, and produce the conquest of all Italy. Such a plan required celerity, profound secrecy, and much boldness: secrecy was the most difficult matter; how was it possible to keep the movements of the army concealed from the numerous spies of England and Austria?—The method deemed eligible by the First Consul was to divulge it himself with so much parade that it should become an object of derision to the enemy, and

to act in such a manner that the latter should consider all these pompous declarations as merely intended to divert the Austrian army, which was blockading Genoa, from its operations. It was necessary to give the observers and spies a precise point of direction; it was, therefore, declared by messages to the Legislative Body and Senate, and by decrees, by publication in the newspapers, and by intimations of all kinds, that the point of concentration of the Army of reserve was Dijon; that the First Consul would review it, &c. All the spies and scouts immediately directed their attention to that city: they there saw, in the beginning of April, a large staff without an army; and in the course of the month, from 5 to 6000 conscripts and retired soldiers, many of whom were maimed, and were actuated rather by their zeal than their strength. This army soon became an object of ridicule; and, when the First Consul himself reviewed it, on the 6th of May, people were surprised to see there not more than 7 or 8000 men, the majority of them not even clothed. They were surprised that the Chief Magistrate of the Republic should quit his palace for a review which might have been made by a brigadier-general. These deceitful reports travelled through Britany, Geneva,

Bâle, London, Vienna, and Italy: Europe was full of caricatures: one of them represented a boy of twelve years of age, and an invalid with a wooden leg; underneath was written *Bonaparte's Army of Reserve.*

Meantime the real army had been formed, and was ready to march; the divisions were organized on several points of rendezvous. These places were insulated, and had no connexion with each other. The conciliating measures which had been employed by the Consular government, during the winter, coupled with the rapidity of the military operations, had pacified La Vendée, and put an end to the system of the Chouans. A considerable portion of the troops which composed the Army of reserve had been drawn from that country. The Directory had felt the necessity of having several regiments at Paris, for its guard, and to keep down the factions. The government of the First Consul being pre-eminently national, the presence of these troops in the capital became entirely useless; they were despatched to the Army of reserve. Numbers of these regiments had not been in the disastrous campaign of 1799, and had preserved unbroken the sentiment of their superiority and glory. The park of artillery was

formed of guns and waggons, sent piecemeal from various arsenals and fortresses. The most difficult thing to conceal was the movement of the provisions indispensable for an army which was to cross barren mountains, where nothing eatable was to be met with. The Commissary Lambert had prepared two millions of rations of biscuits at Lyons. One hundred thousand were despatched to Toulon, to be sent to Genoa; but 1,800,000 rations were sent to Geneva, embarked upon the lake, and landed at Villeneuve, at the moment when the army arrived there.

At the same time that the formation of the Army of reserve was announced with the greatest ostentation, a number of little manuscript bulletins were prepared, in which, in the midst of many scandalous anecdotes respecting the First Consul, it was proved that the Army of reserve did not and could not exist; that from 12 to 15,000 conscripts, at most, were all that could be collected. This was proved by reference to the efforts which had been made during the preceding campaign to form the various armies which had been beaten in Italy, and those which had been made to complete the formidable Army of the Rhine; in a

word, said these bulletins, would the Army of Italy be left so weak, if there was power to reinforce it? These various plans for imposing upon the spies were, on the whole, crowned with the most complete success. It was said at Paris, as at Dijon and Vienna, "There is no Army of reserve." At the head-quarters of Melas, it was added, "The Army of reserve, with which we are so much threatened, is a band of from 7 to 8000 conscripts or invalids, with which they hope to deceive us into raising the siege of Genoa. The French rely too much on our simplicity: they wish to make us realize the fable of the dog who dropped his prey for the shadow."

On the 6th of May, 1800, the First Consul left Paris; he proceeded to Dijon, in order, as we have just said, to review the insulated soldiers and conscripts who were there. He arrived at Geneva on the 8th. The famous Necker, who was in that city, solicited the honour of being presented to the First Consul: he conversed an hour with him, talked much about public credit, and of the morality necessary in a minister of finance; in all he said he suffered it to appear, that he wished and hoped to have the management of the finances of France; yet he did not even know in what

manner the public business was conducted with treasury bonds. He praised the military operations going on under his eyes very highly. The First Consul was only indifferently pleased with his conversation.

On the 13th of May, the First Consul reviewed the real van-guard of the Army of reserve, at Lausanne; it was commanded by General Lannes: it consisted of six old regiments of chosen troops, perfectly clothed, and completely equipped and appointed. It moved immediately afterwards upon Saint-Pierre; the divisions followed in echelon: the whole formed an army of 36,000 fighting men, in whom confidence might be placed: it had a park of forty guns. Generals Victor, Loison, Vatrin, Boudet, Chambarlhac, Murat, and Monnier, held commands in this army.

PASSAGE OF THE SAINT-BERNARD.

The First Consul preferred the passage of the Great Saint-Bernard, to that of Mount Cenis: the one was not more difficult than the other. There is a road practicable for artillery, leading from Lausanne to Saint-Pierre, a village at the foot of the Saint-Bernard; and from the village of Saint-Remi to Aosta, there is likewise a way practicable for carriages. The

difficulty then lay only in the ascent and descent of the Saint-Bernard: the same difficulty existed with respect to the passage of Mount Cenis; but the passage of Saint-Bernard offered the advantage of leaving Turin on the right, and acting in a country more covered and less known, and in which the movements of the army could go on more secretly than upon the high road of Savoy, where the enemy would of course have numerous spies. A speedy passage of the artillery appeared impossible. A great number of mules, and a considerable quantity of small cases, to hold the infantry cartridges and the ammunition of the artillery, had been provided. These cases, as well as mountain-forges, were to be carried by the mules, so that the real difficulty which remained to be surmounted, was that of getting the pieces themselves over. But a hundred trunks of trees, hollowed out for the reception of the guns, which were fastened into them by their trunnions, had been prepared before hand: to every piece thus arranged, a hundred soldiers were to be attached; the carriages were to be taken to pieces and placed upon mules. All these arrangements were carried into execution by the Generals of Artillery Gassendi and Marmont, with so much promptness that the march of the artillery caused no

delay: the troops themselves made it a point of honour not to leave their artillery in the rear, and undertook to drag it along. Throughout the whole passage the regimental bands were heard; and it was only in difficult spots that the charge was beaten to give fresh vigour to the soldiers. One entire division, rather than leave their artillery, chose to bivouac upon the summit of the mountain in the midst of snow and excessive cold, instead of descending into the plain, though they had time to do so before night. Two half-companies of artillery-artificers had been stationed in the villages of Saint-Pierre and Saint-Remi, with a few field-forges for dismounting and remounting the various artillery-carriages. The army succeeded in getting a hundred waggons over.

On the 16th of May, the First Consul slept at the convent of Saint-Maurice, and the whole army passed the Saint-Bernard on the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of May. The First Consul himself crossed on the 20th; in the most difficult places, he rode a mule belonging to one of the inhabitants of Saint-Pierre, pointed out by the Prior of the convent as the most sure-footed in all the country. The First Consul's guide was a tall robust youth of twenty-two, who conversed freely with him, with all the confidence becoming his age and

the simplicity of the inhabitants of the mountains: he confided all his troubles to the First Consul, as well as his dreams of happiness to come. On their arrival at the convent, the First Consul, who had till then shewn no intention to do any thing for the peasant, wrote a note and gave it to him, desiring him to carry it according to its address. This note was an order for certain arrangements which were made immediately after the passage, and realized all the poor fellow's hopes; such as the building of a house, the purchase of a piece of ground, &c. The astonishment of the young mountaineer at seeing, shortly after his return, so many people hurrying to fulfil his wishes, and riches pouring in upon him on all sides, was extreme.

The First Consul remained an hour at the convent of the Hospitallers, and performed the descent *à-la-Ramasse*,* down an almost perpendicular glacier. The cold was still sharp; the descent of the Great Saint-Bernard was more difficult for the horses than the ascent had been; there happened, however, but few accidents. The monks of the convent were stored with a great quantity of wine, bread, and cheese; and

* By sliding down on a sort of a sledge.—*Ed.*

each soldier, as he passed, received a large ration from the good fathers.

On the 16th of May, General Lannes with the sixth light half-brigade, the 28th and 44th of the line, the 11th and 12th regiments of hussars, and 21st chasseurs, arrived at Aosta, a town which was a great resource to the army. On the 17th, this van-guard reached Chatillon, where an Austrian corps of from 4 to 5000 men, which was thought sufficient for the defence of the valley, was in position; it was immediately attacked and routed: on this occasion three guns and some hundreds of prisoners were taken.

The French army fancied every obstacle was overleaped; it was threading a fine valley, in which it found houses, verdure, and spring weather; when all at once its progress was checked by the cannon of fort Bard.

This fort is situated between Aosta and Ivrea, upon a conical hillock, and between two mountains, twenty-five toises distant from each other; at its foot flows the torrent of the Doria, the valley of which it absolutely shuts up; the road passes through the fortifications of the town of Bard, which is walled, and is commanded by the fire of the fort. The engineer officers belonging to the van-guard approached

to reconnoitre a passage, and reported that no other than that through the city remained. General Lannes commanded an attack during the night, in order to try the fort; but it was on all sides protected against a *coup de main*. As it always happens under similar circumstances, the panic communicated itself rapidly throughout the army, even to its rear. Orders were even given for stopping the passage of the artillery over the Saint-Bernard: but the First Consul, who had already reached Aosta, immediately repaired to Bard: he climbed up the rock Albaredo, upon the left mountain, which rock commands at once both the town and the fort, and soon perceived the possibility of taking the town. There was not a moment to be lost: on the 25th, at nightfall, the 58th demi-brigade, led by Dufour, scaled the wall, and gained possession of the town, which is only separated from the fort by the stream of the Doria. In vain, during the whole night, the fort showered grape-shot, at half musquet-distance, upon the French within the town; they maintained themselves there, and at last, out of consideration for the inhabitants, the fire of the fort ceased.

The infantry and cavalry passed one by one, up the path of the mountain, which the First Consul had climbed, and where no horse had

ever stepped: it was a way known to none but goatherds.

On the following nights the artillery officers, with surprising skill, and the gunners, with the greatest intrepidity, took their guns through the town. Every precaution had been taken for concealing the knowledge of this operation from the Commandant of the fort: the road was covered with litter and dung, and the pieces, concealed under branches and straw, were drawn by the men with cords, in the most profound silence. Thus was a space of several hundred toises crossed, within pistol-shot of the batteries of the fort. The garrison, though suspecting nothing, made occasional discharges, which killed or wounded a considerable number of gunners; but that did not in the least check the general zeal. The fort did not surrender until early in June. By that time the French had succeeded, with the utmost difficulty, in mounting several guns upon the Albaredo, whence they thundered upon the batteries of the fort. If they had been forced to delay the passing of the artillery until the capture of this fort, all the hopes of the campaign would have been lost.

This obstacle was more considerable than that of the Great Saint-Bernard itself; yet neither

the one nor the other retarded the march of the army a single day. The First Consul was well aware of the existence of fort Bard; but all the maps and information which had been obtained upon this subject, induced the belief that it would be easily taken. The Austrian officer, who commanded the fort, despatched letter after letter to Melas, to inform him that he saw more than 30,000 men, 3 or 4000 horses, and a numerous staff, attempting to pass; that these masses were inclining to his right, by a path of steps in the rock of Albaredo: but he promised that not a single waggon, or piece of artillery, should pass; he said he could hold out for a month, and that therefore, up to that period, it was not probable that the French army would dare to trust itself in the plain, as it would not have received its artillery. After the surrender of the fort, all the officers of the garrison were strangely surprised on learning that all the French artillery had passed by night, at thirty or forty toises from their ramparts.

Supposing it had proved quite impossible to pass the artillery through the town of Bard, would the French army have repassed the Great Saint-Bernard? No: it would have debouched as far as Ivrea—a movement which

would have necessarily recalled Melas from Nice. It had nothing to fear, even without artillery, in the excellent positions presented to it by the entrance of the passes, where it might have awaited the taking of Bard, and in the meanwhile covered the siege of that place. On the 1st of June, that fort fell, as a matter of course, into the hands of the French; but it is probable that it would have been taken sooner, if it had arrested the passage of the troops, and drawn upon itself all their efforts, instead of having to deal only with a brigade of conscripts commanded by General Chabran, who had been left to besiege it. The latter corps had passed by the Little Saint-Bernard.

In the mean time, from the 1st of May, Melas had been marching troops upon Turin, and reinforcing the divisions which kept the valley of Aosta and that of Mount Cenis; he arrived at Turin, in person, on the 22d. On the same day General Turreau, who commanded in the Alps, attacked Mount Cenis with 3000 men, made himself master of it, took some prisoners, and occupied a position between Susa and Turin: the diversion rendered Melas uneasy, and prevented him from directing all his efforts towards the Dora Baltea.

On the 24th, General Lannes, with the van-

guard, arrived before Ivrea; he there found a division of from 5 to 6000 men: the armament of this place and the citadel had been begun eight days before, and fifteen guns were already in battery; but out of this division of 6000 men, there were 3000 cavalry, who were not fit for the defence of Ivrea, and the infantry were the same that had been already defeated at Chatillon. The town, attacked with the greatest intrepidity, on one side by General Lannes, and on the other by General Vatrin, was soon carried, as well as the citadel, in which were found numerous magazines of all kinds: the enemy retired behind Chiusella, and took up a position at Romano, to cover Turin, whence he received considerable reinforcements.

On the 26th, General Lannes marched against the enemy, and attacked him in his position; and, after a very warm action, overthrew and drove him in disorder upon Turin. The advanced-guard immediately took the position of Chivasso, whence it intercepted the passage of the Po, and seized a great number of vessels laden with provisions and wounded men, and in short, with all that had been sent out of Turin. On the 28th, the First Consul reviewed the van-guard at Chivasso, harangued the

troops, and bestowed eulogiums upon the corps which composed it.

The vessels taken upon the Po were arranged as if for the construction of a bridge: this threat produced the expected effect; Melas weakened the troops which covered Turin upon the left bank, and sent his principal forces to oppose the construction of the bridge.

This was what the First Consul wished for, that he might be left to operate upon Milan unmolested.

General Melas selected one of the officers of the Austrian army, who had the honour of knowing the First Consul, and sent him on a parley to the outposts. His surprise at seeing the First Consul so near the Austrian army was extreme; the intelligence conveyed by the officer to Melas, overwhelmed him with terror and confusion. The whole Army of reserve, with its artillery, arrived at Ivrea on the 26th and 27th of May.

The head-quarters of the Austrian army were at Turin; but half the forces of the enemy were before Genoa, and the other half were supposed to be, and in fact were, on their road, by way of the Col di Tende, to reinforce the corps which were at Turin. Under these circumstances. what course was the First Consul to

pursue? To march upon Turin, repulse Melas, join Turreau, and thus secure his communications with France, and with his arsenals of Grenoble and Briançon? To avail himself of the vessels that fortune had thrown into his power, and throw a bridge across at Chivasso—then rapidly push on to Genoa to raise the blockade of that important place? Or to leave Melas behind, pass the Sesia and the Tesino, and proceed upon Milan and the Adda, in order to effect a junction with Moncey's corps, composed of 15,000 men, which came from the army of the Rhine, and had debouched by the Saint-Gothard?

Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true principles of war, since Melas had considerable forces with him: the French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having a certain retreat, fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas should abandon Turin and move upon Alessandria, the campaign would be a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position: the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiny; and that of Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of Mantua, Placenza, and Milan.

The second course appeared impracticable:

how hazardous would have been the situation of the French in the midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, between the Po and Genoa, without any line of operations, any assured retreat?

The third course, on the other hand, presented every advantage: the French army, once in possession of Milan, would secure all the magazines, depôts, and hospitals, of the enemy's army; it would join the left under General Moncey; and have a safe retreat by the Simplon and Saint-Gothard. The Simplon led to the Valais and Sion, whither all the magazines of provisions for the army had been sent. The Saint-Gothard led into Switzerland, of which we had been in possession for two years, and which was covered by the army of the Rhine, then upon the Iller. In this position the French general was at liberty to act as he pleased; if Melas should march with his united army from Turin upon the Sesia and the Tesino, the French army could give him battle with this incalculable advantage, that if it should be victorious, Melas, without retreat, would be pursued and driven into Savoy; and if it should be defeated, it could retreat by the Simplon and the Saint-Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, should move towards Ales-

sandria in order to join the army coming from Genoa, it might be hoped, that by advancing towards him and crossing the Po, he might be come up with and forced to fight before he could reach Alessandria: the French army having its rear secured by the river, and by Milan, the Simplon, and Saint-Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut off and having no communication with Mantua and Austria, would be liable to be thrown upon the mountains of the western coast of Genoa, or entirely destroyed or taken at the foot of the Alps, at the Col di Tende and in the county of Nice. Lastly, by adopting the third course, if it should suit the First Consul, when once master of Milan, to suffer Melas to pass, and to remain between the Po, the Adda, and the Tesino; he would thus, without a battle, re-conquer Lombardy and Piedmont, the maritime Alps, and the Genoese territory, and raise the blockade of that city: these were flattering results to anticipate.

A corps of 2000 Italian refugees, commanded by General Lecchi, had, on the 21st of May, moved from Chatillon upon the Upper Sesia. This corps had an engagement with the legion of Rohan, defeated it; and came to take up a position in the debouches of the Simplon,

in the valley of Domo d'Ossola, in order to secure the communications of the army by the Simplon.

On the 27th, General Murat directed his march upon Vercelli, and passed the Sesia.

On the 31st of May, the First Consul moved rapidly upon the Tesino; the corps of observation which General Melas had left against the debouches of Switzerland, and the divisions of cavalry and artillery which he had not taken with him to the siege of Genoa, united to defend the passage of the river, and cover Milan. The Tesino is extremely wide and rapid.

Adjutant-general Girard, an officer of the highest merit and most extraordinary intrepidity, was the first to pass the river. The conflict upon the left bank was warm during the whole day. The French army had no bridge; the troops crossed upon four small boats; but as the country is much cut up and very woody, and we were favoured by the position of the Naviglio, or canal of Milan, the enemy's cavalry did not engage upon such ground without reluctance.

On the 2d of June the First Consul entered Milan; he immediately invested the citadel. General Lannes, with the van-guard, had begun

a forced march on the 30th (May); and, leaving a corps of observation on the left of the Dora Baltea, and a garrison in Ivrea, he marched with all expedition upon Pavia, which he entered on the 1st of June. He there found considerable magazines and two hundred guns, thirty of which were field-pieces.

In the mean time, on the 4th, the division of Duhesme entered Lodi; on the 5th it invested Pizzighitone, and its light cavalry occupied Cremona: the army soon arrived in Mantua, which had neither provisions nor garrison. Moncey's corps, with 15,000 men of the army of the Rhine, reached Belinzona on the 31st of May.

It would be difficult to describe the astonishment and enthusiasm of the Milanese on the arrival of the French army; the First Consul marched with the van-guard, so that one of the first persons who presented themselves to the eyes of the Milanese whom enthusiasm and curiosity led by all the by-roads to meet the French army, was General Bonaparte. The people of Milan would not believe it: it had been reported that he had died on the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the French army.

From the 2d to the 8th of June, that is to say, for six days, the First Consul was engaged

in receiving deputations, and shewing himself to the people who had hastened from all points of Lombardy to see their liberator. The government of the Cisalpine Republic was re-organized; but a considerable number of the warmest Italian patriots groaned in the prisons of Austria. The First Consul addressed the following proclamation to the Army:

ARMY OF RESERVE.

Milan, the 17th Prairial, year VIII.

THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE ARMY.

"Soldiers!

"One of our departments was in the power of the enemy; consternation reigned over the whole of the South of France.

"The greater part of the territory of the Ligurians, the most faithful friends of the Republic, was invaded.

"The Cisalpine Republic, annihilated by the last campaign, was become the sport of a ridiculous feudal domination.

"Soldiers! you march—and the French territory is already free! Consternation and dread are succeeded by joy and hope in our country.

"You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa; who will be for ever delivered from their eternal foes.

"You are in the capital of the Cisalpine!

"The enemy, panic-struck, hope only to regain the frontiers. You have taken from them their stores, their magazines, and their reserve of artillery.

"The first act of the campaign is ended.

"You hear daily millions of men manifest their gratitude to you.

"But shall the violation of the French soil pass unpunished? Will you suffer those soldiers who have carried terror into your families, to return to their fire-sides? You rush to arms! —Well then! march to meet them, oppose their retreat, snatch from them the laurels with which they have decked themselves, and thereby teach the world that a malediction rests upon all madmen who dare to insult the territory of the Great Nation.

"The result of our efforts will be, *Unclouded glory* and *solid peace.*

"The First Consul, *(Signed,)* BONAPARTE.

The 15,000 men, led by General Moncey, came up slowly; they marched only by regiments. This delay was injurious; the First Consul reviewed these troops on the 6th and 7th of June. On the 9th, he set out for Pavia. General Murat had, on the 6th of May, ad-

vanced before Placenza, where the enemy had a bridge and a *tête-de-pont*. Murat was fortunate enough to surprise the *tête-de-pont*, and seize almost the whole of the boats. On the same day he intercepted a despatch from the ministry of Vienna to M. de Melas; it contained some curious information with regard to what it called the pretended Army of reserve, the existence of which was denied; and Melas was ordered to continue his operations in Provence vigorously. The minister hoped that Genoa would have capitulated, and that the English army would have arrived. He wrote at the same time that success was indispensable; for that the French army of the Rhine was in the heart of Germany, and that any victory would compel its recall to the relief of Provence; that some commotions which had taken place in Paris, had obliged the First Consul to return hastily from Geneva to that capital; and that the Court of Vienna placed all its confidence in the talents of General Melas, and in the intrepidity of his victorious army of Italy.

The corps of observation, which we had upon the left bank of the Dora Baltea, was unmolested, as well as the garrison of Ivrea. Fort Bard had been in our possession ever since the 1st of June, and Ivrea was filling

with ammunition of all kinds, provisions, and the baggage of the army. Melas had abandoned Turin, and appeared to direct his march on Alessandria to operate upon the right bank of the Po.

The First Consul detached Lapoype's division of General Moncey's corps, to line the Po from Pavia to the Dora Baltea, and to watch the motions of the enemy opposite Placenza; and determined to move on Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, in order to cut off Melas from the road of Mantua, and oblige him to receive battle with his line of operation intersected, and at once to raise the blockade of Genoa, and drive the enemy to the Alps.

General Lannes, with the van-guard, passed the Po, opposite Pavia at Belgiojoso, during the 6th. On the 7th, General Murat passed the Po at Nocetta, and entered Placenza, where he found considerable magazines. The next day he defeated an Austrian corps which had come to attack him, and made 2000 prisoners. General Murat was ordered to proceed to Stradella, there to join the van-guard; the whole army was uniting upon this important point.

But in the midst of such brilliant successes, and while the mind was given up to the

fairest hopes, a distressing piece of intelligence was received; Genoa had recapitulated on the 4th, and the Austrian troops of the blockade were coming, by forced marches, to join the army of Melas at Alessandria. Some Milanese refugees who had been shut up in Genoa, detailed the operations of the siege. Massena had, after the capitulation, committed the unpardonable error of embarking in a privateer to proceed to Antibes. One part of his army had likewise been embarked for the same place of destination; only one corps of 8500 men came off by land. The troops had preserved their arms, ammunition, &c. No capitulation could be more honourable; but this fatal arrangement of General Massena, the less excusable because he knew of the arrival of the First Consul's army upon the Po, annulled all the advantages of the conditions of the capitulation. If, after the surrender, Massena had marched out at the head of all his troops, (and he still had 12,000 disposable men armed, and his artillery,) and, having reached Voltri, had resumed his operations, he would have kept an equal number of Austrian troops in play; he would have been speedily joined by the troops of General Suchet, which were on their march to Porto

Maurizio, and would then have manœuvred against the enemy with some 20,000 men. But the troops marched out without their general; they directed their course along the coast of Genoa: their movement was not stopped until they were met by General Suchet. Three or four days were thus thrown away; these troops were useless. But the victory of Marengo had remedied every thing.

The First Consul then saw that he could rely only on his own strength, and that he was about to have to manage the whole army. On the evening of the 8th, the enemy's scouts came to observe the French, who had passed the Po, and were in bivouac upon the right bank: they believed them to be not very numerous, and a van-guard of from 4 to 5,000 Austrians came to attack them; but the whole French van-guard, and a part of the main army had already crossed. General Lannes presently routed this van-guard of the enemy; and at night he took up a position before the Austrian army which occupied Montebello and Casteggio.

This army was commanded by General Ott, the same who had commanded the blockade of Genoa; his corps had come up in three marches. The fires of the bivouacs, and the

reports of the prisoners and deserters, gave reason to believe that this part of the Austrian army amounted to thirty battalions, or 18,000 men. Ott's grenadiers, the flower of the Austrian army, formed part of it.

General Lannes was in position, and, expecting reinforcements every moment, he had no inducement to attack; but the Austrian general brought on the battle at day break. General Lannes had only 8000 men with him; but Victor's division, which had crossed the river, was not more than three leagues off. The battle was bloody: Lannes covered himself with glory; his troops performed prodigies of intrepidity. About mid-day Victor's division came up and completely decided the victory. The Austrians fought desperately; they were still proud of the successes they had obtained during the preceding campaign; and they felt that their situation laid them under a necessity to conquer.

The First Consul, on hearing of the enemy's attack upon the French van-guard, immediately hastened to the field; but, by the time he got there, the victory had been gained: the enemy had lost 3000 killed, and 6000 prisoners. The field of battle was entirely strewed with the dead. General Lannes was covered with

blood: the troops, conscious that they had behaved well, though worn out with fatigue, were intoxicated with joy.

On the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the First Consul remained at the position of Stradella, employing the time in concentrating his army, and in securing its retreat by the construction of two bridges across the Po, fortifying them by two *têtes-de-pont*. Nothing remained to hurry him; Genoa had fallen.

He sent trusty messengers across the mountains with an order to General Suchet to march upon the Scrivia by the debouche of Col di Cadibona.

The enemy's cavalry was formidable, and its artillery very numerous. Neither of those bodies had suffered, while our cavalry and artillery were extremely inferior in point of number: it was therefore dangerous to engage in the plain of Marengo. If the enemy desired to re-open his communications and regain Mantua, he must pass by Stradella, and march over the French army. This position of Stradella appeared to have been made expressly for the French army: the enemy's cavalry could do nothing against it, and the vast superiority of their artillery would be felt less there than any

where else. The right of the First Consul's army rested upon the Po, and the marshy and impracticable plains in the neighbourhood of that river: the centre, situated upon the high road, was supported on large villages, containing great houses of solid masonry; and the left rested upon fine eminences.

During the battle of the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and had been performing quarantine at Toulon, arrived at the head-quarters, at Montebello, with his aides-de-camp, Rapp and Savary. The whole night was spent in conferences between the First Consul and Desaix, on all that had passed in Egypt since the former had quitted that country—the details of the campaign of Upper Egypt—of the negotiations of El-Arisch, and the composition of the Grand Vizier's grand Turkish army—lastly, on the battle of Heliopolis, and the present situation of the French army. "How," said the First Consul, "could you, Desaix, put your name to the capitulation of El-Arisch?"—"I did it," replied Desaix, "and I would do it again, because the Commander-in-chief was not willing to remain in Egypt; and because, in an army at a distance from home, and beyond the influence of Government, the inclinations of the Com-

mander-in-chief are equivalent to those of five-sixths of the army. I always had the greatest contempt for the Grand Vizier's army, which I have observed closely. I wrote to Kleber that I would undertake to repulse it with my division alone. If you had left me the command of the army in Egypt, and taken Kleber away with you, I would have preserved that fine province for you, and you should never have heard a word about capitulation; but, however, things turned out well; and Kleber made up at Heliopolis for the mistakes he had been committing for six months."

Desaix burned to signalize himself. He thirsted to avenge the ill-treatment he had received from Admiral Keith, at Leghorn; this lay at his heart. The First Consul immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet.

Melas's head-quarters were at Alessandria: all his army had been two days assembled there: his position was critical, because he had lost his line of operation. The longer he delayed determining what to do, the worse his position became; for on one side, Suchet's corps was advancing upon his rear, and on the other, the First Consul's army was daily increasing

its fortifications and intrenchments in its position of Stradella.

General Melas, however, made no movement. In the situation in which he was, he had three courses to choose: the first was, to cut his way through the First Consul's army, the Austrian army being superior to it in number, to gain Placenza, and resume his line of operation upon Mantua.

The second plan was, to cross the Po at Turin, or between that city and the mouth of the Sesia, to advance afterwards, by forced marches, to the Tesino, to cross it; and, reaching Milan before the First Consul's army, to intersect his line, and force him back behind the Adda.

The third course was, to fall back from Alessandria upon Novi, to rest upon Genoa, and upon Admiral Keith's English squadron; not to assume offensive operations until the arrival of the English army, already collected at Mahon. The Austrian army was certain not to want provisions or ammunition, or even reinforcements, since by its right it could have communicated with Florence and Bologna; in Tuscany it had a Neapolitan division, and, besides, the communications by sea were in its power. From

this position General Melas might regain Mantua when he pleased, transporting a great part of his heavy artillery into Tuscany by sea.

General Lapoype, who was on the banks of the Po, was ordered to fall back upon the Tesino, in case the enemy should occupy the left bank; he would there be joined by 5 or 6,000 men, which could be got together by General Moncey, who commanded at Milan. He would then have 10,000 men; more than sufficient to delay the passage, and give the First Consul time to return by the two bridges behind the Tesino.

On the 12th, in the afternoon, the First Consul, surprised at the inaction of General Melas, became uneasy, and began to fear that the Austrian army had moved on Genoa, or upon the Tesino, or else had marched against Suchet to crush him, with the intention of afterwards returning against the First Consul; the latter determined to quit Stradella, and advance upon Scrivia, in the form of a strong reconnoitring party, in order to be able to act according to the course adopted by the enemy. In the evening the French army* took up a position upon the

* French army, 12th and 13th of June.

Divisions Vatrin and Mainoni, Lannes; right wing at Castel-nuovo di Scrivia.

Scrivia, Tortona was surrounded, the head-quarters were stationed at Voghera. During this movement, no intelligence of the enemy was obtained; only some few cavalry scouts were perceived, which did not indicate the presence of an army in the plains of Marengo. The First Consul no longer doubted that the Austrian army had escaped him.

On the 13th, at day-break, he passed the Scrivia, and marched to Saint-Juliano, in the midst of the immense plain of Marengo. The light cavalry discovered no enemy; there was no longer room to doubt that he was in full manœuvre, since, if he had thought proper to wait for the French army, he would not have neglected the fine field of battle presented to him by the plain of Marengo, advantageous as it was for the developement of his immense cavalry: it appeared probable that the enemy was marching on Genoa.

Divisions Boudet and Monnier. Desaix; centre. Ponte-Curone.

Division Lapoype; order to join Desaix.

The cavalry under Murat, between Ponte-Curone and Tortona, having a van-guard beyond Tortona, under Kellermann.

Divisions Gardanne and Chambarlhac. Victor; left wing in advance of Tortona, and supporting the van-guard under Kellermann.

Under this impression, the First Consul, with all expedition, despatched Desaix's corps in the form of a van-guard, upon his extreme left, with orders to observe the high-road leading from Novi to Alessandria; he ordered Victor's division to enter the village of Marengo, and to send scouts upon the Bormida, to ascertain whether the enemy had any bridge there. Victor arrived at Marengo; he there found a rear-guard of 3 or 4,000 Austrians, attacked and routed them, and made himself master of the village. His scouts arrived upon the Bormida at night-fall; they gave information that the enemy had no bridge there, and that there was only an ordinary garrison in Alessandria; they gave no intelligence of the army of Melas.

Lannes's corps bivouacked diagonally in the rear of Marengo, upon the right.

The First Consul was very uneasy; during the night he determined to visit his head-quarters of the preceding day, in order to meet intelligence from General Moncey, General Lapoype, and the agents who had been sent towards Genoa, and who were to rendezvous upon those head-quarters; but the Scrivia had overflowed its banks. This stream swells considerably in the course of a few hours, and a

few hours also are sufficient for its return to its usual state. This circumstance determined the First Consul to fix his head-quarters at Torre-di-Garafola, between Tortona and Alessandria. In this situation was the night spent.

Meanwhile the most dreadful confusion had prevailed in Alessandria, since the battle of Montebello. The Austrian Council was agitated by the most sinister presentiments: they beheld the Austrian army cut off from its line of operation and depôts, and placed between the army of the First Consul and that of General Suchet, whose advanced posts had passed the mountains, and began to be felt upon the rear of the right flank of the Austrians. The greatest irresolution pervaded their minds.

After much hesitation, Melas, on the 11th, resolved to send a strong detachment against Suchet, the remainder of the Austrian army continuing covered by the Bormida and the citadel of Alessandria; but, during the night of the 11th and 12th, Melas heard of the First Consul's movement upon the Scrivia. On the 12th, he recalled his detachment, and passed the whole day and night of the 13th in deliberation; at last, after some sharp and stormy discussions, the Council of Melas pronounced that the existence of the Army of

reserve had been unknown to him; that the orders and instructions of the Aulic Council had mentioned only the army of Massena; that the unfortunate position in which they found themselves ought, therefore, to be attributed to the ministry, and not to the general; that in this unforeseen situation, brave soldiers ought to do their duty; that they were, then, called upon to cut their way through the army of the First Consul, and thus re-open the communications with Vienna; that, in case of success, every thing was gained, since they were masters of Genoa, and, by returning promptly upon Nice, they could execute the plan of operations fixed at Vienna; and, lastly, that if they failed and lost the battle, their position would, no doubt, be dreadful; but that the whole responsibility of it would fall upon the ministry.

This train of reasoning settled all opinions; there was but one cry—To arms! to arms! and every one began to make his dispositions for the next day's battle.

The chances of victory were wholly in favour of the Austrian army, which was very numerous. It had, at least, three times as many cavalry as the French army. The strength of the latter was not exactly known; but the

TABLE

Shewing the composition and force of the Army of Reserve on the 14th of June, 1800.

BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL,

COMMANDING IN PERSON.

ALEX. BERTHIER,
GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

MARESCOT,
COMMANDING THE ENGINEERS.

DUPONT,
CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

MARMONT,
COMMANDING THE ARTILLERY.

IN LINE AT MARENGO.

INFANTRY.

LIEUTENANT GENERALS.	GENERALS OF DIVISION.	GENERALS OF BRIGADE.	Number of the Battalions or Squadrons.	TOTALS by DIVISION.
Victor	Gardanne	"	6	3,691
		"		
	Chambarlhac	Herbin	9	5,287
		Rivaud		
Lannes	Watrin	Malher	12	5,083
		Gency		
		Mainony		
Desaix	Monnier	Cara St-Cyr	8	3,614
		Shilt		
	Boudet	Musnier	9	5,816
		Guesneau		
	Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Consular Guard, commanded by Soulés		1	800
	Total of the Infantry		45	23,791

CAVALRY.

Murat		Kellermann	6	470
	Cés. Berthier,	Champeaux.	11	998
	adjutant-general.	"	10	800
		Rivaud	8	759
		"	3	301
	Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Consular Guard, commanded by Bessières		2	360
	Total of the Cavalry		40	3,688
	Artillery and Engineers			690

RECAPITULATION.

Infantry	23,791
Cavalry	3,688
Artillery and Engineers	690
	28,169 men.

BEFORE THE FORTRESSES AND IN POSITION ON THE BANKS OF THE PO.

INFANTRY.

LIEUTENANT GENERALS.	GENERALS OF DIVISION.	GENERALS OF BRIGADE.	Number of Battalions or Squadrons.	TOTALS by DIVISIONS.
Duhesme	Loison	Broussier	9	5,304
		Gobert		
	Lapoype	"	7	3,462
		"		
Moncey	Lorge	Leechy	6	4,400
		"		
	Gilly	"	4	3,30,
		"		
	Chabran	"	7	3,373
		"		
	Turreau	Davin	10	4,450
		"		
	Bethencourt	"	1	695
	Total of the Infantry		44	24,964

CAVALRY.

	Harville	Dumoulin	4	382
	Chabran	"	1	120
		"	10	950
	Loison	Broussier	10	1,180
		Gobert		
	Turreau	Kister	6	700
	Total of the Cavalry		31	3,312
	Artillery and Engineers			1,400

RECAPITULATION.

Infantry	24,964
Cavalry	3,312
Artillery and Engineers	1,400
	29,676 men.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

In line at Marengo	28,169
Before the fortresses	29,676
Total	57,845

POSITIONS

OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH AND AUSTRIAN ARMIES IN ITALY ON THE DAY OF THE BATTLE OF MARENGO.

FRENCH.		AUSTRIAN.	
Fort Bard		At Alessandria	The General-in-chief Melas, with an army of 45,000 men, composed of the divisions of Ott, Elnitz, Haddick, and Kaim.
Ivrea		Valenza	
Chivasso	Occupied by Chabran's division.	Casal	
Crescentino		Verrua	
Trino		Turin	
Vercelli		Ceva	
Before Arona	Bethencourt's division.	Coni	Occupied by the Austrian troops.
Before the Castle of Milan	Gilly's division.	Savona	
At Crema	Lorge's division.	Genoa	
At Brescia	The Italic legion.	Gavi	
At Cremona		Tortona	
Before the Castle of Placenza	Lieut.-Gen. Duhesme, with Loison's division.	Bobbio	
Before Pizzighettone		Parma	
At Castel S. Giovanni		Mantua	General Wucassowitsch.
At Pavia	Lapoype's division.	Peschiera	The Garrison.
At Sale	Rivaud's brigade of cavalry.	Upper Adige	Dedowitsch.
At Torre di Garofolo	Head-quarters of Monnier's division.	Vessona, on the frontiers of the Tyrol	General Laudon.
Before St. Juliano	Lieut.-Gen. Lannes, with Watrin's division.	The Castle of Placenza	Occupied by the Austrians, and besieged or masked by the French.
At Marengo	Lieut.-Gen. Victor, with Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's divisions, and Kellermann's and Champeaux's brigades of cavalry	Pizzighettone	
		The Castle of Milan	
At Rivalta	Lieut.-Gen. Desaix, with Boudet's division.	The Fort of Arona	
At Cassino, Acqui, Spigno, Dego, and before Savona	General Massena joined with General Suchet.		
At Bussolino, near Susa	Turreau's division.		

Memoirs, Vol. I. page 293.



Austrian army, notwithstanding its losses at the battle of Montebello, and those it had experienced in the neighbourhood of Genoa and Nice, after the retreat, was still very superior to the Army of reserve.*

On the 14th, at break of day, the Austrians defiled by the three bridges of the Bormida, and made a furious attack on the village of Marengo. The resistance was obstinately kept up for a long time. The First Consul, finding, from the briskness of the cannonade, that the Austrians had commenced the attack, immediately despatched orders to General Desaix to return with his troops upon San-Juliano; he was half a day's march off, to the left. The First Consul arrived on the field of battle at ten o'clock in the morning, between San-Juliano and Marengo. The enemy had at length carried Marengo; and the division under Victor having been forced to give way after a firm resistance, was thrown into the utmost disorder. The plain on the left was covered with our fugitives, who spread alarm wherever they went, and many were even exclaiming in dismay, "*All is lost.*"

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* See the subjoined statement.

The corps of General Lannes, a little in the rear of the right of Marengo, was engaged with the enemy, who, after taking that place, deployed upon its left, and formed its line opposite our right, beyond which it already extended. The First Consul immediately despatched his battalion of the cavalry guard, consisting of eight hundred grenadiers, the best troops in the army, to station themselves at five-hundred toises distance from Lannes, on the right, in a good position, in order to keep the enemy in check. Napoleon himself, with the seventy-second demi-brigade, hastened to the support of Lannes, and directed the division of reserve of Cara Saint-Cyr, upon the extreme right, to Castel-Ceriolo, to flank the entire left of the enemy.

In the mean time the army perceived, in the middle of this immense plain, the First Consul, surrounded by his staff, and two hundred horse grenadiers with their fur caps: this sight proved sufficient to inspire the troops with hopes of victory; their confidence revived, and the fugitives rallied upon San-Juliano, in the rear of the left of General Lannes. The latter, though attacked by a large proportion of the enemy's army, was effecting his

retreat through the midst of this vast plain, with admirable order and coolness. This corps occupied three hours in retiring three-quarters of a league, entirely exposed to the grape-shot of eighty pieces of cannon; at the same time that by an inverse movement Cara Saint-Cyr advanced upon the extreme right, and turned the left of the enemy.

About three o'clock in the afternoon the corps of Desaix arrived: the First Consul made him take a position on the road in advance of San-Juliano. Melas, who believed the victory decided, being overcome with fatigue, repassed the bridges, and entered Alessandria, leaving to General Zach, the head of his staff, the care of pursuing the French army. The latter, thinking that this army was effecting its retreat by the road from Tortona, endeavoured to reach this road behind San-Juliano; but the First Consul had altered his line of retreat at the commencement of the action, and had directed it between Sala and Tortona, so that the high-road from Tortona was of no consequence to the French army.

Lannes' corps in its retreat constantly refused its left, thus directing its course towards the new point of retreat; and Cara Saint-Cyr, who was at the extremity of the right, found

himself almost upon the line of retreat, at the very time that General Zach imagined the two corps were intersected.

The division of Victor had, in the mean time, rallied, and burnt with impatience to recommence the contest. All the cavalry of the army was concentrated in advance of San-Juliano, on the right of Desaix, and in the rear of the left of General Lannes. Balls and shells fell upon San-Juliano; its left was already gained by a column of 6000 of Zach's grenadiers. The First Consul sent orders to General Desaix to charge with his fresh division this column of the enemy. Desaix immediately prepared to execute these orders accordingly; but, as he advanced at the head of two hundred troopers of the ninth light demi-brigade, he was shot through the heart by a ball, and fell dead at the very moment that he had given the word to charge: by this stroke the Emperor was deprived of the man whom he esteemed most worthy of being his lieutenant.

This misfortune by no means disconcerted the movement, and General Boudet easily inspired the soldiers with the same lively desire of instant revenge for so beloved a chief, which actuated his own breast. The ninth light demi-brigade, who did, indeed, on this

occasion, deserve the title of *Incomparable*, covered themselves with glory. General Kellermann, with 800 heavy horse, at the same time charged intrepidly the middle of the left flank of the column: in less than half an hour, these 6000 grenadiers were broken, overthrown, dispersed, and put to flight. General Zach and all his staff were made prisoners.

General Lannes immediately charged forward. Cara Saint-Cyr, who was on our right, and *en potence* with the left flank of the enemy, was much nearer than the enemy to the bridges upon the Bormida. The Austrian army was thrown into the most dreadful confusion in a moment. From 8 to 10,000 cavalry, which were spread over the field, fearing that Saint-Cyr's infantry might reach the bridge before them, retreated at full gallop, and overturned all they met with in their way. Victor's division made all imaginable haste to resume its former field of battle, at the village of Marengo. The enemy's army was in the most horrible disorder. No one thought of any thing but flight. The pressure and confusion became extreme on the bridges of the Bormida, where the masses of fugitives were obliged to crowd together; and at night, all who remained upon the left bank fell into the power of the Republic.

It would be difficult to describe the confusion and despair of the Austrian army. On one side the French army was on the bank of the Bormida, and was expected to pass it at daybreak. On the other, they had General Suchet with his army on their rear, in the direction of their right.

Which way could they effect their retreat? Behind they would be driven to the Alps, and the frontiers of France: they might have moved towards Genoa on the right, before the battle; but they could not hope to do so after their defeat, and closely followed by the victorious army. In this desperate situation, General Melas resolved to give his troops the whole night to rally and repose themselves, availing himself of the screen of the Bormida and the protection of the citadel of Alessandria for this purpose; and afterwards to repass the Tanaro, if necessary, and thus maintain himself in that position, and endeavour at any rate, by entering into negotiations, to save his army by capitulating. On the 15th, at daybreak, the Austrians sent a flag of truce with proposals for an armistice, which produced, the same day, the following convention, by which Genoa and all the fortified places in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations, were given up to the

French army; and by which the Austrian army obtained leave to retire behind Mantua, without being made prisoners of war. Thus was the conquest of all Italy secured.

CONVENTION

Between the Commanders-in-chief of the French and Imperial Armies.

ARTICLE 1.—There shall be an armistice and suspension of hostilities between the army of his Imperial Majesty and that of the French Republic in Italy, till an answer be received from the Court of Vienna.

2.—The army of his Imperial Majesty shall occupy all the country between the Mincio, Fossa, Maestra, and the Po; viz. Peschiera, Mantua, and Borgo-Forte; and thence all the left bank of the Po, as well as the city and citadel of Ferrara on the right.

3.—The army of his Imperial Majesty shall likewise occupy Tuscany and Ancona.

4.—The French army shall occupy the country comprised between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po.

5.—The country between the Chiesa and the Mincio shall not be occupied by either of the two armies. The army of his Imperial Majesty

may draw provisions from the countries which formed a part of the duchy of Mantua. The French army to be supplied by the countries which formed a part of the province of Brescia.

6.—The castles of Tortona, Alessandria, Milan, Turin, Pizzighetone, Arona, and Placenza, shall be delivered up to the French army, between the 27th of Prairial and the 1st of Messidor, (or the 16th and 20th of June).

7.—The fortress of Coni, the castles of Seva, Savona, and the city of Genoa, shall be surrendered to the French army, between the 16th and 24th of June, (or 27th of Prairial and 5th of Messidor).

8.—Fort Urbino shall be surrendered on the 26th of June, (7th of Messidor).

9.—The artillery of the evacuated places to be divided as follows: 1st. All artillery of the Austrian calibre and fount, to belong to the Austrian army. 2d. All of Italian, Piedmontese, and French calibre and make, to belong to the French army. 3d. The provisions to be divided: half to be at the disposal of the Commissary-general of the French army, and half at that of the Commissary-general of the Austrian army.

10.—The garrisons shall march out with the

honours of war, repairing with their arms and baggage by the most direct road to Mantua.

11.—The Austrian army shall repair to Mantua, by way of Placenza, in three columns: the first, between the 27th of Prairial and the 1st of Messidor, (from the 16th to the 20th of June); the second, from the 1st to the 5th of Messidor, (or from the 20th to the 24th of June); the third, from the 5th to the 7th of Messidor, (or from the 24th to the 26th of June).

12.—General Saint-Julien and General de Schvertnick of the artillery, General de Bruni of the engineers, M. Telsiege, commissary of provisions, and citizens Dejean, counsellor of state, and Daru, inspector of reviews, Adjutant-general Leopold Stabedrath, and Mossel, chief of brigade of artillery, are nominated commissioners to see that the articles of the present Convention are carried into execution, with respect to inventories, provisions, carriages, and all other objects in question.

13.—No individual shall be ill-treated on account of services rendered to the Austrian army, or on account of political opinions. The Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army shall set at liberty all persons arrested in the Cisalpine Republic for political opinions, and who

may be confined in the fortresses under his command.

14.—Whatever may be the answer from Vienna, neither of the two armies shall attack the other without giving six days' previous notice.

15.—During the suspension of hostilities, neither army shall send any detachments into Germany.

Alessandria, 26th of Prairial, year VIII. of the French Republic, (June 15, 1800).

(Signed,) ALEXANDER BERTHIER,
MELAS, *General of Cavalry*

General Melas acted in conformity to the interests of his sovereign, in saving the Austrian army; and giving up places, which, being ill-provisioned and ill-garrisoned, could not have made any long resistance, or have been of any utility when the army was destroyed.

The First Consul, on the other side, considered that 20,000 English had just arrived at Genoa; that with the 10,000 Austrians remaining in that place they formed an army; that not having any place of strength in Italy, the position of the French was precarious; that they had suffered greatly in the battles of Montebello and Marengo; that the French army of Genoa, and that of Suchet, had likewise sus-

tained considerable loss, both before the siege and whilst it lasted, during the movements on Nice, and in the pursuit of the Austrians; that General Melas, having passed the Tanaro, was for several days out of the reach of attack; that he would therefore gain time to rally, and put his troops in order once more, and that when the Austrian army should be thus re-organized, a single day's march stolen in advance would be enough to disengage it, either by throwing itself upon Genoa, or reaching Stradella by marching in the night; that the great superiority of the enemy in cavalry gave them many advantages in concealing their movements; and, in short, that if the Austrian army should get clearly away, even with the loss of its artillery and baggage, it would require a great deal of time and abundance of labour to take so many fortified places.

General Suchet, with his corps, marched upon Genoa, and on the 24th of June entered that city, which was given up to him by Prince Hohenzollern, to the great regret of the English, whose van-guard from Mahon had arrived within sight of the port, with the intention of taking possession of the place. The fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, Coni, Fenestrelles, Milan, Pizzighetone, Arona, Peschiera, Urbino, and Ferrara, were successively given up to the

French, with all their artillery. The army of Melas passed through Stradella and Placenza, and took up its position behind Mantua.

The joy of the Piedmontese, the Genoese, and the Italians was beyond expression; they saw themselves restored to liberty, without suffering the horrors of a protracted war, which was already removed to their frontiers, and without experiencing any of the inconveniences attendant on sieges of fortified places, always fraught with disastrous consequences to the towns and surrounding country.

In France the intelligence at first appeared incredible. The first courier who arrived at Paris was a commercial express: he brought news that the French army had been defeated. He had set out on the morning of the 14th of June, between ten and twelve, just as the First Consul was coming on the field of battle. This only increased the general joy, when the victory of the First Consul was promulgated, with all its attendant advantages to the Republic. The soldiers of the army of the Rhine were ashamed of having done so little; and a noble emulation impelled them to desire that no armistice should be concluded, until they should be in possession of the whole of Bavaria.

The English troops, crowded together upon

the rock of Mahon, became the prey of various maladies, and lost a number of their soldiers. Soon after this celebrated battle of the 14th of June, all the Italian patriots were released from the dungeons of Austria, and entered the capital of their nation in triumph, amidst the acclamations of their countrymen, and cries of *Viva il liberatore dell' Italia!*

The First Consul set out on the 17th of June, from Marengo, for Milan, where he arrived at night: he found the city illuminated, and a scene of the most animated rejoicings: all proclaimed the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic; but the Constitution by which it had been regulated being susceptible of improvement, he established a Provisional Government, which left greater facilities for terminating, in a time of peace, the complete and definitive organization of this Republic. He charged Petiet, the Commissary-general, who had been Minister of war in France, with the functions of Minister of France to the Cisalpine Republic, instructing him to direct its administration, attend to the wants of the French army, and look into and prevent every species of abuse.

The Ligurian Republic was thus re-organized, and restored to independence. The Austrians had not restored the King of Sardinia, when

they made themselves masters of Piedmont, but had appropriated the country to their own profit. In this they differed in opinion with the Russians, who wished the King of Sardinia to be re-established in Piedmont. This monarch, who had landed from Sardinia, was in Tuscany, and had not obtained leave to go to Turin.

The First Consul established a Provisional Government in Piedmont, and nominated General Jourdan Minister of the French Republic to this government. He was charged to superintend it, and to reconcile the interests of the people of Piedmont with those of the French Republic. This general, whose conduct had been somewhat suspicious at the time of the 18th of Brumaire, felt grateful on finding that the First Consul had not only entirely forgotten the past, but was also willing to give him so high a proof of confidence. He devoted all his zeal to the public good.

Though General Massena was guilty of an error in embarking his troops at Genoa, instead of conducting them by land, he had always displayed much character and energy. The services he had rendered in the first campaigns, and latterly at Zurich, testified also in his favour. The First Consul appointed him Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy.

The affairs of the French Republic rendered the presence of the First Consul necessary at Paris. He set out on the 5th of Messidor (June 24th), passed through Turin, staying there only two hours, to visit the Citadel, crossed Mount Cenis, and arrived at Lyons, where he stopped some time to gratify the inhabitants of the city, and lay the first stone for the rebuilding of the *Place Bellecour*. This ceremony was rendered sublime by the immense concourse, and the enthusiasm of the people. He arrived in Paris on the 13th of Messidor (July 2d) unexpectedly, and in the middle of the night; but the next day, as soon as the news was spread through the various quarters of that vast capital, all the city and the suburbs ran to the courts and gardens of the palace of the Tuileries. All the labouring people at once left their occupations; and the populace crowded round the windows in the hope of seeing him to whom France was so much indebted. Acclamations of joy resounded through the gardens, in the courts, and on the quays. In the evening every one, rich or poor, joyfully illuminated his house.

It was a truly glorious day.

APPENDIX.

LETTER from BARRAS and FRERON, Representatives of the people, attending the Army before Toulon, To their Colleagues composing the Committee of Public Safety.

Marseilles, 11th Frimaire, year II. of the French Republic, one and indivisible (1793.)

CITIZENS, OUR COLLEAGUES,

WE now lay aside all other business, in order to call your whole attention to our situation in the departments of the Var and the mouths of the Rhone. You, who are at the helm of the state, are well aware that the most destructive warfare to which we are exposed, and on which the despots combined against our liberty chiefly rely, is that of famine. Unfortunately, the state of our magazines in the interior is not such as to relieve us from all anxiety; our efforts, and those of all the deputies in the departments, have been exerted, in conjunction with the zeal of our faithful citizens, to discover the means of procuring corn. Since the troops of the Republic entered the rebellious districts, we have lived only from hand to mouth, and we have found

it excessively difficult to procure subsistence for our army in Italy, and for that before Toulon. These two departments of the Republic were already famished, through the protracted stay of the combined squadrons, even before the sacrilegious city fell into their power. We flattered ourselves with the hope of obtaining considerable supplies of grain from Italy and the Levant; but when Naples and Tuscany joined the coalition, we were compelled to relinquish those hopes. Tunis, according to all appearances, has now been gained over by the forces and the gold of the English; there is every reason to believe that the Dey is become hostile to us; the immense convoy which lay in his port is lost to the Republic: only three frigates have escaped, which have taken refuge in Corsica. But how long will they remain in safety there, and how can they afford any assistance to us?

On the other hand, the slavish forces increase at Toulon; according to the reports of all our spies, they amount to five and thirty thousand men, and they still expect thirty thousand more: it seems that the Portuguese furnish part of these forces. It is certain that if they were to attack with their whole army, they would force our lines; but they fear the army of Nice, which might place them between two fires; they have accordingly formed a plan to cut it off. The valour of our

troops and the vigilance of our generals, will, no doubt, baffle all such schemes; but our defenders are in danger of perishing by famine. The bad weather renders the roads impassable, the magazines are empty, nothing can be carried except on mules; as soon as the rains set in, these brave men will be in imminent danger. Robespierre the younger is here, and confirms all these melancholy details. Fifteen days of rain might place us in the most wretched condition. Ever since the 2d, the Durance has overflowed, and done us enormous damage; it has long prevented a quantity of cattle from reaching us.

It is also necessary to observe that the East wind, which deprives us of all chance of relief by sea, either from Arles or from Cette, blows almost perpetually, wafting succours to our enemies. Besides, were they to receive no reinforcements, covered as they are, by the position of Toulon, they are more than sufficient to set our attacks at defiance. It would require half as many more troops as we have; to attack with our present numbers would be an useless sacrifice of our brethren: as to waiting for reinforcements, the enemy may also be reinforced in the same proportion; and a famine must certainly take place. In what did the strength of Provence (lately so called) consist? In Toulon, and in Toulon only. Why not abandon to the

enemy all the barren ground as far as the Durance, after carrying off the provisions of every kind. The egotists of Marseilles have already paid in money. You would then form an immense bulwark on the banks of that river; you would there assemble two hundred thousand men, whom you could maintain with ease; you would leave the care of providing subsistence for all Provence to the infamous English. On the return of summer, when the harvests were at hand, and vegetables already productive, the republicans, rushing like a torrent upon this country, would drive the slavish horde into the sea which throws them on our coasts. Such, we should think, would be the ideas of the generals: the soldiers are discouraged by the dread of wanting provisions. Let these reflections be well weighed and deliberated upon in a committee. We will take care to have the orders which may be given carried into execution; but there is not a moment to lose. Salutation and Fraternity.

Your co-operators,

BARRAS, FRERON.

SITTING OF THE 7TH OF NIVOSE.

CARNOT, in the name of the Committee of Public Safety, produced the following letter, which was read.

FRERON and PAUL BARRAS, Representatives of the people, attending the Army before Toulon,

To their Colleagues composing the Committee of Public Safety.

Head-quarters, Toulon, 30th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

WE have read, with indignation, Citizen Colleagues, the forged letter which has been attributed to us, but which, happily, failed to impose on the committee. This stroke came from Marseilles, at the very time that city was attempting to produce a counter-revolutionary movement, which we crushed.

You will observe that it was at the very moment when we were setting out for Ollioules, to meet our colleagues for the purpose of striking the decisive blow, that our ruin was attempted—that the calumniators, who denounced us, were aspersing our characters, and inventing criminal accusations against us. We assisted in taking Toulon; that is our answer.

(Signed,) BARRAS and FRERON.

P.S. A patriot of Toulon, who has only been a

fortnight out of prison, and who has not read the public papers for five months, assures us that a report was spread during the siege, and that it was publicly asserted, that the Representatives of the people had determined to cause the French army to retire to the banks of the Durance; and that it was through Robespierre the elder that this measure had been carried in the Committee of Public Safety. This, to our apprehension, threw some light upon the subject: it is evident that the emissaries of Pitt are the authors of this calumny, and of the letter to which our signatures have been forged.

Address of the National Convention,

To the Army of the Republic, before the walls of Toulon.

30th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

Soldiers of the Republic! You have too long deferred the national vengeance: too long you have put off your own triumph. The infamous traitors of Toulon still live: we are braved by our enemies, and menaced by tyrants; yet you remain tranquil spectators of this shameful sight; or have you ceased to exist, since these wretches still encumber the earth?

The standard of Royalty waves before your eyes; it defies your courage, and excludes the Mediterranean from your sight. Has then the tri-coloured banner lost its hues? Does it no longer rally the defenders of the nation?

A vile horde of slaves, surrounded by hateful walls, insults the Republic; and its numerous battalions in vain surround the brigands of London and Madrid!

The North has triumphed; on the Sarthe the rebels have been vanquished. Is the South alone to be disinherited of its portion in the national glory?

Inhabitants of the Southern countries, you in whose souls an ardent climate has kindled generous passions, and the fiery enthusiasm whence great achievements spring, you have not yet felt sufficient indignation at the treachery of the people of Toulon, the corruption of England, the baseness of Spain. The operations of the siege proceed with languor. Must the North then be called upon to defend you? Must other arms than yours be invited to throw up the earth to form the intrenchments destined to protect the soldier's life, and secure victory? Will you be able to call the conquest of Toulon your glory, if the North is called in to accelerate its fall? Will you suffer other hands to reap the laurels which liberty has caused to spring up by your side?

Dare you return to your homes unless victory speedily clears you a glorious path thither? Will you suffer it to be hereafter said in France, in Europe—'The Republic bade them conquer—but they feared death?'

Hapless and venerated shades of Representatives of the people, immolated by English barbarity! appear to our troops, and shew them the path of honour. Let the clanking chains of the French patriots transported to Gibraltar resound in your ears: they call for vengeance; they ought to obtain it.

Yes, brave Republicans, the national convention intrusts that vengeance to your courage: you will regain the dominion of the Mediterranean for France; you will re-establish abundance; you will reinstate commerce in her ports; restore our navy, and open to our political councils, the way to Italy and to the Dardanelles.

March, soldiers of the nation; no longer let the crimes of Toulon remain unpunished. The Republic commands you to conquer.

Soldiers! you are Frenchmen, you are free: before you are Spaniards—Englishmen—slaves; —the eye of Liberty is upon you.

SITTING OF THE 4TH OF NIVOSE, YEAR II.

The Representatives of the people attending the Army directed against Toulon,

To the Committee of Public Safety.

Head-quarters, Ollioule, 28th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

WE announced to you, on a former occasion, Citizen Colleagues, that the result of the affair of the 10th was only the precursor of more important successes. The event has just fulfilled our prediction.

Conformably to your decree, all measures had been taken for forcing the brigands, who had basely obtained possession of Toulon, to an ignominious flight from that infamous place.

We lost not a single moment, and even before all the forces expected were assembled, we commenced our attack, which was principally directed against the English redoubt commanding the forts of l'Eguillette and Balagnier, defended by above 3000 men, twenty pieces of cannon, and several mortars.

The enemy had availed themselves of all the resources of art to render this place impregnable; and we assure you that few forts are so completely fortified against every species of attack as this redoubt; yet it was not

strong enough to withstand the ardour and courage of the brave defenders of our country. The forces of this division, under the command of General Laborde, and in which General Dugommier has honourably distinguished himself, attacked the redoubt at five in the morning; and at six the flag of the Republic waved on its battlements. This first success cost the nation 200 men killed, and above 500 wounded; but the enemy lost their whole garrison, 500 of whom are prisoners, including eight officers, and a Neapolitan commander of high rank.

Malevolence had neglected nothing that was calculated to prevent the success of this important enterprise; but we were distributed in the different columns, and rallied those who had for an instant been discouraged. At our call, at the names of *Liberty* and the *Republic*, all rushed on to victory, and the English redoubt, as well as the forts of l'Eguillette and Balagnier, were carried by assault.

The taking of this redoubt, on which all the hopes of the enemy relied, and which might be called the bulwark of the Allied Powers, totally disconcerted them. Terrified by our success, they abandoned the forts of Malbosquet and Tomet during the night; they blew up the latter in despair: they also evacuated Fort Rouge and Fort Blanc, and the redoubt and fort of

Pharon. They took measures for securing their fleet from the fire of our cannon and bombs, which incessantly played upon them.

The fleet is at this moment out of the roads; many of the people of Toulon, and most of the enemy's forces are on board; they have, however, left troops at Fort La Malgue and in the city, to cover their retreat. We possess the Signal-station, Fort Artigue, and Cape Brun. We hope to take Fort La Malgue in the course of the night, and to be in Toulon to-morrow, occupied in avenging the Republic.

Above four hundred oxen, with many sheep and pigs, (the only troops furnished by the Pope, except a few monks,) much forage, provisions of every kind, tents, all the carriages which the enemy had in their forts and redoubts, and more than a hundred pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, have fallen into our hands. We shall be able to give you, in a few days, a list of those who have most distinguished themselves, and whom we shall have rewarded. You will see by this return, that we drew from the army of Nice all the force that was disposable, and that we have neglected no means of ensuring the fall of this ever-to-be-detested city. Our next letter will be dated from the ruins of Toulon. We could not write to you earlier, because we have been on horseback for several days

and nights, and have not had a single moment to spare for the purpose of writing.

(Signed,) RICORD, FRERON, and ROBESPIERRE the younger.

P.S. Our colleague Barras, who is with the division commanded by General Lapoype, informs us that all the heights of the mountain of Pharon have been carried at the point of the bayonet; that the redoubt of the fort of that name has been evacuated, and eighty prisoners taken, including an English lieutenant. He will communicate to you the advantages obtained by this division, which are the result of the execution of the plan laid down by the Committee of Public Safety.

In short, the general attack was so ably concerted that in twenty-four hours all the posts were attacked and occupied by the two divisions of the army of the Republic. Salutation and Fraternity.

LETTER from the General-in-chief DUGOMMIER to the Minister of War.

Head-quarters, Ollioule, 10th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

CITIZEN MINISTER,

THE action of this day has been hot, but successful; an important battery had for two days cannonaded

Malbosquet, and greatly annoyed that post and its environs. This morning, at five o'clock, the enemy made a vigorous sortie, by which he at first carried all our advanced posts on the left, as well as this battery. At the first discharge of musquetry, we hastened to the left wing, where I found almost half the forces in utter confusion. General Garnier complained that his troops had abandoned him. I ordered him to rally them, to advance, and retake our battery: I, myself, at the head of the third battalion of the Isere, advanced likewise, by another road, to the same battery. We were fortunate enough to succeed: this post was quickly retaken; the enemy, briskly repulsed, fell back on every side, leaving on the field a great number of killed and wounded. Their army has lost in this sortie more than twelve hundred men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; amongst the latter are several officers of high rank, particularly General O'Hara, their Commander-in-chief, who was wounded by a musquet-ball in the right arm. The Generals on both sides were destined to be hit in this action; for I received two severe contusions, one in the right arm, the other in the shoulder; but they are not dangerous. After having thus driven back the enemy to the place whence he came, our republicans, in the heat of their generous enthusiasm, marched towards Fort Malbosquet, under

a most formidable fire kept up by that fort; they brought away the tents of a camp which their intrepidity had made the enemy evacuate. This action, which is a real triumph for the arms of the Republic, is a most auspicious omen for our ulterior operations: for what may we not expect from a concerted and well-arranged attack, when our unpremeditated movements are crowned with success?

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all those of our brethren in arms, who fought on this occasion; amongst those who chiefly distinguished themselves, and who most assisted me in rallying and pushing forward, are the citizens, Bonaparte, commanding the artillery; Arena and Gervoni, Adjutants-general.

DUGOMMIER, General-in-Chief.

LETTER addressed to the Minister of War, by the General-in-chief of the Army of Italy.

Head-quarters, Ollioule, 29th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

CITIZEN MINISTER,

TOULON is restored to the Republic, and the success of our arms is complete. The promontory of L'Eguillette being destined to decide the fate of this infamous city, as I have already informed you, and the positions it affords being equally adapted for securing the retreat

of the enemy, or for burning their ships, by means of our bombs; all possible means were taken for securing the conquest of this position on the 26th of Frimaire. The weather was excessively unfavourable until one in the morning; but nothing could damp the ardour of freemen fighting against tyrants. Thus, in spite of every obstacle presented by the weather, our brethren rushed forward to glory, the moment the word of command was given.

The Representatives of the people, Robespierre, Salicetti, Ricord, and Freron, were with us: they set our brethren an example of the most devoted heroism. This fraternal and exalted unanimity deserved conquest; nor was it long before victory declared for us: our success will be cited in history as miraculous; it put us in possession of the English redoubt covered by a double enceinte; an intrenched camp, defended by works consisting of chevaux-de-frises, trees cut down, &c.; thirty pieces of cannon, thirty-six and twenty-four pounders, &c.; five mortars, and two thousand choice troops: it was also supported by the cross fires of three other redoubts, which contained three thousand men.

The impetuosity of the republicans, and the sudden capture of this terrible redoubt, which appeared from its heights an inaccessible volcano, struck the enemy with such consternation, that he quickly abandoned

the rest of the promontory, and spread a panic terror in Toulon, which arose to the highest pitch when it was found that the squadrons were evacuating the roads.

I caused the attacks on Malbosquet and the other posts to be continued the same day; Toulon then lost all hopes; and the redoubts of Fort Rouge, Pommets, Pharon, and several others, were abandoned in the course of the following night.

At length Toulon itself was evacuated likewise; but the retiring enemy had the address to cover their flight, and we were unable to pursue them. They were covered by the ramparts of the town, the gates of which, closed with the greatest care, prevented our obtaining any intelligence.

The fire which appeared at the entrance of the port was the only signal of their departure. We immediately approached Toulon; and it was not until after midnight that we ascertained the place was abandoned by its vile inhabitants and by the infamous coalition which madly hoped to subject us to its odious sway.

The hurry in which the general evacuation was effected, preserved nearly all our property, and the greater part of the shipping. Toulon has been forced to restore all that its treachery had robbed us of. I

shall send you, without delay, the returns I have had drawn up of all particulars worthy of notice.

Whilst the west division of our army was effecting these grand operations, the east division, commanded by General Lapoype, proceeded with Citizen Barras, Representative of the people, to Mount Pharon, and carried the first redoubt. All the others, with Fort Pharon itself, were evacuated by the enemy like those of the west.

We have lost from seventy-five to eighty of our brethren, and the number of wounded is about two hundred and fifty. It is scarcely possible to judge of the loss of the enemy, except from their wounded, who have been taken into our hospitals; but it may be considered certain that with the addition of those killed and taken prisoners, we have this day deprived them of more than twelve thousand combatants.

Thus, Citizen Colleagues, has the counter-revolution of the south terminated. We are indebted for its overthrow to the brave republicans constituting this army, which has, without exception, deserved well of the country, and some individuals of which ought to be distinguished by the national gratitude. I send you the list of them, and beg your gracious acquiescence in my requests; this list will inform you of the names of

those who chiefly signalized themselves in the action; and I confidently hope that the promotions I solicit for them will be granted.

Salutation and Fraternity,

DUGOMMIER.

LETTER from FOUCHÉ to COLLOT D'HERBOIS, his colleague and friend, member of the Committee of Public Safety.

Toulon, 28th of Frimaire, year II. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

AND we also, my friend—we have contributed to the taking of Toulon, by the terror we struck into the cowards who entered the place, exposing to their sight the carcases of thousands of their accomplices.

The war is at an end, if we know how to avail ourselves of this memorable victory. Let us be terrible, that we may not be in danger of becoming weak or cruel; let us destroy, in our wrath, and at one blow, all rebels, conspirators and traitors, to spare ourselves the anguish, the tedious misery of punishing them as kings. Let us execute justice as Nature does; let us avenge ourselves as a people; let us strike like the thunderbolt, and annihilate even the ashes of our foes, that they may not pollute the soil of Liberty.

May the perfidious and ferocious English be attacked in all directions; may the whole Republic form but

one volcano to overwhelm them with its devouring lava; may the infamous Isle which produced these monsters, whom humanity disowns, be ingulfed for ever in the depths of ocean!

Adieu, my friend, tears of joy gush from my eyes and inundate my soul. The courier is departing—I will write again by the ordinary post.

(Signed,) FOUCHÉ.

P.S. We have only one way of celebrating the victory; this evening we send two hundred and thirteen rebels to meet death amidst the thunder of our guns. Extraordinary couriers will be instantly despatched to convey the intelligence to the army.

SALICETTI, RICORD, FRERON, ROBESPIERRE, and BARRAS, Representatives of the people, attending the Army acting against Toulon, to their Colleagues, composing the Committee of Public Safety.

Head-quarters, Toulon, 30th of Frimaire, year III. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

THE army of the Republic, dear Colleagues, entered Toulon on the 29th of Frimaire, at seven in the morning, after five days and five nights of fighting and fatigue. Our troops were burning with ardour to rush to the assault; four thousand scaling-ladders were ready: but the cowardice of our enemies, who had evacuated

the place after having spiked all the guns of the ramparts, rendered scaling unnecessary.

"When they heard of the taking of the English redoubt and of all the promontory, and saw, on the other hand, all the heights occupied by General Lapoype's division, terror seized on their minds. They entered this place like traitors, they defended it like cowards, they quitted it like robbers. They blew up the Themistocles, which was used as a prison for the patriots; happily the latter found means to escape whilst she was burning, with the exception of six. They have burnt nine of our ships, and carried off three; fifteen have been saved to the Republic, amongst which is that noble vessel the Sans-culotte, of 130 guns. She was approached by some of the enemy's boats even in the port, and whilst we were in Toulon; but two field-pieces on the quay drove them off. Four frigates were already in flames, when the galley-slaves (the worthiest people in Toulon) cut the cables, and extinguished the fire. The rope-factory and the timber-magazine are not damaged; the general magazine was in danger of falling a prey to the flames, but we set five hundred labourers to work, who cut off the communications. We have some frigates left; so that the Republic still possesses a respectable naval force at this place. We found provisions of every description, of which returns are now making out, and will speedily be forwarded to you.

The vengeance of the nation is at work; shooting goes on rapidly; all the officers of marine are already exterminated; the Republic shall be avenged as she ought to be; the manes of slaughtered patriots shall be appeased.

As some soldiers, in the intoxication of victory, were beginning to plunder, we caused it to be proclaimed throughout the town, that the booty of all the rebels was the property of the victorious army; but that all the moveables and effects must be deposited in an extensive place that we appointed, in order to be valued and sold on the spot for the benefit of our brave defenders; besides which, we promised the army a gratuity of one million. This proclamation produced the best effects. Beauvais has been delivered from his dungeon; he is scarcely to be recognised: we have placed him in a comfortable house. He embraced us all tenderly; when he passed through the ranks, the army fired a volley in the air by way of rejoicing. Pierre Bagle's father is also released. One of our batteries has sunk an English frigate.

To-morrow you shall have farther details: you can easily conceive our occupations and fatigues.

Salutation and Fraternity,

(Signed,) Salicetti, Freron, Ricord, Robespierre, and Barras.

EXTRACT from the *Moniteur Universel*, of the 20th of Brumaire, year VIII. of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

ON the 19th of Brumaire, at nine o'clock in the morning, the Directory was still ignorant of the events which were taking place: Gohier, Moulins, and Barras, had met; Sieyes was walking in the garden of the Luxembourg; and Roger Ducos was at his own house. Sieyes, having been informed of the decree of the Council of Ancients, went to the Tuileries. Roger Ducos asked his three colleagues whether there was any truth in the rumours that were spread abroad. Being unable to afford any information, they proceeded to the Council of Ancients.

At ten o'clock, Gohier, Barras, and Moulins, forming the majority of the Directory, ordered General Lefevre, commanding the 17th military division, to attend them to give an account of his own conduct, and to inform them of what had taken place. Lefevre answered, that according to the decree which had been just made by the Council of Ancients, he was accountable only to Bonaparte, who had become his general.

At this intelligence the three Directors were struck with consternation. Moulins, in a violent rage, wanted to send a battalion to surround Bonaparte's house; but there were no means of executing any order: the

guard of the Directory had abandoned it, and gone to the Tuileries. The barriers were, however, closed for a few moments, and it is thought that the order was given by the three Directors.

In the course of the morning, Bellot, secretary to Barras, was seen to enter the Council of the Ancients; he came to speak to Bonaparte. He conversed in private with him for some time; after which, Bonaparte, raising his voice, said to him before a crowd of officers and soldiers, "What have you done with that France which I left you so splendid? I left you peace,—but I find you at war. I left you victories—I find nothing but oppressive laws and misery. What have you done with a hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I once knew, all my companions in glory? They are dead."

"This state of affairs cannot last. It would lead us into slavery in less than three years. But we are resolved to have the Republic established on the foundations of equality, equity, civil liberty, and political tolerance. Under a good administration all individuals will forget the factions of which they were compelled to become members, in order to obtain the privilege of being Frenchmen. Finally, it is time to restore to the defenders of the nation that confidence to which they have so many just claims. According to some factious persons, we should all be enemies of the

Republic, shortly—we, who have preserved it by our efforts and our courage. We have no occasion for those who are better patriots than the brave men who have lost their limbs in the service of the Republic."

LETTER of BARRAS, addressed to the Council of Five Hundred.

18th of Brumaire.

HAVING engaged in public affairs, solely through my enthusiasm for liberty, I consented to accept the first magistracy of the state, only in order to support it, when in danger, by my devotedness; to preserve the patriots who hazarded themselves in its cause from the malice of their enemies; and to secure to the defenders of the country those attentions which could not be paid to them more constantly than by a citizen who of old had witnessed their heroic virtues, and had always felt for their wants.

The glory which attends the return of the illustrious warrior to whom I had the happiness of first opening the path of honour, the striking proofs of confidence bestowed on him by the Legislative Body, and the decree of the National Representation, convince me that, whatever post the interest of the public may hereafter assign to me, the dangers of liberty are surmounted, and the interests of the army are secured." I return,

joyfully, into the station of a private citizen; happy, after so many troubles, to render up the fortunes of the Republic, committed in part to my care, more prosperous and respectable than ever.

Salutation and Respect,

(Signed,) BARRAS.

PROCLAMATION

Of the Minister of General Police to his Fellow Citizens.

18th of Brumaire.

THE Republic was threatened with approaching dissolution.

The Legislative Body has caught liberty on the brink of a precipice, in order to secure her on an immoveable basis.

Events have at last laid the foundation of our happiness, and of that of our posterity.

Let the Citizens of the Republic be calm, for their wishes are about to be fulfilled; let a firm resistance be shewn to the perfidious suggestions of those who, in political events, seek only the means of exciting commotions; and in commotions look only for the perpetuation of troubles and revenge.

Let the weak be encouraged by the recollection that

they are with the strong; let every one securely follow his business, and mind his domestic affairs.

None have cause for fear or hesitation, but those who spread alarms, mislead men's minds, and create disturbances. Every measure is adopted for repressing their attempts; the instigators of tumults, those who attempt to drive the nation into royalty, and, finally, all who shall be found to attack public or private tranquillity, shall be seized and delivered up to justice.

(Signed,) FOUCHÉ.

SITTING OF THE COUNCIL OF ANCIENTS.

18th of Brumaire.

THE Council of Ancients met on the 18th of Brumaire, at two o'clock, in the great gallery of the Chateau of Saint Cloud. At four, General Bonaparte was introduced, and having received from the President permission to address the Council, he spoke as follows:

"REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE. You do not now meet under common circumstances, you are upon a volcano. Permit me to address you with the freedom of a soldier, the candour of a citizen zealous for the welfare of his country; and to intreat you to suspend your judgment till you have heard the whole of what I am about to say.

"I was residing in tranquillity at Paris, when I received the decree of the Council of Ancients, which declared to me the dangers of the Council and of the Republic. I instantly summoned around me my brethren in arms, and we came to afford you our support, to offer you the arms of the nation, because you are its head. Our intentions were pure and disinterested; but in return for the devotedness which we evinced yesterday, we are to-day overwhelmed with calumnies. Some talk of a second Cæsar, some of another Cromwell: it is reported that I wish to establish a military government.

"Had I wished, Representatives, to overthrow the liberties of my country—had I aimed at usurping the sovereign authority, I should not have obeyed the orders you gave me; I should not have had occasion to receive that authority from the Senate. More than once, and under the most favourable circumstances, I have been called upon to assume it. After our triumphs in Italy, I was invited to it by the voices of my comrades, by those of the soldiers who have been so ill used since I ceased to command them, and who, in the deserts of the west, are at this time compelled to carry on a horrible war, which prudence and a recurrence to principles had appeased, but which imbecility or treason has rekindled.

"I swear, Representatives, that the nation possesses

no defender more zealous than myself; I devote myself without reserve to the execution of your orders; but the welfare of the nation depends on you alone, for there is now no Directory: four of the members who composed that body have given in their resignation, and the fifth has been placed under superintendence for his own safety. Danger presses, and disasters are increasing: the Minister of Police has just informed me that several fortified places in La Vendée have fallen into the hands of the Chouans. Representatives of the people, the Council of the Ancients is invested with great powers, but the wisdom which inspires it is still greater. Consult only that wisdom, and the imminence of our dangers. Save the state from being torn to pieces; save us from the loss of what we have sacrificed so much to obtain, Liberty and Equality!"

(Here, being interrupted by a member, who reminded him of the Constitution, Bonaparte resumed thus):

"The Constitution! you violated it on the 18th of Fructidor: you violated it on the 22d of Floreal; you violated it on the 30th of Prairial. The Constitution! all factions invoke it, and they all infringe its laws; it is despised by them all. It can no longer be a source of protection to us, for it is not respected by any one. Representatives of the people, you see in me no wretched intriguer, covered by the mask of hypocrisy. I have

given proofs of my devotion to my country, and dissimulation would to me be unavailing. I hold this language to you only because I am desirous that the reward of such mighty sacrifices may not be lost. The constitution and the rights of the people have been repeatedly violated; and since it is no longer permitted to us to pay that constitution the respect which it ought to command, let us save the foundations on which it rests. Let us preserve equality and liberty; let us find means of securing to every one the liberty which is his right, and in which the constitution has proved inadequate to protect him. I declare to you that as soon as the dangers which have caused extraordinary powers to be confided to me are over, I will abdicate those powers. With respect to the Magistracy to which you may appoint me, I only wish to be the arm to support it, and to execute your commands."

(A member required General Bonaparte to furnish proofs of the existence of the dangers he alluded to.)

Bonaparte. "If a full explanation is required, if individuals must be named, I will name them. I say the Directors Barras and Moulins have proposed to me to put myself at the head of a party tending to the ruin of all men of liberal ideas."

(A discussion now took place, whether Bonaparte should continue his address in public, or whether the

assembly should resolve itself into a secret committee. It was decided that he should be heard in public.)

Bonaparte. "Once more, Representatives of the people, I repeat that the Constitution, thrice violated, no longer affords any security to the citizens: it cannot maintain harmony, for it commands no respect. I repeat that I do not hold this language for the sake of possessing myself of power, after the fall of existing authorities; yet that power has been offered to me continually since my return to Paris. All the different factions have knocked at my door, but I have paid no attention to them, because I belong to no cabal; I am of no party but that of the French people.

"Several members of the Council of Ancients know that I have discoursed with them on the proposals that have been made; and I have only accepted the authority which you have confided to me, for the purpose of sustaining the cause of the Republic. I will not conceal from you, Representatives, that in taking the command, I relied only on the Council of the Ancients. I did not reckon on the Council of Five Hundred, which is divided; and which contains men who would restore conventions, revolutionary committees, and scaffolds. I did not rely on the Council of Five Hundred, in which the heads of that party have just taken their

seats;—on that Council whence emissaries are even now proceeding with instructions to instigate and organize a tumult in Paris.

"Fear not, Representatives, these criminal projects. Surrounded by my brethren in arms, I shall find means to protect you from them. Your courage will enable me to fulfil my promise, brave comrades, to whom I am represented as hostile to liberty; grenadiers, whose caps I observe; brave soldiers, armed with those bayonets which I have so often directed to the humiliation of kings—which have aided me to found Republics. Should some orator, in foreign pay, talk of outlawing me, let him beware lest he draw down that condemnation upon himself. Should he talk of outlawing me, I would appeal to you, my brave companions in arms, to you, valiant soldiers, whom I have so often led to victory; to you, intrepid defenders of the Republic, with whom I have shared so many dangers to establish liberty and equality. I would in that case rely on you, my friends, and on my own good fortune.

"I call upon you, Representatives of the people, to resolve yourselves into a general committee, and therein to take the salutary measures which the urgency of our danger imperiously requires. You shall always find my arm ready to carry your resolutions into effect."

(The President, in the name of the Council, invited the General to develope, fully, the plot with which the Republic was threatened.)

Bonaparte. "I have already had the honour to state to the Council that the Constitution is incapable of preserving the country, and that such an order of things must be created as will enable us to raise her out of the abyss in which she is plunged. The former part of what I have just repeated, was stated to me by the two Directors whom I have named to you, and who, had they done nothing more than give utterance to a truth known to all the nation, would not be more guilty than many other Frenchmen. Since it is allowed that the Constitution is insufficient to preserve the Republic, hasten then to take the means of withdrawing it from danger, if you wish to escape the bitter and eternal reproaches of the French people, of your families, and of your own hearts."

DECREE OF DEPORTATION of the 25th of Brumaire, year VIII. of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

THE Consuls of the Republic, in execution of the third Article of the Law of the 19th of this month, by which they are especially charged to restore internal

tranquillity, have decreed, this 25th of Brumaire, as follows:

Article I.—The individuals hereinafter named, viz.: Destrem, ex-deputy; Arena, ex-deputy; Marquesi, ex-deputy; Truc, ex-deputy; Felix Lepelletier, Charles Hesse, Scipion-du-Roure, Gagny, Massard, Fournier, Giraud, Fiquet, Basch, Marchand, Gabriel, Mamin, J. Sabathier, Clemence, Marné, Jourdeuil, Metche, Mourgoing, Corchaut, Maignant (of Marseilles), Henriot, Lebois, Soulavie, Dubrueil, Didier, Lamberté, Daubigny, and Xavier Audouin, shall leave the continental territory of the French Republic. They shall for this purpose be obliged to proceed to Rochefort, to be afterwards conducted to and detained in the department of French Guiana.

II.—The individuals hereinafter named: Briot, Antonelle, Lacheyardiere, Poulain-Grandpré, Grandmaison, Talot, Quirot, Daubermisnil, Frison, Declercq, Jourdan (of Upper Vienne), Lesage-Senault, Prudhon, Groscassand-Dorimond, Guesdon, Julien (of Toulouse), Sonthonax, Tilly (ex-chargé-d'affaires of Genoa), Stevenette, Castaing, Bouvier, and Delbrel, shall be obliged to proceed to the commune of Rochelle, in the department of Lower Charente, thence to be conducted to and detained in such place within that department as shall be appointed by the Minister of General Police.

III.—Immediately after the publication of the present Decree, the individuals comprised in the two preceding Articles, shall be divested of the exercise of all rights of property; and shall not be restored to such rights, until authentic proof be made of their arrival at the place fixed by the present Decree.

IV.—Those who shall quit the place to which they shall have proceeded, or that to which they shall have been conducted by virtue of the preceding ordinances, shall, in like manner, be divested of such rights.

V.—The present Decree shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws; the Ministers of General Police, of Marine, and Finance, are respectively charged, each so far as concerns his office, with the care and execution of this Decree.

(By the Consuls of the Republic,)

SIEYES, ROGER DUCOS, BONAPARTE.

DECREE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY, dated 26th of Vendemiaire.

THE Executive Directory, on the Report of the Minister of Foreign relations: considering, 1st, That the imprisonment of Nappertandy and Blackwell, naturalized French citizens in the service of the Republic, as likewise that of citizens Morris and Corbett, in the dungeons of Hamburg, and the giving up of

the said citizens to the agents of England, is a violation of the law of nations, an outrage on humanity, and a serious offence to the French Republic;

2dly, That the laws of neutrality impose on those states which enjoy their advantages, duties involving all that is most sacred in social and public rights;

3dly, That the most imperious of these duties is that of keeping the neutral territory inviolate from all acts of hostility, and thereby affording to the persons of the subjects and citizens of all the belligerent powers a complete protection, and an asylum, without distinction of nations, against all the violences exercised under the rights of war;

4thly, Considering that since the pride and fanaticism of some particular governments have re-kindled the flames of war, outrages against the law of nations have multiplied to an alarming extent; that in particular the head of an empire far distant in the north of Europe and Asia, without any provocation on the part of the French, has become the tool of the enmity of the English Government against the French Republic, and against the liberal and philanthropic principles on which that Republic is established; that this chief has lavished threats and insults on all those governments which do not take part in his blind and impassioned policy;

5thly, That unless a stop is put to this moral and political corruption, by an appeal to all governments which have not yet fallen into this state of degradation, and by the punishment of those which participate in its disgrace; unless, in short, these outrages are marked by public opinion with the abhorrence they deserve, there would be reason to apprehend that the laws of war would soon be restrained by no check, and the rights of peace would be left without security; that shortly no barrier would exist to oppose a general dissolution, and that Europe would rapidly relapse into a state of barbarity;

Finally, Considering that the deference of any government to atrocious commands cannot be excused on account of its weakness; above all, when that government has rendered itself guilty of the dependence of the position in which it has voluntary placed itself; and that such is the case in which the magistrates of Hamburg have placed themselves, in ordering the imprisonment of citizens Nappertandy, Blackwell, Morris, and Corbett, and in refusing to liberate them on official proof that they were French citizens and officers of the Republic;

Has decreed, on the 17th of Vendemiaire:

Article I.—The aggression committed by the government of Hamburg, shall be denounced to all allied

and neutral governments, by the ministers of the Republic residing at the seats of those governments.

II.—The resident Consular and diplomatic Agents to the senate of Hamburg, shall immediately quit that city and its territories.

III.—Every Agent of the government of Hamburg, residing in France, shall receive orders to quit the place of his residence within twenty-four hours, and the French territory within eight days.

IV.—A general embargo shall be laid on all ships and vessels bearing the flag of Hamburg, and being in the ports of the Republic.

PROCLAMATION

Of BONAPARTE, General-in-Chief, to the Citizens composing the Sedentary National Guard at Paris.

18th of Brumaire, year VIII. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

CITIZENS!

THE Council of the Ancients, the depository of the wisdom of the nation, has just pronounced the annexed Decree; by virtue of Articles 102 and 103 of the Act of the Constitution.

It enjoins me to take the necessary measures for the safety of the National Representation. Its immediate removal is necessary. The Legislative Body will find itself in a condition to save the Representation from

that imminent danger into which a state of disorganization is plunging us.

It requires, at this important crisis, the union and confidence of our patriots. Rally around it; that is the only way to establish the Republic on the basis of civil liberty, internal prosperity, victory, and peace.

BONAPARTE.

PROCLAMATION

Of BONAPARTE, General-in-Chief, to the Army.

General Lefebvre retains the command of the 17th military division.

The troops will return into their respective quarters; the duty will proceed as usual.

General Bonaparte is highly satisfied with the conduct of the troops of the line, invalids, and sedentary national guards, who throughout the proceedings of yesterday, so fortunate for the Republic, proved themselves the true friends of the people. He expresses his particular satisfaction to the brave grenadiers on duty at the chambers of the National Representation, who covered themselves with glory, in saving the life of their General when assailed by the daggers of some of the Representatives.

BONAPARTE.

PROCLAMATION

Of the CONSULS of the Republic to the French People.

THE Constitution of the Year III. was hastening to destruction. It had proved incapable of maintaining either your rights, or its own existence. Reiterated infractions had deprived it, irretrievably, of the respect of the people. Hostile and greedy factions were dividing the Republic amongst them. France was approaching the last stage of general disorganization.

But patriotism exerted its powers. Every thing capable of doing injury has been removed; all that could be useful, all that remained pure in the National Representation united under the banners of Liberty.

Frenchmen! the Republic, strengthened and replaced in Europe, in the rank which she ought never to have forfeited, will see all the hopes of her citizens realized, and her glorious destinies accomplished.

Take, with us, the oath which we swear, to be faithful to the Republic, one and indivisible, founded on equality, liberty, and the representative system.

(By the Consuls of the Republic,

BONAPARTE.

The Consuls of the Republic to the Legislative Committee of the Council of Five Hundred.

24th Brumaire.

Citizens Representatives,

By a report annexed to the present message, the Minister of Finance represents to the Consuls of the Republic, the necessity of repealing the law of the forced loan, and of substituting for it, a war duty of twenty-five per cent. on all contributions levied on land, moveables, and superfluities.

Conformably to Article IX. of the law of the 19th of this month, the Consuls of the Republic now make the formal proposal necessary to authorize you to legislate on this subject.

(By the Consuls of the Republic,)

Roger-Ducos, Bonaparte.

Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, to the French People.

To render the Republic dear to her citizens, respectable in the eyes of foreigners, formidable to her enemies; such are the obligations which we have contracted in accepting the chief magistracy.

The Republic will be dear to her citizens, if the laws and acts of authority be always stamped with the impression of order, justice, and moderation.

Without order, administration is but a chaos; there

can be no finances, no public credit; and the fortune of the state must be ruined with those of individuals. Without justice, there is nothing but factions, oppressors, and victims.

Moderation confers an august character on governments as on nations. It is always the companion of strength, and of the long duration of social institutions.

The Republic will be imposing to strangers, if she take care to respect, in their independence, the basis of her own—if her engagements, originating in wisdom and formed with candour, be fulfilled with fidelity.

Finally—She will be formidable to her enemies, if her armies and fleets be powerfully composed; if every one of her defenders be enabled to find a family in the corps to which he may belong, and in that family an inheritance of virtues and glory; if the officer, formed by long studies, obtains by regular promotion the recompense due to his talents and services.

On these principles depend the stability of government, the success of commerce and agriculture, the greatness and prosperity of nations.

In thus declaring them, we have designated the rule by which we ought to be judged. People of France, we have declared our duties; it will be your part to tell us whether we have fulfilled them.

BONAPARTE.

The First Consul to the Conservative Senate.

6 Nivose.

Senators,

The Consuls of the Republic hasten to inform you that the government is installed. Whatever events may occur, they will employ all means in their power to destroy the spirit of faction, create public spirit, and strengthen the Constitution which is the object of the hopes of the French people. The Conservative Senate will be animated by the same spirit, and by its unanimity with the Consuls, the plans of the evil disposed, if there exist any such in the first bodies of the state, will be disconcerted.

The First Consul, Bonaparte.

PROCLAMATION

Of the First Consul to the Inhabitants of the Departments of the West.

An impious war threatens to ravage, a second time, the departments of the West. The duty of the First Magistrates of the Republic is to arrest its progress, and to extinguish it in its commencement; but they are unwilling to resort to force until they have exhausted all the means of persuasion and justice.

The authors of these troubles are traitors sold to the English, and become the tools of that nation's fury; or robbers, who only seek in civil dissensions the objects and the impunity of their crimes.

To such men government owes no remonstrance, no declaration of its principles.

But there are citizens dear to the nation, who have been seduced by the artifices of the former; to such citizens true information and explanation are due.

Unjust laws have been promulgated and executed; arbitrary acts have alarmed the citizens for their safety and their liberty of conscience. In every direction rash inscriptions on the lists of emigrants have ruined citizens who never abandoned their country, or even their homes; finally, some of the first principles of social order have been violated.

It is to repair the injuries occasioned by these unjust and erroneous proceedings, that a government founded on the sacred basis of liberty, equality, and the Representative system, has been proclaimed and acknowledged by the nation. The constant desire, as well as the interest and glory of the first magistrates whom it has appointed, will be to heal all the wounds of France; and this intention is already proved by the acts which have emanated from them.

Thus the disastrous law of the forced loan, and the

still more disastrous law of hostages, have been repealed: individuals deported without due process of law, have been restored to their country and their families. Every day is and will be marked by acts of justice; the Council of State labours unremittingly in preparing the reformation of evil laws, and a more beneficial arrangement of the public contributions.

The Consuls also declare, that freedom of worship is secured by the Constitution; that no magistrate has power to infringe thereon; that no man is authorized to say to another, *you shall exercise such a worship*, and *only on such a day*.

The law of the 11th of Prairial, year III, which permits to all citizens the use of all buildings destined to religious worship, shall be executed.

All the departments must be equally subjected to the rule of the general laws; but the first magistrates will always extend more particular interest and attention to the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of those departments which have suffered the greatest calamities.

The government is inclined to forgiveness; it will pardon the repentant; its indulgence will be unreserved and absolute: but it will punish all who, after this declaration, shall dare to resist the national sovereignty.

French inhabitants of the western departments, rally around a constitution which confers on the magistrates it has created, the power, as well as the office, of protecting the citizens; a constitution which equally secures them from the instability and the intemperance of the laws

Let those who are anxious for the prosperity of France, separate themselves from men who would persist in misleading them, in order to yield them up to the sword of tyranny, or the yoke of foreigners.

Let the worthy country people return to their homes, and re-commence their useful labours; let them be deaf to the insinuations of those who seek to restore them to feudal servitude.

If, notwithstanding all the measures which the Government has adopted, there should still be found men daring enough to provoke a civil war, the chief magistrates would have only one painful but necessary duty to perform, that of subduing them by force.

But this will never happen. One sentiment will animate all minds; the love of their country. The ministers of a God of peace will be the first to promote reconciliation and concord. Let them address to the hearts of their hearers the language they have learned in the school of their Master. Let them seek those temples which are once more opened to them, and

there, with their fellow citizens, offer expiatory sacrifices for the crimes of war, and the blood which it has caused to flow.

The First Consul, BONAPARTE.

PROCLAMATION

Of the FIRST CONSUL to the Army of the West.

SOLDIERS!

THE Government has taken measures to enlighten the misled inhabitants of the Western departments: it has listened to their complaints. It has redressed their grievances, because their claims were reasonable. Most of the loyal inhabitants have laid down their arms. There now remain none but brigands, emigrants, and men in the pay of England.

Frenchmen in the pay of England! They can only be heartless, dishonoured, vagabond wretches. March against them; you will have no occasion for any extraordinary exertions of valour.

The army is composed of more than sixty thousand brave men. Let me hear shortly that the leaders of the rebels are no more. Let the Generals set an example of activity! Glory is only to be earned by hardships; if it could be gained by living at head-

quarters in great cities, or occupying good barracks; who would be without it?

Soldiers! whatever may be your rank in the army, the national gratitude awaits your services. In order to deserve it, you must defy the inclemency of the seasons, frost and snow, and excessive nightly cold, in order to surprise your enemies at daybreak, and to exterminate those wretches, the disgrace of the French name.

Let your campaign be good and short. Be inexorable to the rebels, but observe strict discipline.

BONAPARTE.

PROCLAMATION

Of the FIRST CONSUL to the Inhabitants of the Departments of the West.

21 Nivose, year VIII.

The Government has done all that reason could suggest to restore peace and tranquillity to your homes. After many long delays, a fresh term of indulgence has been extended to contrition. A great many citizens have acknowledged their errors, and rallied round that Government which, incapable of hatred or vindictiveness, devoid of fear or suspicion,

knows equally well how to protect good citizens, and to punish those who forget their duty to their country.

None can now remain in arms against France, but men devoid of honour and patriotism, perfidious tools of foreign hostility, or brigands infamous for their crimes, whom indulgence itself cannot pardon.

The good of the State, and the safety of its citizens, require that these men should perish by the sword of national power; a farther extension of sufferance would only be a triumph to the enemies of the Republic.

A formidable force awaits only the signal to disperse and destroy these bands of robbers; let that signal be given.

National guards, aid the troops of the line by the efforts of your arms. If you know any partisans of the brigands amongst yourselves, arrest them; let them find no asylum against the soldier who is about to pursue them; and should there be traitors daring enough to receive and protect them, let all such perish together with them.

Inhabitants of the West, on this last effort depends the tranquillity of your country, the safety of your families, the security of your property. At one blow you will level with the earth the villains who plunder you, and the enemy who hires them, and pays them for their crimes.

The First Consul, BONAPARTE.

PROCLAMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

18 Pluviose, year VIII.

THE Consuls of the Republic, conformably to Article V. of the law of the 23d of Frimaire, which appoints the manner in which the Constitution is to be presented to the French people, after having heard the report of the Ministers of Justice, of the Interior, of War, and of Marine,

Proclaim the result of the votes given by the citizens of France on the Constitutional Act.

Out of three million twelve thousand five hundred and sixty-nine voters, one thousand five hundred and sixty-two have rejected the Constitution: three million eleven thousand and seven have accepted it.

The First Consul, BONAPARTE.

EXTRACT from the REPORT of the Minister of General Police respecting the shipwrecked persons at Calais.

FAR be it from me to extenuate the crime of men guilty of offences against their country, or to weaken that sentiment of just indignation which they inspire; but the emigrants shipwrecked at Calais have several times suffered the punishment decreed against the crime of emigration: for death consists, not in the

stroke which deprives us of life, but in the agonies and torments which precede it. During the last four years, these individuals, thrown by tempests upon their native shore, have breathed only the air of the tomb. Whatever, therefore, was their intention, they have expiated it, and are absolved by their wreck.

After hearing this report, the Consuls adopted the following resolution:

The Consuls of the Republic, specially charged with the restoration of order in the interior, after having heard the report of the Minister of General Police;

Considering, 1st, that the emigrants detained in the Castle of Ham, were shipwrecked on the coast of Calais;

2dly, That their case is not within any of the provisions of the laws relating to emigrants.

3dly, That it is not in the spirit of the laws of civilized nations to take advantage of the accident of a shipwreck; to deliver up the unhappy sufferers rescued from the waves, even to the just resentment of the laws; Resolve:

Article I.—The French emigrants wrecked at Calais on the 23d of Brumaire, year IV, and named in the judgment of the Military Commission established at Calais on the 9th of Nivose, year IV, shall be deported out of the territory of the Republic.

II.—The Ministers of General Police and War, are charged, each according to his office, with the execution of the present resolution, which shall be printed in the bulletin of the laws.

(Signed) ROGER-DUCOS, SIEYES, BONAPARTE.

The Minister of General Police,

(Signed,) FOUCHÉ.

LETTER from the Minister of Exterior Relations of the French Republic, to LORD GRENVILLE, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, 5 Nivose, year VIII. of the Republic.

MY LORD,

I DESPATCH, by order of General Bonaparte, First Consul of the French Republic, a courier to London. He is bearer of a letter from the First Consul of the Republic to his Majesty the King of England. I request you to give the necessary orders for enabling him to deliver it immediately into your own hands. This step, of itself, sufficiently bespeaks the importance of the object to which it relates.

Accept, my Lord, the assurances of my highest consideration.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

French Republic. — Sovereignty of the People.— Liberty.—Equality.

BONAPARTE, First Consul of the Republic, to His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland.

CALLED by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the First Magistracy of the Republic, I have thought proper, on commencing the discharge of the duties of this office, to communicate the event directly to Your Majesty.

Must the war, which has for eight years ravaged the four quarters of the world, be eternal? — Is there no room for accommodation?

How can the two most enlightened nations in Europe, stronger and more powerful than is necessary for their safety and independence, sacrifice commercial advantages, internal prosperity, and domestic happiness, to ideas of vain grandeur? Whence is it that they do not feel peace to be the first of wants, as well as the first of glories?

These sentiments cannot be new to the heart of your Majesty, who rules over a free nation, with no other view than to render it happy.

Your Majesty will see in this overture only my sincere desire to contribute effectually, for the second

time, to a general pacification, by a prompt step taken in confidence, and freed from those forms, which, however necessary to disguise the dependence of feeble States, only serve to discover in those which are powerful, a mutual wish to deceive.

France and England may, by the abuse of their strength, long defer the period of its utter exhaustion, unhappily for all nations. But I will venture to say, that the fate of all civilized nations is concerned in the termination of a war, the flames of which are raging throughout the whole world.

I have the honour, &c.

BONAPARTE.

LORD GRENVILLE'S answer to the Minister of Exterior Relations at Paris.

Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

SIR,

I HAVE received and laid before the King the two letters which you have transmitted to me; and his Majesty, seeing no reason to depart from those forms which have long been established in Europe, for transacting business with foreign states, has commanded me, to return in his name, the official answer which I

send you herewith inclosed. I have the honour to be, with high consideration,

Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

GRENVILLE.

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c. at Paris.

NOTE to the Minister of Exterior Relations at Paris.

Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

THE KING has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory.—He has had no other view than that of maintaining, against all aggression, the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack; and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend; nor can he hope that this necessity could be removed by entering, at the present moment, into negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France; since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate, which originally produced the war, and by which it has since been protracted, and, in more than one instance, renewed. The same system, to the pre-

valence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilized nations. For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, (his Majesty's ancient friends and allies,) have successively been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majesty has himself been compelled to maintain an arduous and burthensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdoms. Nor have these calamities been confined to Europe alone; they have been extended to the most distant quarters of the world, and even to countries so remote both in situation and interest from the present contest, that the very existence of such a war was perhaps unknown to those who found themselves suddenly involved in all its horrors. While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shewn that no

defence, but that of open and steady hostility, can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression; and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of stability for property, for personal liberty, for social order, or for the free exercise of religion.—For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such professions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe; and whom the present rulers have declared to have been all, from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of amity and peace. Greatly, indeed, will his Majesty rejoice, whenever it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his Allies have been so long exposed have really ceased; whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity of resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crimes and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction, which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length been finally relin-

quished: but the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his Majesty's wishes, can result only from experience, and from the evidence of facts.

The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and in consideration and respect abroad: such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be both to France and to the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. His Majesty looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his Allies, and to the general safety of Europe.—Whenever he shall judge that

such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of that country, from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his Allies the means of immediate and general pacification. Unhappily no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability. In this situation, it can, for the present, only remain for his Majesty to pursue, in conjunction with other powers, those exertions of just and defensive war, which his regard to the happiness of his subjects will never permit him either to continue beyond the necessity in which they originate, or to terminate on any other grounds, than such as may best contribute to the secure enjoyment of their tranquillity, their constitution, and their independence.

GRENVILLE.

Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

PROCLAMATION

Of the First Consul of the Republic To the French.

People of France,

You are desirous of peace: your government desires it still more ardently than yourselves. Its first views, and the whole course of its measures, have been directed to that object. The English ministry repels it; the English ministry has betrayed the secret of its horrible policy. To dismember France, to destroy her marine and her ports, to efface her from the map of Europe, or to degrade her to the rank of secondary powers, to keep all the nations of the Continent divided, in order to seize on their commerce and enrich themselves with their spoils—these are the detestable advantages for which England scatters her gold, lavishes her promises, and multiplies her intrigues.

But neither the gold, the promises, nor the intrigues of England, will chain down the Continental powers in subjection to her views. They have listened to the voice of France; they know the moderation of the principles by which she is influenced; they will attend to the call of humanity, and the powerful voice of their own interest.

Should it prove otherwise, the government which has not feared to offer and solicit peace will recollect that it is for you to command it. In order to command it, money, steel, and soldiers, are requisite.

Let all hasten to pay their contribution to the general defence; let the young citizens march: it is no longer for the choice of tyrants that they are about to take up arms; it is for the security of all they hold most dear; for the honour of France; for the sacred interests of humanity and liberty. Already the armies have resumed that attitude which presages victory: at the sight of those troops, at that of the whole nation united in their wishes and views, be assured, people of France, that you will have no enemies on the Continent; but should any power still persist to tempt the chance of battles, your First Consul has promised you peace, and he will go and conquer it at the head of those warriors whom he has so often led to victory. With them he will seek again those fields where the memory of their exploits is still fresh; but in the midst of battles he will invoke peace, and he swears to fight only for the happiness of France and the repose of the world.

The First Consul, BONAPARTE.

CONSULAR CONSTITUTION OF 1799.

Law abrogating the Executive Directory, and organizing a Provisional Government.

19th of Brumaire, year VIII. (10th of Nov. 1799.)

THE Council of Ancients, adopting the motives of the Declaration of Urgency, which precedes the resolution hereinafter contained, approves the Act of Urgency.

(Here follows the Declaration of Urgency, and the resolution of the 19th of Brumaire.)

The Council of Five Hundred, considering the situation of the Republic, declares the Urgency, and resolves as follows:

Art. I.—The Directory no longer exists; and the individuals next hereinafter named, on account of the excesses and crimes to which they have constantly addicted themselves, and particularly the greater number of them in the sitting of this morning, are no longer members of the national representation.*

II.—The Legislative Body creates, provisionally, a Consular Executive Commission, composed of citizens Sieyes and Roger-Ducos Ex-Directors, and Bonaparte, General, who shall bear the title of Consuls of the French Republic.

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* Here follow the names, to the number of 61 deputies, of the Council of Five Hundred.

III.—This Commission is invested with the full power of the Directory, and is specially charged with the organization of order in every department of the administration, the restoration of internal tranquillity, and the establishment of an honourable and solid peace.

IV.—It is authorized to send delegates, with definite powers, within the limits of its own.

V.—The Legislative Body adjourns itself to the 1st of Ventose next; it will re-assemble of right at that period in Paris, in its palaces.

VI.—During the adjournment of the Legislative Body, the members will retain their remunerations and their constitutional privileges.

VII.—They may, without losing their quality of Representatives of the people, be employed as Ministers, Diplomatic Agents, Delegates of the Executive Consular Commission, or in any other civil functions. They are even invited, in the name of the public good, to accept such functions.

VIII.—Each Council shall, previously to its separation, and in full meeting, select from amongst its members a Committee, composed of twenty-five members.

IX.—The Committees, named by two Councils, shall, upon the formal and necessary proposition of the Executive Consular Commission, make decrees on all urgent objects of police, legislation, and finance.

X.—The Committee of the Five Hundred shall exercise the initiative power; the Committee of the Anciens the approbatory.

XI.—The two Committees are at the same time enjoined to prepare, in the same order of proceeding, and concurrently, the necessary alterations to be introduced into the organic regulations of the Constitution, of which experience has shewn the defects and inconveniences.

XII.—These alterations are to have no other objects than the strengthening, safety, and inviolable conservation of the sovereignty of the French people, the Republic one and indivisible, the Representative System, the Division of Powers, Liberty, Equality, Security, and Property.

XIII.—The Executive Consular Commission may offer them its views on these subjects.

XIV.—Finally, the two Committees will be charged with the preparation of a Civil Code.

XV.—They will sit at Paris, in the palace of the Legislative Body, which they may convoke by an extraordinary summons, for the purpose of the ratification of peace, or in case of more urgent public danger.

XVI.—The present resolution shall be printed, sent by couriers extraordinary into all the departments, solemnly published, and posted in all the communes of the Republic.

After a second reading, the Council of Ancients approves the foregoing resolution.

At Saint-Cloud, 19th of Brumaire, year VIII. of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

The Consuls of the Republic order that the foregoing law shall be published and executed; and that it shall be ratified by the Seal of the Republic.

Done at the National Palace of the Consuls of the French Republic, 20th of Brumaire, year VIII. of the Republic.

ROGER-DUCOS, BONAPARTE, SIEYES.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

Decreed by the Legislative Committees of the Two Councils, and by the Consuls.

22d of Frimaire, year VIII. (13th of December, 1799.)

TITLE I.

Of the exercise of Civil Rights.

Article 1.—The French Republic is one and indivisible.

Its European territory is divided into departments and communal districts *(arrondissemens)*.

2.—Every man born and residing in France, who, having attained the age of twenty-one years, shall have caused his name to be inscribed on the civic register of his communal district, and shall have resided one year on the territory of the Republic, is a French citizen.

3.—A foreigner becomes a French citizen, when, after having attained the age of twenty-one years, and declaring his intention to fix his residence in France, he shall have resided there for ten successive years.

4.—The quality of citizen may be forfeited,

By naturalization in a foreign country.

By the acceptance of offices or pensions under a foreign government.

By affiliation to any foreign corporation which allows of any distinctions of birth.

By condemnation to corporal or infamous punishment.

5.—The exercise of the rights of a French citizen may be suspended by the circumstance of being bankrupt, or immediate heir of a bankrupt detaining the whole or part of the property inherited from such bankrupt, by a gratuitous title.

By the situation of a hired servant, employed in personal or household service.

By being under judicial interdict, accusation, or in contumacy.

6.—To exercise civic rights in a communal district, it is necessary to acquire a domicile therein by a year's residence, and not to have lost it by a year's absence.

7.—The citizens of each communal district will select by their votes such persons amongst them as they think most proper to intrust with public affairs. This will produce a confidential list, containing a number of names equal to one-tenth of the number of citizens entitled to co-operate in forming such list. From this first communal list the officers of the district are to be selected.

8.—The citizens comprised in the communal lists of each department are also to select a tenth part of their number. This will produce a second or departmental list, from which are to be chosen the public officers of the department.

9.—The citizens named in the departmental list are in like manner to designate a certain number from amongst them; hence will result a third list, comprising the citizens of that department eligible to national public functions.

10.—The citizens entitled to co-operate in the formation of one of the lists mentioned in the three preceding Articles, are required, every three years, to re-

place the persons inscribed therein deceased, or absent on any account, save that of the discharge of a public function.

11.—They may, at the same time, withdraw from the lists the names of those persons whom they shall not think fit to continue therein, and replace them by the names of other citizens in whom they may feel more confidence.

12.—No person can be struck out of a list but by the votes of the absolute majority of the persons entitled to assist in forming the list.

13.—A citizen is not withdrawn from one list, merely because his name may not be continued on another list, superior or inferior in degree.

14.—Inscription on a list of persons eligible is only necessary with respect to those of the public functions for which this condition is expressly required by the Constitution or by the Law. The lists of eligibles shall be formed, for the first time, in the course of the year IX.

The citizens who shall be named for the first formation of the constituted authorities, will form a necessary part of the first lists of eligibles.

TITLE II.

Of the Conservative Senate.

15.—The Conservative Senate is composed of eighty members, who are chosen for life and cannot be removed; they must be at least forty years of age.

For the formation of the Senate, sixty members are at first to be nominated; this number shall be increased to sixty-two in the course of the year VIII, to sixty-four in the year IX, and thus shall gradually rise to eighty, by the addition of two members in each of the first ten years.

16.—The nomination to the office of a Senator shall be made by the Senate, who shall choose one of three candidates presented: the first by the Legislative Body; the second by the Tribunate; and the third by the First Consul.

The Senate will only have to choose between two candidates, if one of them be presented by two of the three presenting authorities: it is bound to admit any candidate who shall be proposed by all the three presenting authorities at once.

17.—The First Consul, on leaving that office, whether by the expiration of his functions, or by resignation, becomes a Senator, of right and necessity.

The two other Consuls, during the month succeed-

ing the expiration of their functions, may take their places in the Senate, but are not obliged to exercise this right.

They do not possess it when they quit their Consular functions by resignation.

18.—A Senator is for ever ineligible for any other public function.

19.—All the lists made in the departments by virtue of Article 9 are to be addressed to the Senate; they form the national list.

20.—The Senate elects, from these lists, the Legislators, Tribunes, Consuls, Judges of Cassation, and Commissioners for auditing public accounts.

21.—It is to ratify or annul all the acts reported to it as unconstitutional by the Tribunate or Government. The lists of eligibles are comprised amongst these acts.

22.—Definite revenues in national domains shall be assigned for the expenses of the Senate. The annual salary of each of its members is taken out of these revenues, and is equal to a twentieth part of that of the First Consul.

23.—The sittings of the Senate are not public.

24.—Citizens Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, Consuls going out of office, are nominated Members of the Conservative Senate: they will unite with the new Second

and Third Consuls appointed by the present Constitution.

These four Citizens will nominate the majority of the Senate, which will afterwards complete itself, and proceed to the elections intrusted to it.

TITLE III.

Of the Legislative Power.

25.—No new laws shall be promulgated, but such whereof the project has been proposed by the Government, communicated to the Tribunate, and decreed by the Legislative Body.

26.—The projects proposed by the Government are to be drawn up in Articles. In every stage of the discussion on these projects, the Government may withdraw them; it may re-produce them with modifications.

27.—The Tribunate is composed of one hundred members, aged at least twenty-five years; one-fifth of their number is to be renewed every year, and they are to be indefinitely re-eligible, as long as they remain on the national list.

28.—The Tribunate discusses the projects of laws: it votes their adoption, or rejects them.

It sends three orators, chosen from its number, by

whom the motives of its decision expressed on each of these projects are explained and defended, before the Legislative Body.

It lays before the Senate, in cases of violation of the Constitution only, the lists of eligibles, the acts of the Legislative Body and of the Government.

29.—It expresses its recommendations on the laws made or to be made, on abuses to be corrected, on improvements to be introduced in the various parts of the public administration; but never on civil or criminal affairs brought before the Tribunals.

The recommendations it shall make by virtue of the present Article have no necessary effect, and do not render the deliberation of any Constitutional Authority compulsory.

30.—When the Tribunate adjourns, it may name a Committee, of from ten to fifteen members, charged to convoke it again if it shall think expedient.

31.—The Legislative Body is composed of three hundred members, each aged at least thirty years; they are renewable by a fifth every year.

It ought to contain, at least one citizen from each department of the Republic.

32.—A member going out of the Legislative Body cannot return into it until after the lapse of one year;

but he may be immediately elected to any other public function, including that of Tribune, if eligible in other respects.

33.—The session of the Legislative Body begins every year on the 1st of Frimaire, and lasts only four months. It may be convoked extraordinarily by the Government, during the other eight months.

34.—The Legislative Body enacts laws by voting by secret ballot, and without any discussion on the part of its members on the project of laws debated before it, by the orators of the Tribunate and Government.

35.—The sittings of the Tribunate, and those of the Legislative Body, are public: the number of persons present at either is not to exceed two hundred.

36. The annual salary of a Tribune is 15,000 francs: that of a Legislator, 10,000.

37.—Every decree of the Legislative Body is, on the 10th day after its making, promulgated by the First Consul, unless, during that interval, any appeal is made to the Senate, on the ground of unconstitutionality. This appeal cannot be made against laws already promulgated.

38.—The first renewal of the Legislative Body and Tribunate is to take place in the year X.

TITLE IV.

Of the Government.

39.—The government is intrusted to three Consuls, named for ten years, and indefinitely re-eligible.

Each of these is elected individually, with the distinct title, either of First, Second, or Third Consul.

The Constitution appoints, as First Consul, Citizen Bonaparte, ex-Consul Provisional; as Second Consul, Citizen Cambacérès, ex-Minister of Justice; and, as Third Consul, Citizen Le Brun, ex-Member of the Committee of the Council of Ancients.

On this occasion the Third Consul is only named for five years.

40.—The First Consul has particular functions and attributes, in which one of his colleagues may supply his place for a temporary purpose.

41.—The First Consul promulgates the laws: he names and removes at pleasure the Members of the Council of State, the Ministers, Ambassadors, and other principal external agents, the Officers of the Army and Navy, the Members of the Local Administrations, and the Commissioners of Government to the Tribunals. He also appoints the Criminal and Civil Judges, except the Justices of Peace and Judges of the Courts of Cassation; but has no power to remove them.

42.—In the other acts of government, the Second and Third Consuls have a deliberative voice; they sign the register of such acts, to prove their presence; and, if they think proper, they may record their opinions; after which the decision of the First Consul suffices.

43.—The salary of the First Consul is to be 500,000 francs in the year VIII. The salary of each of the other Consuls to be equal to three-tenths of that of the First Consul.

44.—The Government proposes laws, and makes the regulations necessary for securing their execution.

45.—The Government directs the receipts and expenses of the state, according to the annual law which determines their amount respectively; it superintends the coinage of money, of which the law alone orders the issue, and fixes the title, weight, and form.

46.—If the Government is informed that any conspiracy is formed against the State, it may decree warrants to bring before it, and to arrest, such persons as are supposed to be the authors or accomplices of such conspiracies. But unless within ten days after their arrest, such persons be set at liberty, or regularly proceeded against, it shall be deemed a crime of arbitrary detention in the Minister who signed the warrant.

47.—The Government provides for the internal security and external defence of the State; it distributes

the military and naval forces, and regulates their application.

48.—The national guard, in actual service, is subjected to the rules of public administration; the sedentary national guard is subject only to the law.

49.—The Government keeps up political relations abroad; conducts negotiations; makes preliminary stipulations; signs, causes to be signed, and concludes, all treaties of peace, alliance, truce, neutrality, commerce, and other conventions.

50.—Declarations of war, and treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, are proposed, discussed, decreed, and promulgated as laws. But the discussions and deliberations on these subjects, both in the Tribunate and Legislative Body, are to be in a secret committee when required by the Government.

51.—The secret articles of a treaty cannot be destructive of the apparent articles.

52.—The Council of State is charged, under the direction of the Consuls, with drawing up the projects of laws and regulations of public administration, and with the resolution of difficulties which may arise in the business of administration.

53.—The speakers to be instructed to address the Legislative Body in the name of the Government, are always to be chosen out of the Council of State.

The number of these speakers to be employed for the defence of any one law is not to exceed three.

54.—The Ministers procure the execution of the laws, and regulations of public administration.

55.—No act of government can be effectual unless signed by a Minister.

56.—One of the Ministers is specially intrusted with the administration of the public money; he secures the receipts, and orders the transfers of funds and the payments authorized by law. He can do no act unless by virtue, 1st, of a law, and that as far only as the funds appointed by law for a particular species of expense will extend: 2dly, of a resolution of the Government: 3dly, of an order signed by a Minister.

57.—Detailed accounts of each Minister's expenses, signed and certified by himself, are rendered public.

58.—The Government can only elect or continue as Counsellors of State, or Ministers, citizens whose names are inscribed in the national list.

The local administrations established either for each communal district, or for more extensive portions of territory, are subordinate to the Ministers. No one can become or remain a member of these administrations, who is not entered or continued in one of the lists mentioned in articles 7 and 8.

TITLE V.

Of the Tribunals.

60.—Each communal district has one or more justices of peace, elected immediately by the citizens for three years.

Their principal duty is to reconcile the parties, whom they are to recommend, in case they cannot agree, to submit their causes to arbitration.

61.—In civil cases there are tribunals of first resort, and tribunals of appeal. The law determines the organization of both, their competence, and the districts within their respective jurisdictions.

62.—In cases of crimes to which corporal or infamous punishments are annexed, a first jury allows or rejects the accusation: if it be admitted, a second jury investigates the fact, and the judges forming a criminal tribunal apply the punishment. Their judgment is without appeal.

63.—The office of public accuser to a criminal tribunal is held by a commissioner of Government.

64.—Offences to which no corporal or infamous punishments are attached, are tried by tribunals of correctional police, saving an appeal to the criminal tribunals.

65.—There is a tribunal of cassation, for the whole

Republic, which pronounces on the appeals in cassation against judgments in the last resort given by the tribunals, on appeals in cases of removal from one tribunal to another on account of lawful suspicion or public safety, on exceptions to the competence of an entire tribunal.

66.—The tribunal of cassation does not enter into the merits of suits; but annuls judgments given on proceedings in which the forms of law have been violated, or which contain any express contravention of the law; and it sends back the merits of the suit to the tribunal to which the cognizance thereof belongs.

67.—The judges composing the tribunal of first resort, and the commissioners of government appointed to these tribunals, are to be selected from the communal or departmental lists.

The judges composing the tribunal of appeal, and the commissioners appointed to them, are to be taken from the departmental list.

The judges composing the tribunal of cassation, and the commissioners appointed to that tribunal, are to be selected from the national list.

68.—All the judges, except the justices of peace, retain their functions during life, unless they are condemned for misdemeanour, or cease to be kept on the list of eligibles.

TITLE VI.

Of the responsibility of Public Functionaries.

69.—The functions of Members of the Senate, Legislative Body or Tribunate, of Consuls and Counsellors of State, imply no responsibility.

70.—Personal offences carrying corporal or infamous punishment, committed by any member of the Senate, Legislative Body, or Council of State, are to be prosecuted before the ordinary tribunals, after this prosecution has been authorized by a deliberation of the body to which the accused belongs.

71.—Ministers accused of private offences carrying corporal or infamous punishment, are considered as members of the Council of State.

72.—The Ministers are responsible, 1st, for every act of the Government signed by them, and declared unconstitutional by the Senate; 2dly, For the non-execution of the laws and regulations of public administration; 3dly, For the particular orders they may give, if contrary to the Constitution, laws, or regulations.

73.—In the case mentioned in the foregoing article, the Tribunate denounces the Minister by an act, on which the Legislative Body deliberates in the usual forms,

after having heard or called the party denounced. The Minister decreed to be tried by the Legislative Body, is to be tried by a High Court, without appeal or right of cassation.

The High Court is composed of judges and jurors. The judges are chosen by the Tribunal of Cassation from amongst its members: the jurors are selected from the national list: the whole according to forms determined by law.

74.—The civil and criminal judges are to be prosecuted for delinquencies in their functions before the tribunals, to which the Court of Cassation is to send them, after annulling their acts.

75.—The agents of Government, except the Ministers, cannot be prosecuted for acts relative to their functions, except by virtue of a decision of the Council of State: in that case the prosecution is to take place before the ordinary tribunals.

TITLE VII.

General Dispositions.

76.—The house of every person inhabiting the French territory is an inviolable asylum.

During the night no person has a right to enter it,

except in case of fire, inundation, or request from the inside of the house.

During the day it may be entered for a special object determined either by a law, or by an order emanating from a public authority.

77.—The warrant authorizing the arrest of any person, cannot be lawfully executed, unless, 1st, it express formally the motives of the arrest, and the law in execution whereof such arrest is ordered: 2dly, that it emanate from a functionary formally endowed by law with this power: 3dly, that it be notified to the person arrested, and copy thereof be left with him.

78.—No keeper or gaoler can receive or detain any person without first transcribing in his register the instrument ordering the arrest: this instrument should be either a mandate given in the forms prescribed by the preceding Article, or an order of caption of the body, or a decree of accusation, or a judgment.

79.—Every keeper and gaoler is obliged, notwithstanding any order to the contrary, to produce the person detained to the civil officer intrusted with the police department of the house of detention, whenever required so to do by such officer.

80.—The production of the person detained, cannot be refused to his relations and friends bearing the order

of the civil officer, unless the keeper or gaoler produce a judge's order for detaining the prisoner in close custody.

81.—All persons who, not having been lawfully invested with the power of arresting, or causing to be arrested, shall give, sign, or execute the arrest of any person whomsoever; all persons who, even in case of arrest according to law, shall receive or detain the person arrested in any place of detention not publicly and legally designated as such; and all keepers and gaolers who shall act contrary to the provisions of the three preceding Articles; shall be deemed guilty of the crime of arbitrary detention.

82.—All rigour used in arrests, detentions, or executions, other than such as is authorized by law, is criminal.

83.—All persons have a right to address private petitions to all constituted authorities; and especially to the Tribunate.

84.—The public force is essentially obedient; no armed body can deliberate.

85.—The crimes of soldiers are submitted to special tribunals, and to particular forms of judgment.

86.—The French nation declares that pensions shall be granted to all soldiers wounded in defence of the nation, as well as to the widows and children of soldiers

who are killed in the field of battle, or die in consequence of their wounds.

87.—National rewards shall be decreed to the warriors who shall have performed brilliant services in fighting for the Republic.

88.—A national institute is charged to promote discoveries, and to advance the sciences and arts.

89.—A committee of national accounts shall regulate and verify the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the Republic. This committee is composed of seven members chosen by the Senate from the national list.

90.—No constituted body can deliberate but in a session, in which at least two-thirds of its members must be present.

91.—The government of the French Colonies is determined by special laws.

92.—In case of an armed revolt, or of commotions menacing the safety of the state, the law may suspend, for a definite period, in a specified place, the power of the Constitution.

This suspension may be provisionally declared in the same cases, by a decree of the Government, the Legislative Body being in recess, provided that body be convoked anew at the shortest possible interval, by an Article of the same decree.

93.—The French nation declares that in no case will it permit the return of those natives of France, who, having abandoned their country since the 14th of July, 1789, are not comprised in the exceptions contained in the laws enacted against emigrants; it prohibits all new exceptions on this point.

The property of emigrants is irrevocably confiscated to the profit of the Republic.

94.—The French nation declares that after a sale of national property lawfully consummated, whatever may be its origin, the lawful purchaser cannot be dispossessed; saving the claims of third parties, if any, to be indemnified out of the public treasure.

95.—The present Constitution shall be forthwith offered to the acceptance of the French people.

Done at Paris, the 22d of Frimaire, year VIII. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

LAW regulating the manner in which the Constitution shall be presented to the French people.

23d of Frimaire, year VIII. (14th December, 1799.)

THE Committee of the Council of Ancients appointed by the Law of the 19th of Brumaire, adopting the motives of the Declaration of Urgency hereinafter contained, approves the Act of Urgency.

(Here follow the Declaration of Urgency, and the Resolution of the 23d of Frimaire.)

The Committee of the Council of Five Hundred created by the law of the 19th of Brumaire last;

Deliberating on the formal proposition, contained in the message of the Consuls dated this day, of regulating by a law the manner in which the Constitution is to be presented to the French people;

Considering that the Constitution intended to substitute for a Provisional Government a definitive and invariable order of things, ought to be offered to the acceptance of the citizens without delay;

That the most suitable and popular mode of acceptation is that which will most promptly and easily satisfy the wants and just impatience of the nation;

Declares the existence of Urgency.

The Committee, after having declared the Urgency, takes the following resolution:

Article I.—Registers of acceptation and non-acceptation shall be opened in each commune: the citizens are invited to subscribe, or cause to be subscribed therein, their votes on the Constitution.

II.—The registers shall be opened at the Secretary's office of each administration, with the clerks of all the tribunals, with all the communal agents, justices of peace and notaries; the citizens are entitled to choose,

at pleasure, between these different places of registration.

III.—The period for voting in each department is fifteen days from the day on which the Constitution shall reach the central administration; and three days for each commune from the day on which the Constitutional Act shall reach the principal place of the canton.

IV.—The Consuls of the Republic are required to regulate and promote the formation, opening, keeping, closing, and forwarding of the registers.

V.—The Consuls are in like manner required to proclaim the results of the votes.

VI.—The present resolution shall be printed.

After a second reading, the Committee of the Council of Ancients approves the above resolution. (23d Frimaire, year VIII.)

The Consuls of the Republic order that the foregoing law shall be published, executed, and ratified with the seal of the Republic.

Done at the national palace of the Consuls of the Republic, the 23d of Frimaire, year VIII. of the Republic.

ROGER-DUCOS, BONAPARTE, SIEYES.

PROCLAMATION

Of the CONSULS of the Republic.

24th of Frimaire, year VIII. (15 Dec. 1799.)

The Consuls of the Republic, to the French People.

A Constitution is presented to you.

It puts an end to the uncertainties which the Provisional Government occasioned, as well in the foreign relations as in the internal and military affairs of the Republic.

It places in the institutions established by it the first magistrates, whose devotion seemed necessary to carry it into effect.

The Constitution is founded on the true principles of representative government, on the sacred rights of property, equality, and liberty.

The powers it constitutes will be strong and durable, as they ought to be for the purpose of securing the rights of citizens, and the interests of the State.

Citizens, the Revolution is fixed to the principles on which it was commenced: it is now at an end.

ROGER-DUCOS, BONAPARTE, SIEYES.

LAW concerning the respective operations and communications of the Authorities charged by the Constitution to concur in the formation of the Law.

19th Nivose, year VIII. (9th January, 1800.)

IN the name of the French people, Bonaparte, First Consul, proclaims as a Law of the Republic the following Decree made by the Legislative Body, the 19th of Nivose, year VIII, on the proposition made by the Government the 12th of the said month, and communicated to the Tribunate the 13th of the same month.

DECREE.

The Legislative Body being assembled to the number of members prescribed by Article 90 of the Constitution:

Having read the project of law concerning the respective operations and communications of the Authorities charged by the Constitution to concur in the formation of the law, proposed by the Government the 12th of the present month of Nivose, and communicated to the Tribunate the following day:

The speakers of the Tribunate, and those of the Government, having been heard in the sitting of the 19th of Nivose; and the votes collected by secret ballot,

Decrees,

Article 1.—When the Government has resolved that the project of a law shall be proposed, it is to inform the Legislative Body thereof by a message.

2.—The Government appoints the day on which it thinks proper that the discussion on the project of law shall be opened.

3.—One of the speakers of the Council of State having read to the Legislative Body the project of law, and explained its motives, deposits in the office three copies thereof.

4.—On one of these copies a memorial is to be made of the proposition of the law: it is then to be transmitted, signed by the president and secretaries, to the speaker or speakers of the Government.

5.—One of the remaining copies is to be deposited in the archives of the Legislative Body.

6.—The third copy is to be addressed, without delay, by the Legislative Body to the Tribunate.

7.—On the day appointed by Government, the Tribunate will send its speaker to the Legislative Body to make known its sentiments on the proposition of law.

8.—If on the appointed day the Tribunate require a prorogation of delay, the Legislative Body, after hearing the speaker or speakers of Government, will

pronounce whether or not there are grounds for the prorogation required.

9.—If the Legislative Body decide that there is ground for the prorogation, the Government proposes a new delay.

10.—If the Legislative Body decide that there is no ground for the prorogation, the discussion is to be opened.

11.—If the Tribunate offer no observation on the project of law, it is considered as having consented to the proposition.

12.—The Bureau of the Legislative Body cannot close the discussion, either on the propositions of law, or on demands of new delay, until each of the speakers of the Government and Tribunate shall have been heard once, if he demand it.

13.—To place the Government in a situation to deliberate whether or not there be ground for withdrawing the project of law, the speakers of Government may at all times demand an adjournment, which cannot be denied them.

14.—The Legislative Body votes, in all cases, in the following manner: two urns are placed on the Bureau; a secretary calls over the *appel nominal* of the voters; as fast as they appear at the Bureau, another secretary delivers to each a white ball, intended to signify *Aye*,

and a black ball, intended to signify *No*. Only one of the urns is intended to receive the votes, the useless balls are thrown into the other. When the *appel* is over, the secretaries open the ballotting urn before the assembly, and count the votes; the President declares the result.

Let the present law be ratified by the seal of the State, inserted in the bulletin of the laws, and inscribed in the registers of Judicial and Administrative Authorities; the Minister of Justice is charged to see to the publication thereof.

At Paris, 29th Nivose, year VIII. of the Republic.

BONAPARTE, First Consul.

PROCLAMATION

Of the CONSULS of the Republic.

18th Pluviose, year VIII. (7th Feb. 1800.)

THE Consuls of the Republic, in conformity to Article V. of the law of the 23d of Frimaire, which regulates the manner in which the Constitution should be presented to the French people; after having heard the report of the Ministers of Justice, of the Interior, at War, and of Marine,

Proclaim the result of the votes given by the French citizens on the Constitutional Act:

Out of three million twelve thousand five hundred

and sixty-nine voters, one thousand five hundred and sixty-two have rejected, three million eleven thousand and seven have accepted the Constitution.

The Consuls of the Republic decree,

Art. 1.—The result of the votes given on the Constitution shall be proclaimed, published, and posted in all the Communes of the Republic.

2.—A national festival on the acceptation of the Constitution shall be celebrated in all the Communes, consecrated to the union of French citizens. This festival shall be celebrated in the decade following the complete pacification of the Western departments.

Paris, 19th Ventose, year VIII. (20th March.)

TO THE YOUTH OF FRANCE

THE First Consul receives many letters from young Citizens eager to prove to him their attachment to the Republic, and the desire they feel to concur with him in the efforts he is about to make to conquer peace. Affected by their self-devotion, he receives the assurances of it with the most lively interest. Glory awaits them at Dijon. When he sees them assembled under the colours of the Army of reserve, he proposes to thank them, and to applaud their zeal.

BONAPARTE.

Paris, 12 Germinal, year VIII. (April 1800.)

To General Berthier, Minister at War.

The military talents of which you have given so many proofs, and the confidence of the Government, call you to the command of an army.* You have during the winter re-organized the war administration: you have provided, as well as circumstances would admit, for the wants of our armies: it now remains for you to lead our soldiers to victory during the spring and summer: this is the effectual way to attain peace and establish the Republic.

Accept, I entreat you, Citizen General, the assurance of the entire satisfaction of Government with your conduct in the Ministry.

Bonaparte.

Head Quarters, Martigni,
28 Floreal, year VIII. (18th May, 1800.)

To the Minister of the Interior.

Citizen Minister,

I am at the foot of the High Alps, in the middle of the Valais.

The Great Saint-Bernard presented many obstacles, which were surmounted with that heroic courage which distinguishes French soldiers under circum-

* That of the Army of Reserve, to which he was appointed by a decree transmitted with the letter.

stances of every description. A third of the artillery is already in Italy; the army is descending with great expedition; Berthier is in Piedmont; in three days the whole will have passed.

Head Quarters, Milan.
20th of Prairial, year VIII. (9th June, 1800.)

To the two CONSULS remaining at Paris.

You have seen, Citizen Consuls, by the letters of General Melas, subjoined to my former letter, that the same day on which the order to raise the blockade of the City of Genoa reached General Ott, General Massena pressed by the absolute want of provisions, demanded a capitulation. It seems that General Massena has ten thousand serviceable soldiers; General Suchet has almost as many: if these two corps have, as I expect, effected a junction between Oneglia and Savona, they may enter Piedmont rapidly by the Tanaro, and may be very useful, whilst the enemy will be obliged to leave some troops in Genoa.

The greater part of the army is now at Stradella. We have a bridge at Placenza, and several ferry-boats opposite Pavia. Orsi, Novi, Brescia, and Cremona, are in our possession.

You will find subjoined several bulletins and intercepted letters, which you will probably think it expedient to publish. I salute you. BONAPARTE.

Head Quarters, Broui, 21st of Prairial, year VIII.
(10th of June, 1800.)

To Citizen PETIET, Counsellor of State.

WE had yesterday a very brilliant action. Without exaggeration, the enemy had 1500 men killed, and twice that number wounded; we made 4000 prisoners, and took five pieces of cannon. It was Lieutenant-general Ott's corps, who came from Genoa, by forced marches; he wished to re-open the communication with Placenza.

As I have no time to despatch a courier to Paris, I request you to impart this intelligence to the Consuls by an extraordinary courier.

The army is continuing its march on Tortona and Alessandria.

The whole of the division of the army of the Rhine has arrived; a part of it is already beyond the Po.

BONAPARTE.

Head Quarters, Torre di Garofola, 27th of Prairial, year VIII.
(16th June, 1800.)

To the CONSULS of the Republic.

THE day after the battle of Marengo, Citizen Consuls, General Melas sent to my advanced posts to demand permission to send General Zach to me. In the course of the day we agreed on the convention, of which you will find a copy hereunto annexed.*

* The famous capitulation of Melas, at Alessandria, already inserted.

It was signed in the night by General Berthier and General Melas. I hope the French nation will be satisfied with its army.

BONAPARTE.

Lyons, 10th Messidor, year VIII. (29th of June, 1800.)

To the CONSULS of the Republic.

I HAVE reached Lyons, Citizen Consuls, where I stop to lay the first stone of the front of the *Place Bellecour*, which is about to be rebuilt. This circumstance alone could have retarded my arrival at Paris: but I could not withstand the ambition of accelerating the restoration of this place, which I have seen so beautiful, and which now presents a scene so deplorable. I am led to hope it will be entirely finished in two years.

I trust that before then the commerce of this city, formerly the pride of all Europe, will have resumed its ancient prosperity.

I salute you,

BONAPARTE.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF MEMOIRS.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY S. AND R. BENTLEY, DORSET STREET.

Plan
of the Siege of
TOULON,
surrendered to the Allies August 27th 1707,
and retaken by the French Troops, commanded
successively by Generals Cartaux, Doppet and
Dugommier, on the 19th of December following.
French Troops
Allied Troops
March of the French Troops
March of the Allied Troops
English Miles, 69½ to a Degree.
Common French Leagues 25 to a Degree.
TOULON
Ste Anne
La Seine
Great Road
PENINSULA OF CREPET
Hospital
Arsenal
Mountains of Cambret
Mount Faron



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